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FOREWORD 
The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of 
persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures [...]. 
Article 3(2) TEU 
 recent Eurobarometer poll showed once again that, of all the rights 
associated with European citizenship, respondents are most 
familiar with their right to free movement: 88% are aware that a 
citizen of the European Union has the right to reside in any member state of 
the Union (subject to certain conditions). Almost the same number of 
people (82%) were also aware that if such citizens live in another EU 
country, they have the right to be treated in the same way as nationals of 
that state.1 
Given that many EU citizens will also admit to feeling that they do 
not know much about the EU and how it works, such a level of awareness 
is impressive but it also raises a number of questions. If this is common 
knowledge, why is it often so difficult for people who want to exercise this 
right to be able to do so? Why do so many people administering systems at 
the local level seem to know so little – not even that equal treatment is the 
basic principle?  
The contributions to this publication will answer some of these 
questions and raise a number of others. Comprehension is made difficult 
by a range of legislation which does not knit together easily and can 
therefore be confusing; there are some member states which are 
manipulating the rules in such a way as to make life very difficult for 
individuals, their family and their employers in cross-border situations. 
Kees Groenendijk’s Chapters 1 (“Access for Migrants to Social Assistance”) 
and 2 (“Social Assistance and Social Security for Lawfully Resident Third-
Country Nationals”) demonstrate this very clearly.  
                                                   
1 Flash Eurobarometer 365, 2013. 
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For those coming to the EU from non-EU (third) countries as 
migrants or those seeking international protection, life can also be 
complicated when trying to negotiate issues of entitlement to particular 
benefits, not least because there is an element of discretion applying to 
member states in the EU Directives, as Madeline Garlick’s contribution 
(Chapter 5) concerning asylum seekers and those in need of international 
protection shows. 
The Your Europe advice service currently handles some 17,000 
questions per year that are becoming increasingly complicated and often 
involve the ‘Free Movement Directive’ 2004/38/EC.2 The service estimates 
that about 15% of these queries should really lead to infringement 
proceedings and an EU Rights Clinic has recently been set up to help 
citizens present their cases, in co-operation with a number of non-
governmental organisations around the EU. 
I have been involved in this area since arriving in the European 
Parliament in 1999. I was endowed with the Green Group’s legacy of 
working on Parliament’s position on the modernisation and simplification 
of Council Regulation 1408/71 on the coordination of social security 
between member states.3 The legal base had just changed post-Maastricht 
Treaty and was now to be decided on the basis of unanimity between 
member states and co-decision with the European Parliament; co-decision 
was the new element.  
Like the majority of EU citizens, I had never heard of the Regulation 
but I soon came to appreciate its complexities and importance in people’s 
everyday lives. I was also a member of the European Parliament’s Petitions 
Committee and we would regularly hear from people experiencing 
difficulties – those who had been waiting for months, if not years, to have a 
question settled relating to their pension rights after having lived in more 
than one EU country, or who felt they had been denied unemployment 
benefit having moved from one country to another to be with their spouse, 
to name just two examples. This combination meant that I was seeing real 
                                                   
2 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the member states.  
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons, self-employed persons, and to members of 
their families moving within the Community. 
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examples of how the system should work but was actually failing for 
many. It also meant that we as Parliamentarians could see gaps between 
systems but could do nothing about them as the rules were about national 
systems side-by-side and those nations did not want to build bridges 
between their systems so that people could move easily from one to 
another. In many ways, this is still the case. 
Fortunately, the new Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of 
social security is accompanied by an implementing Regulation 987/2009, 
which includes provision for the electronic exchange of information.4 There 
were those who thought this meant the Commission would be running the 
whole coordination system, but that was maybe wishful thinking! At least 
we should now be able to move away from quite so many pieces of paper 
in unintelligible handwriting that have to be interpreted before healthcare 
bills can be reimbursed cross-border – just one of the more credible reasons 
put forward for delays in payment. The European Health Insurance Card 
(EHIC) has also been a useful innovation, providing standard information 
in a standardised format, which is much easier to use than the old E-111 
form. 
Primarily, the EHIC is for use for “urgent and necessary” treatment 
on the same basis as nationals in the state where treatment is carried out. 
This sometimes leads to its own confusions as EU citizens frequently expect 
that treatment will happen on the same basis as in their own member state. 
In some cases, this comes as a nasty shock if you are used to treatment free 
at the point of delivery, or may deter people from treatment if they expect 
to pay but don’t have to. Rulings of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union have also clarified the situation regarding those who might want or 
need to seek care abroad due to the urgency of their medical situation and 
who cannot be treated within a satisfactory time from a medical point of 
view in their member state of origin. Such requests should not be turned 
down and costs should be carried by the country where the individual is 
insured in the national system. We now have an additional Directive on 
Cross-Border Healthcare clarifying the reimbursement situation for those 
who simply choose to seek treatment in another EU member state when 
                                                   
4 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems and Regulation (EC) 
No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
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they could be satisfactorily be treated in their insuring country: they will 
only be reimbursed up to the cost of treatment in their insuring state.5 
Access to healthcare is crucial for individuals but it is a contested 
right in many of the negotiations between the Council and the Parliament 
in setting legislation, and on the ground when people need care. 
In the negotiations concerning those seeking international protection, 
we have seen some member states argue that only the need for urgent and 
emergency care should be guaranteed in legislation. When discussing the 
so-called Qualifications Directive, for which I was Parliament’s rapporteur, 
we found ourselves in arguments over the wording about issues of mental 
health. There were those who only wanted care guaranteed in cases where 
it could be demonstrated that any mental health problem resulted from the 
trauma of their experience related to the protection claim.6 We know that in 
some member states, mental healthcare provision is under stress, but 
should not the priority be medical need rather than migration status or the 
root causes of a demonstrable problem? Also, how can we justify people 
with mental health problems being viewed as vulnerable in terms of 
reception needs and then finding they cannot get treatment when status 
has been awarded? I hope we found a satisfactory outcome, but it was a 
frustrating debate with the Council. 
Member states will often argue over the issue of costs, but will rarely 
bring figures to the table. Even some of the governments that argue for the 
possibility of restrictions actually deliver quite comprehensive care; they 
appear to want the flexibility to roll back from that position if they so 
choose. 
Even among groups of third-country nationals, we can see differences 
in entitlements. Chapter 4 on “Social Security Rights of Third-Country 
Nationals under the Euro Mediterranean Association Agreements”, by 
Anja Wiesbrock, spells out the consequences of certain bilateral EU 
arrangements and the problems of trying to bring those up-to-date while 
                                                   
5 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 
2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. 
6 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of 
the protection granted. 
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still maintaining the acquired rights of individuals, as does Paul 
Minderhoud in Chapter 3 on “The Significance of Decision 3/80 of the 
EEC-Turkey Association Council”. In recent legislation on migration, some 
of us in the European Parliament have been trying to ensure that all third-
country nationals have access to social security on the same basis as 
nationals, in line with the European Council’s 1999 Tampere Conclusions. 
Regulation 883/2004 has provided the definition of what is meant by core 
social security rights. In most EU member states, third-country nationals 
working in a cross-border situation are today covered by the Regulation 
1231/2010, except in the UK which is keeping the earlier Regulation 
859/20037, applying to employed and self-employed persons, as well as 
their family members.8 Denmark is not covered by either Regulation. The 
fact that the UK and Ireland have a variable opt-in/out attitude to EU 
legislation concerning those in need of international protection and also 
concerning non-EU nationals with regard to social security matters 
provides a further layer of complexity. We have yet to see national systems 
work easily for family and partners of EU nationals coming from outside 
the EU; there is a certain irony, and sadness, in some couples being told 
that they have a better chance of living together as a couple in another 
member state rather than in the country of origin of the EU national.  
We are also seeing an interplay developing between access to 
healthcare under the state system and the Free Movement Directive. In 
2007, when transposing Directive 2004/38/EC, France removed the right 
for non-economically active residents from other EU member states to state 
healthcare, not only for new residents but existing ones. The latter 
complained to the Commission and the European Parliament about this 
change in their situation. The French government argued that they had the 
right to do this in order to stop these individuals being a “burden” on their 
system in accordance with the Directive. Following the outcry, the French 
                                                   
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 859/2003 of 14 May 2003 extending the provisions of 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 to nationals of 
third countries who are not already covered by those provisions solely on grounds 
of their nationality. 
8 Regulation (EU) No 1231/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 extending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) 
No 987/2009 to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by these 
Regulations solely on the grounds of their nationality. 
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government reinstated the right to state care for those who had previously 
been covered. 
In the UK, we are now seeing that students who are EU citizens, for 
example, and who have relied on the National Health Service in the UK to 
provide their health cover under Regulation 883/2004 are finding that this 
is used as a reason to deny them permanent residence under Directive 
2004/38/EC, as they are seen as having been a “burden on the state” as 
they did not have private insurance cover. There is no definition of 
“burden” in any quantitative or qualitative sense. Such actions could be 
seen as unreasonable and the Commission is likely to act on this issue, 
which will be welcomed by Parliament. In a recent report on the “Impact of 
the crisis on access to care for vulnerable groups”, for which I am 
rapporteur, the Parliament is asking the Commission to look at the 
interplay between Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38/EC in order 
to clarify where member states are not facilitating the right to free 
movement, but are instead obstructing it. 
Given that the recent Eurobarometer poll shows a majority of citizens 
in all EU nations consider that the free movement of people within the EU 
has economic benefits for their country, it is a pity that some of our national 
governments seem to want to construct increasing barriers. 
This is currently being seen in the actions of four member states – the 
UK, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands – in their stated concern to 
tackle “abuses” of national welfare systems by the social welfare “tourists” 
in a recent letter to the Irish Presidency.9 Those of us who have been active 
in the immigration and asylum field will recognise this sort of language, 
especially coming from these countries. This time it is coming on the back 
of the ending of transition periods towards full free movement for those 
countries that have most recently joined the EU. 
The letter does not come from the ministers responsible for social 
welfare benefits, but from those responsible for immigration matters – the 
Federal Ministers of the Interior of Austria and Germany, the Minister for 
Immigration from the Netherlands and the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department of the UK. The ministers state that: “We are fully committed to 
the common European right to the freedom of movement. We will always 
                                                   
9 Letter to Mr. Alan Shatter, Minister for Justice and Equality (Republic of Ireland), 
President of the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs, May 2013.  
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welcome EU citizens who move to another EU country to work or to take 
up professional training or university studies.”10 
It is therefore clear that there are other citizens who are not so 
welcome. However, the ministers claim that a number of local authorities 
in the EU are under “a considerable strain by certain immigrants (sic) from 
other member states. These immigrants avail themselves of the 
opportunities that freedom of movement provides, without, however, 
fulfilling the requirements for exercising this right.”11 
The ministers then go on to argue that remedies to deal with this 
situation are inadequate and that Article 35 of Directive 2004/38/EC does 
not spell out what measures might be taken or how failure to comply might 
be sanctioned. They wish to work with the Commission to look at actions 
that might be taken: “The sanctions to be discussed in this context include 
expulsion and bans on re-entry for appropriate periods.”12 
I hope these ministers will read the two chapters by Kees 
Groenendijk and Chapter 7 by Corrado Giulietti and Martin Kahanec in 
this book, in particular the findings concerning figures and their 
assessment of the empirical evidence showing there is no evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that welfare is a strong magnet for immigrants. 
When trying to track down the basis for some of these claims about 
pressure and abuse in Germany and the UK, my own political group 
(Greens/EFA) has also found it difficult to find substantive examples. This 
has also been my experience when negotiating legislation with member 
states: the issues of potential abuse and costs are frequently there in the 
Council’s arguments but are rarely substantiated with any figures or 
research. If people are not entitled to certain benefits, they should not get 
them – we are back to the issue of the quality of administration, the clarity 
of guidance and the training of the individuals involved. As we have seen, 
many citizens are poorly served but that does not seem to concern 
ministers to the same degree. 
When we read further into the letter, it becomes clear that general 
changes are being sought to deal with a specific group of EU citizens: “We 
call upon the member states of origin to permanently improve the local 
living conditions of those concerned. We also call upon them to make sure 
                                                   
10 Ibid., p. 1. 
11 Ibid., p. 2. 
12 Ibid., p. 3. 
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that the EU funds which have already been set aside for these purposes are 
actually used to benefit those concerned.”13 
I would deduce that this letter primarily concerns EU citizens of 
Roma descent, although that is not explicitly stated. In that case, most 
would agree with the sentiments voiced above; no-one should feel they 
need to leave their country of origin due to discrimination and poverty. 
Certainly, the European Parliament is very concerned that money allocated 
is well spent and should help tackle the many problems experienced by this 
group of citizens. Parliament also wants existing legislation, such as the 
Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment on grounds of race 
or ethnic origin, to be fully implemented and upheld.14 However, I think it 
is essential that those of us concerned with the right to free movement are 
alert to measures to amend it that could introduce draconian penalties in 
order to solve a specific problem which is not the result of the legislation 
itself. The Commission and member states’ governments might do better to 
turn their attention to how to amend the Roma strategy to make it more 
effective and to look at how member states can co-operate to address the 
issues positively. It could be argued that some of the member states 
identifying this as a free movement problem could do much more to tackle 
the racist attitudes in their own countries towards Roma and improve the 
social conditions for that group, which would reduce some of the 
difficulties.15 
However, in terms of social security benefits, movement is not only 
one-way. A number of benefits can be exported from the state responsible 
for insurance when an individual moves elsewhere in the European Union. 
Increased worker mobility is embraced as an idea by all member states and 
job-seekers can take their unemployment benefits with them for a period of 
time – at least three months – but this may not be long enough to find work 
and an extension is being considered. Those entitled to a state pension have 
exported these pension rights, assisting many older EU citizens to live in 
warmer climates or move to be nearer their children, such as the estimated 
                                                   
13 Ibid. 
14 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. 
15 B. Foster and P. Norton (2012), “Educational Equality for Gypsy, Roma and 
Traveller Children and Young People in the UK”, Equal Rights Review, Vol. 8, pp. 
85-112. 
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500,000 UK state pensioners living elsewhere in the EU. For the European 
Parliament, the opportunity for people with disabilities to exercise their 
free movement possibilities has long been an issue of concern. We have 
therefore welcomed the Commission’s action on special non-contributory 
benefits, as explained in Chapter 6 by Rob Cornelissen, who has done so 
much to develop the whole field of free movement through his work at the 
Commission. 
This excellent book demonstrates that legislation concerning free 
movement is still an area of complexity, developing as social security, 
welfare benefits and social rights shift and change within the EU. The 
priority has to be ensuring that it works for people and not against them. 
This requires better administration and willingness on the part of national 
governments to tackle problems effectively rather than trying to reduce the 
scope of existing rights. We would do well to remember that the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights starts with the statement: 
Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected. 
 
Jean Lambert 
Member of the European Parliament 
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PREFACE 
s the financial crisis deepens in a number of member states, the 
stresses on national budgets from increasing social benefit costs are 
also rising. As tax revenues diminish with the rise in 
unemployment, the capacities of national treasuries to fulfil their 
obligations to the unemployed and others receiving social benefits has 
become a matter of contestation. At times such as these, it is common for 
public debate to emerge over who should be entitled to social benefits and 
who should be excluded. These discussions are often set out in terms of 
whether the social benefits system should change in nature from being 
based on a needs assessment to one where there is also an assessment of 
whether the individual deserves public support. In addition or as an 
extension to this public discussion, we find that the re-categorisation of 
people on grounds other than need for the purposes of the social benefits 
system also encourages reflection on whether non-citizens should be 
entitled to social benefits in the host state. It is this aspect of the debate that 
we aim to analyse in this volume. 
The political and legal debate often takes place around questions of 
whether non-citizens have worked in the host state. Have they paid 
contributions and taxes to the contributory and non-contributory social 
benefits system such that they should have access to insurance against risk, 
or should they go ‘home’? If they are encouraged to go to their country of 
nationality, should they be entitled to take with them their social benefits 
from the host state on the basis that they have accumulated contributions 
which are designed to pay for benefits? Or should any benefits paid to non-
citizens in their country of origin be assessed on the basis of the cost of 
living in that country? And if so, should only an amount equivalent to the 
percentage of average income which they would have earned in the host 
state (had they been permitted to stay there) be paid? 
The collection of essays contained in this book examines the main 
policy controversies that have emerged in the EU regarding linkages 
between welfare and migration. Does migration constitute in fact a 
disproportionate burden to member states’ domestic labour markets and 
A
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welfare systems? Should non-citizens be entitled to social benefits in the 
state where they live? Is there objective evidence and statistical data 
indicating abuse of social benefits and increasing financial burdens by non-
citizens, 'social welfare tourism' or the so-called 'welfare magnet’ 
hypothesis, whereby migrants are attracted to countries that provide more 
generous welfare?  
There are five main categories of non-citizens who are captured by 
EU law and policy for the purposes of social benefits: EU citizens living in a 
member state other than that of their nationality; third-country nationals 
(non EU-nationals) who are lawfully resident in the EU; Turkish nationals; 
third-country nationals covered under Association (Euro-Mediterranean) 
Agreements; and asylum seekers and refugees. For each of these groups of 
non-citizens, the book analyses the main debates and the uses of data, 
information and knowledge on their reliance on social benefits. The volume 
concludes with a synthesis of the cross-cutting research findings 
delineating the relationship between migration and social benefits in the 
EU, and a set of policy recommendations addressed to policy-makers.  
 
Prof. Elspeth Guild and Dr. Sergio Carrera 
Brussels 
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1. ACCESS FOR MIGRANTS TO SOCIAL 
ASSISTANCE: CLOSING THE FRONTIERS 
OR REDUCING CITIZENSHIP?  
KEES GROENENDIJK* 
1. Historical alternatives in dealing with the exception to 
the ‘natural’ case 
Rules on access to social assistance have always functioned as an 
instrument to distinguish between those who ‘belong to us’ and for whose 
needs ‘we’ feel responsible, and the ‘others’ who belong elsewhere, for 
whom we do not feel responsible and who we can remove from ‘our’ 
society if they become destitute. Under the 19th century Poor Laws, the 
poor were to be relieved by their own parish or community. Migrants 
presented a problem to this system. Generally, three alternatives were 
available: equal treatment of the migrant poor; removal of the migrant poor 
from the community; or insisting on the community of origin paying for 
relief. “[B]y the late 18th century and early 19th centuries, many parishes in 
the UK allowed non-resident relief. In other words, a migrant’s home 
parish would send money to relieve a pauper who would not then be 
forced to return ‘home’. In the UK in 1802-3, there were nearly 200,000 
individuals being relieved by parishes to which they did not belong.”1 
Within developing nations, birth, religion, residence or settlement were, 
                                                   
* The author wished to express his gratitude to Gisbert Brinkmann, Johannes 
Proksch, Simon Roberts and Bernard Ryan for their kind assistance in obtaining 
access to statistical data and other information on Germany and the UK. 
1 D. Feldman (2006), “The boundaries of welfare”, History in Focus, Institute of 
Historical Research, University of London 
(www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Migration/articles/feldman.html), referring to PP 
1803-4 xiii, Abstract of Answers and Returns... Relative to the Expense and Maintenance 
of the Poor in England, 715. 
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and to a certain extent still are, markers for ‘entitlement’ to assistance. For 
most of the 19th century, that assistance was considered a favour rather 
than a right. “Internal migrants in England under both the Old and the 
New Poor Law posed local authorities problems that were structurally 
similar to those presented to central governments by international migrants 
in the 20th and 21st centuries.”2 On the continent during the 19th and early 
20th centuries, states concluded agreements to deal with the payment for 
relief granted to their destitute nationals living in other states or with the 
expulsion, return and re-admission of those poor nationals.  
In the developing post-1945 welfare states in Western Europe, the 
right to social security benefits was primarily linked to the status of a 
worker, being resident in the state, or to the ‘need’ for the service (in the 
UK’s National Health Service). In his famous essay on “Citizenship and 
Social Class”, T.H. Marshall argued that social rights (equal rights to a 
minimum income and other social services) were the third element of 
citizenship. But who is considered to be and be treated as a citizen? Social 
assistance was awarded to nationals only; non-nationals without 
permission to be on the territory were excluded and were granted social 
assistance in exceptional situations and for a short time only. But to what 
extent should non-nationals with lawful residence be treated as citizens? 
An early and not very generous answer to this question can be found in 
one of the first conventions concluded within the Council of Europe, the 
1953 European Convention on Medical and Social Assistance (no. 14). The 
Convention provided for reciprocal equal treatment of the nationals of the 
State Parties and for a restriction to expel them after five or ten years of 
residence on the grounds that they received social assistance.3 The 
Convention left the State Parties free to expel non-nationals only on the 
grounds that they had applied for social assistance before the end of the 
five years. The scope of the relevant rules was extended by Article 13(4) of 
the 1961 European Social Charter to nationals of all State Parties to the 
Charter and the same Article in the 1996 Revised European Social Charter.4 
Most EU member states have ratified one or both versions of the Charter. 
                                                   
2 Ibid. 
3 Article 1 and Articles 6 to 10 of the European Convention on Medical and Social 
Assistance (CoE Treaty No. 14) concluded on 11 December 1953. Article 4 provides 
that the cost of assistance to a national of any of the Contracting Parties shall be 
borne by the Contracting Party which has granted the assistance. 
4 See also the Appendix to the Revised European Social Charter. 
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2. Social assistance for EU nationals: Becoming and 
remaining citizens 
The first rules on free movement of workers in the EEC provided for equal 
treatment with regard to contributory social security benefits, but these 
rules generally did not cover access to non-contributory social assistance 
for workers or other economically active persons or their family members. 
Only after the case law of the Court of Justice on the definition of ‘worker’ 
ruling that part-time workers earning less than the minimum wage or 
receiving supplementary benefits were also covered (Levin [1982] and 
Hoeckx [1985]) and the extensive interpretation of the equal treatment 
clause with regard to social benefits in Article 7(2) of Council Regulation 
1612/68, were the first steps taken to allow EU migrants (partial) access to 
social benefits.5 In many member states, the gradual establishment of the 
internal market and the abolition of controls at internal borders foreseen for 
1992 raised fears that migrants from other member states would come and 
(mis)use “their honeypot”. Of course, each of the then 12 member states 
considered its own honey pot to be the most attractive. 
The first Directive providing the right of residence for economically 
non-active nationals of other member states granted that right under the 
condition that they themselves and the members of their families “have 
sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance 
system of the host member state during their period of residence”. The 
resources were deemed to be sufficient “where they are higher than the 
level of resources below which the host member state may grant social 
assistance to its nationals”.6 Thus, their right of residence was dependent 
on them not making use of the social assistance system. The Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992 introduced the concept of EU citizenship. Six years later in 
1998, the Court in Martínez Sala held that all lawfully resident EU citizens 
were eligible for equal treatment in social assistance, irrespective of 
                                                   
5 Case 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035 and Case 49/83 Hoeckx [1985] ECR 973; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on the freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community and the workers’ families. 
6 Article 1(1) of Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of 
residence and Article 1(1) of Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the 
right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their 
occupational activity. The latter was replaced by Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 
the Council of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students. 
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whether their right of residence was based on national or on EU law. In 
2001, the Court in the Grzelczyk judgement, relying on the provisions on EU 
citizenship on the prohibition of nationality discrimination and the clause 
in the preamble of the 1990-1993 Directives that “beneficiaries of the right 
of residence must not become an unreasonable burden on the public 
finances of the host member state”, held that a member state could not 
terminate the right of residence of a student of another member state who, 
in his final year for the first time, temporarily received social benefits. 7 
Three years later, the member states unanimously codified this case law in 
the 2004/38/EC Directive on free movement of EU citizens. This Directive 
introduced two relevant innovations: the principle of equal treatment was 
extended to social assistance, and the possibilities to remove EU nationals 
for being in need of social assistance were limited. Except for the first three 
months, during the first five years EU citizens and their family members 
with a right of residence are entitled to equal treatment in terms of social 
assistance as long as they do not become an unreasonable burden on the 
social assistance system of the host member state. After five years of 
residence, EU nationals and their third-country national family members 
acquire a permanent right of residence that can no longer be terminated in 
case of reliance on social assistance.8 The same five-year period was already 
present in the above-mentioned Convention signed by 14 member states of 
the Council of Europe in 1953. 
3. Citizens of other member states and “our honey pot”: 
Stories and facts 
The focus of the recent public debate on access for immigrants to social 
assistance in certain member states is not on migrants from third countries 
but on migrants from other member states. This is nothing new; fears of 
‘welfare tourism’ were expressed in many (but not all) member states at 
each accession of new member states. Before the UK accession, this fear 
was expressed on both sides of the channel. In the UK, it concerned 
                                                   
7 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691 and Case C-148/99 Grzelczyk [2001] 
ECR I-6193. 
8 Articles 24, 14 and 16 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the European Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member 
states. 
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“French and Dutch who are not Europeans” from the former colonies and 
in the Netherlands, the focus was on black Britons.9 When Greece acceded 
to the EEC in 1981, the term ‘welfare tourism’ was used again. The 
establishment of the Internal Market in 1992 and the related abolition of 
controls at the internal borders in the Schengen area again aroused the fear 
in several member states that the nationals of other member states or third-
country nationals living there would come and draw on “their honeypot”. 
In section 3.1 below, we focus on the main features of the debates in three 
member states (Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) and then, in section 
3.2, we present the publicly available facts on the actual use of social 
assistance by nationals of other member states in the same three member 
states. 
3.1 Public and political debate on social assistance for migrants 
The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 again created the fear that 
unlimited labour migration would cause serious problems (e.g. wage 
dumping) for labour markets and potential ‘welfare tourism’ by EU-10 
nationals to the ‘old’ member states. Apart from the considerable extension 
of the personal and territorial scope for free movement within the EU, there 
were two additional sources of fear. First, the 2004 Free Movement 
Directive extended the rights of residence of unemployed EU citizens, 
either as jobseekers or after earlier employment, and the Directive explicitly 
granted nationals of other member states access to social assistance. 
Second, the banking crisis and the resulting economic downturn after 2009 
created political pressure for a reduction of the budget for social benefits, 
justified by the liberal ideology of withdrawal of the state and 
responsibility and self-reliance of the individual. How did those three 
changes (enlargement, Directive 2004/38/EC, and the economic climate) 
affect the debate on access for migrants to social assistance in three member 
states – Germany, the Netherlands and the UK? The policy of these three 
member states regarding the transitional regime varied. In Germany, the 
restrictions of the transitional regime for EU-8 workers ended in May 2011, 
in the Netherlands it ended in May 2007, while the UK granted free access 
to EU-8 workers immediately in May 2004, subject only to an obligation for 
the worker to register with the Home Office. All three member states have 
restricted the free movement of workers from Bulgaria and Rumania (EU-
                                                   
9 W.R. Böhning (1972), The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the 
European Community, London: Oxford University Press, p. 7 and pp. 152-158. 
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2) under the transitional regime starting in 2007 until its very end in 
January 2014. 
Germany 
The use of transitional measures for the full seven years with regard to 
workers from the EU-8 and EU-2 may have been inspired primarily by the 
wish to avoid a large-scale migration of workers from those countries, or 
may have been a response to hostile feelings in part of the population about 
immigration. It has severely reduced the possibilities for EU-8 nationals to 
apply for social benefits in Germany until 2011; for EU-2 nationals this will 
apply until 2014. The derogatory term ‘soziale Hängematte’ (‘social 
hammock’) was used by the press and by right-wing politicians in 
Germany, though not exclusively in relation to foreigners receiving social 
benefits. Repeated publications by academics concluding that the feared 
‘welfare tourism’ by EU-8 workers other EU member states, especially in 
the UK and Sweden, did not materialise in real life10 may have reduced 
these fears in Germany. The debate appears to have focused on the rights of 
jobseekers and unemployed workers from other member states to basic 
jobseekers’ income support as a form of social assistance.11 The debate was 
triggered by case law of the Court of Justice in Collins (2004) and in 
Vatsouras (2009) confirming the right of non-discrimination for jobseekers 
with regard to any “benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access 
to employment in the labour market of a member state”.12 After the Federal 
                                                   
10 For instance, K. Brenke and K.F. Zimmermann (2007), “Zuwanderung aus Mittel- 
und Osteuropa trotz Arbeitsmarktbarrieren deutlich gestiegen”, DIW 
Wochenbericht Vol. 74, No. 44, pp. 645-653; A. Zaiceva and K.F. Zimmermann 
(2008), “Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labor Migration in Europe”, Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 428-452; K.F. Zimmermann (2009), 
“Labor Mobility and the Integration of European Labor Markets”, DIW Berlin 
Discussion Papers No. 862; T.E. Cherkeh, M. Steinhardt and T. Straubhaar (2006), 
“Did the European Free Movement of Persons Residence Directive Change 
Migration Patterns within the EU?”, CESinfo DICE Report, No. 4, pp. 14-19. 
11 For an analysis of this issue in several member states, see F. Wollenschläger and 
J. Ricketts (2012), “The Situation of Jobseekers under EU Law on Free Movement: 
Residence Rights of Jobseekers and ‘Vatsouras’ Benefits – National Practices and 
Legislation”, Report for the European Network on Free Movement of Workers.  
12 Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703 and Cases C-22/08 and 23/08 Vatsouras 
[2009] ECR I-4585. 
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Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) had ruled that the exclusion of jobseekers 
from other member states was contrary to the equal treatment clause in the 
1953 European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, Germany 
filed a declaration in December 2011 with the Council of Europe in order to 
exclude certain forms of social assistance from the scope of that 
Convention. The aim of this declaration by the German government was to 
avoid nationals from EU member states that were also party to the old 
Council of Europe Convention claiming equal treatment under the 
Convention and the right of residence in Germany under Directive 
2004/38/EC. The declaration mentioned two forms of social assistance: the 
basic income support for jobseekers regulated in Book Two of the Social 
Code (SGB), and the social assistance of Book Twelve of the Social Code.13 
A few months later, the press reported that jobseekers from other member 
states were still entitled to a form of social assistance not covered by the 
declaration shortly after arrival in Germany.14 The real debate on so-called 
Armutseinwanderung (poverty immigration) from Bulgaria and Romania in 
the serious press started only in early 2013.15 A leading Dutch newspaper 
reported on this debate under the headline: “German politicians see poor 
Roma everywhere”.16 
The Netherlands 
Since the accession of the EU-10 to the EU, Dutch politicians of all main 
parties have voiced worries about workers from those countries applying 
for unemployment benefits or social assistance. In the political debate on 
                                                   
13 Declaration in a letter from the German Permanent Representative of 15 
December 2011 
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=014&C
M=8&DF=30/12/2012&CL=ENG&VL=1). 
14 S. Von Borstel and M. Hollstein (2012), “EU-Ausländer mit Anspruch auf 
deutsche Sozialhilfe”, Die Welt, 4 May. 
15 With headlines such as “Association of Municipalities expresses concerns on 
poverty immigration” and “Federal Minister of Interior Friedrich takes problems 
with poverty immigration very serious” in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 14 
and 16 February 2013, see also W. Frenz (2013), “‘Armutseinwanderung’ zwischen 
EU-Freizügigkeit und Menschenwürde”, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, Vol. 66, No. 
17, pp. 1210-1212. 
16 F. Vermeulen (2013), “Duitse politici zien overal arme Roma”, NRC-Handelsblad, 
22 March.  
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the introduction or extension of the transitional regime for workers, this 
issue was highlighted as one of the negative effects of introducing free 
movement. From the reports commissioned by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, almost every other year since 2005, it appeared that the actual 
number of EU-8 nationals receiving benefits was rather small, both in 
absolute and relative terms. In 2004, nationals from EU-8 states accounted 
for 0.2% of all persons receiving unemployment benefits and 0.3% of those 
receiving social assistance in the Netherlands.17 The Minister of Social 
Affairs then began to stress that the number of applicants for benefits was 
growing without relating the increase to the rapid growth in the number of 
EU-8 workers and other residents from those countries in the Netherlands. 
The most recent official statistical data on the use of benefits by persons 
from other EU countries are based on their country of birth, not their 
nationality. The numbers again are higher, partly because Dutch nationals 
born elsewhere in the EU and naturalised EU migrants are now included. 
Among the Dutch population, this issue apparently draws less attention: 
most of the 40,000-plus complaints registered on the internet hotline for 
complaints about EU-10 nationals run by Geert Wilders’ PVV party in 2012 
related to other issues: “nuisance, drunkenness or noise” (60%), “they take 
away our jobs or houses” (16%) and “criminality” (14%).18  
Since 2004, subsequent Dutch governments have proposed or 
introduced policy measures reducing or ending the export of social security 
benefits for third-country nationals returning to their home country and 
reducing or excluding EU-10 workers, especially Polish and EU-2 workers, 
from unemployment benefits and social assistance. The following measures 
were proposed in 2010-12 by members of the minority government that 
relied on the votes of Geert Wilders’ party: amending Regulation 883/2004 
so that periods of employment in another member state no longer have to 
be taken into account for the right of EU workers to unemployment 
benefits; introducing a special check by the immigration authorities on the 
rights of residence of EU nationals applying for social assistance; stricter 
rules on the expulsion of all non-nationals applying for social assistance; 
                                                   
17 Ph.J. Muus (1992) “Nederland: Internationale migratie, arbeidsmarkt en sociale 
zekerheid”, in Ph. J. Muus, C.A. Groenendijk and P.E. Minderhoud (eds), Migratie, 
Arbeidsmarkt en Sociale Zekerheid, The Hague: SER, p. 33. 
18 “40.000 klachten bij PVV-meldpunt over Polen”, Trouw, 13 December 2012. The 
large majority of entries at the hotline voiced criticism on the existence of the 
hotline.  
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limiting the right of residence of EU jobseekers to three months; and 
introducing the requirement that applicants for social assistance pass a 
Dutch language test.19 The language test returned in the October 2012 
coalition agreement of the current conservative (VVD) and social-
democratic (PvdA) government, supplemented by a seven-year residence 
requirement for nationals of other member states and third countries 
applying for social assistance. This residence requirement is incompatible 
with Directive 2004/38/EC and Directive 2003/109/EC, since both 
Directives provide for national treatment and a permanent right of 
residence after five years.20 This proposal would thus require an 
amendment to both Directives, illustrating the highly symbolic character of 
the policy intentions. The Dutch language requirement for social assistance, 
according to the coalition agreement, should apply “equally for nationals of 
third countries, EU nationals and Dutch nationals.” With regard to 
nationals of other member states and long-term resident third-country 
nationals, the language requirement would be a clear example of indirect 
discrimination on the basis of nationality. If the language test were not 
strictly applied to Dutch nationals too, excluding illiterate Dutch nationals 
from social assistance, it would even be direct discrimination on the basis 
of nationality. Moreover, the new language test would primarily be a 
barrier for Dutch nationals of immigrant origin, who make up a large share 
of the actual recipients of social assistance, and would come at the time 
when the government has ended the payment for their language courses.  
The United Kingdom 
Apart from occasional stories in the popular media about housing benefits 
paid to migrants from outside the EU, who often turn out to be refugees, 
the focus is on migrants from the new member states. In March 2004, the 
then UK Home Secretary David Blunkett set the tone of the policy and the 
debate on migrants from the EU-8 with the statement that while “hard 
working immigrants are welcome. Benefit tourists are not. […] That is why 
the Government is putting in place a package of measures to prevent 
                                                   
19 See letters of the Minister of Social Affairs to the Parliament of 14 April 2011 and 
17 April 2012, Tweede Kamer 29407, nos. 118 and 147. 
20 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents. 
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people who are not working from accessing benefits.”21 The UK 
government organised an information campaign that, according to the 
minister, communicated a simple message: “You can come to the UK to 
work, if you register, but you cannot claim benefits.”22 This policy sends the 
message to the British public that many EU-8 nationals intended to come to 
the UK to claim benefits rather than to work. It ignores that EU-workers 
pay taxes and national insurance contributions in the UK and are entitled 
under EU law to social benefits if they happen to lose a job and are unable 
to find a new one immediately. 
After 2004, Polish and other EU-8 workers no longer needed a work 
permit in the UK, but they had to register with the Home Office Worker 
Registration Scheme to be issued with a certificate that allowed them to 
work legally. Employers had to carry out identity checks and it was a 
criminal offence to employ an EU-8 worker who had not registered. In 
1994, the UK introduced a habitual residence test for several income-based 
benefits (subsequently extended to new means-tested benefits), requiring a 
claimant to prove that they have genuine links with the UK. On the day of 
the accession of the EU-8 countries, the UK introduced a further test for 
income-related benefits: a claimant also has to have a “right to reside” in 
the UK or Ireland under UK or EU law. The aim of the new test is to 
“safeguard the UK’s social system from exploitation by people who wish to 
come to the UK not to work but to live off benefits”23 The effect of this test 
is that an EU-8 worker who is obliged to register under the Worker 
Registration Scheme and loses his or her job due to any reason, even illness 
or involuntary unemployment, also loses the right to reside in the UK and 
thus is no longer entitled to income-based benefits, such as Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, Housing Benefit or Council Tax Benefit, until he or she has 
completed five years of lawful residence in the UK and has acquired a 
permanent right of residence under Directive 2004/38/EC.24  
                                                   
21 Quoted by S. Roberts (2008) “Pracowici imigranci mile widziani: zabezpieczenie 
spoleczne polskich pracowników w zjednoczonym królestwie wielkiej brytanii i 
irlandii”, Polityka Społeczna, Special Edition, December (S. Roberts (2008), “‘Hard 
working immigrants welcome’: Social security for Polish migrants in the UK”, 
Polityka Spoleczna, Special Edition, December.) 
22 Ibid., as quoted by Roberts (2008). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Philip Larkin published three articles on this new test and its effects: P. Larkin 
(2005), “The Limits to European Social Citizenship in the United Kingdom”, 
 
ACCESS FOR MIGRANTS TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE  11 
When in 2011 the European Commission started an infringement 
procedure against the UK because it held the new right to reside test to be 
in violation of Directive 2004/38/EC, the UK government reacted 
vehemently with efforts to mobilise other member states in protest against 
the Commission’s action. Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith 
called the Commission’s decision “provocative” because it could mean “the 
British taxpayer paying out over £2 billion extra a year in benefits to people 
who have no connection to our country and who have never paid in a 
penny in tax.”25 A year later, the minister stated that the likely cost to UK 
taxpayers of allowing more foreigners to claim benefits would be 92% 
lower than previously claimed (£155 million rather than £2 billon), a figure 
he still described as “enormous.”26 The Commission’s infringement 
procedure against the UK probably forced the minister to have a more 
serious look at the scope of the issue. In a recent speech on the immigration 
system, the UK Home Secretary Theresa May said: “We can be smarter 
about the benefits and services we provide for foreign nationals.”27 
Apparently, there is little debate in the media or among leading politicians 
about improving access to benefits to those non-nationals who actually are 
excluded. 
3.2 Data on actual reliance on social assistance by non-nationals 
in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK 
Data on the actual use of social assistance by non-national residents are 
scant and not easily accessible. Moreover, comparisons between the 
                                                                                                                                 
Modern Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 435–447; P. Larkin (2007), “Migrants, social 
security, and the ‘right to reside’: a licence to discriminate?”, Journal of Social 
Security Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 61-85; P. Larkin (2009), “A policy of inconsistency 
and hypocrisy: United Kingdom social security policy and European citizenship” 
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 33-45. 
25 I. Duncan Smith (2011), “Brussels poses serious threat to our welfare reforms”, 
Daily Telegraph, 30 September 2011; and D. Martin (2011), “Revolt over EU benefits 
diktat: 12 nations join UK fight to curb welfare tourism free-for-all”, Daily Mail, 1 
October. 
26 B. Wheeler (2012), “Iain Duncan Smith’s £2bn benefit tourism estimate cut by 
92%”, BBC News UK politics, 14 September 2012. 
27 T. May (2012) “An immigration system that works in the national interest”, 
speech delivered on 12 December 2012 (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-
centre/speeches). 
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member states are hampered by differences in the criteria on which the 
statistics are based and in the social systems. For example, in the UK 
income-related support is granted through tax relief more often than in the 
other two member states. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn 
from the data presented below. 
Germany 
Table 1. Social assistance (Sozialhilfe) for non-nationals in Germany on 31 
December 2011 
 Basic security 
benefits 
(Grundsicherung) 
Supplementary welfare 
allowance (Hilfe zum 
Lebensunterhalt) 
Total recipients 844,030 100% 331,758 100% 
German nationals 715,955 85% 310,124 93.5% 
Non-nationals 128,075 15% 21,634 6.5% 
EU-26 nationals 17,091 2% 4,631 1.5% 
Third-country nationals 110,984 13% 17,003 5% 
Source: Our calculations on the basis of the German Federal Statistical Office 
(Statistisches Bundesamt), Basic security at old age and at reduced earning 
capacity (Grundsicherung im Alter und bei Erwerbsminderung) (Tabellen G1 
und G10_2011_D) and supplementary welfare allowance (Hilfe zum 
Lebensunterhalt) (Tabellen E_01.1_2011_D bis E_01.3_2011_D). 
The legal and political discussion in member states tends to focus on 
the use of social assistance by nationals of other EU member states. In 
Germany, the absolute number of third-country nationals receiving social 
assistance is more than five times higher than the number of EU nationals 
receiving assistance. EU nationals account for almost 40% of the total 
foreign population in Germany. The percentage of all non-national 
residents receiving social assistance is almost twice as high as among 
Germans. In 2010, 1.1% of German nationals and 1.9% of the non-German 
population received social assistance. But only 0.4% of the resident 
nationals of the other 26 member states received social assistance, i.e. 
almost three times fewer than German nationals. In 2011, non-nationals 
accounted for 8.5% of the total population and almost 15% of the persons 
receiving social assistance. Both differences are related to the over-
representation of third-country nationals in the lower income groups. From 
the data of the Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistics Agency) it appears 
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that in 2011, three quarters of the third-country nationals receiving social 
assistance were 65 years or older, whilst the proportion of older people 
among beneficiaries of social assistance was considerably lower among EU 
nationals receiving assistance (65%) and among German nationals (40%).28 
These differences can be explained by the (generally) lower income of 
immigrants and the fact that due to their age at entry to Germany, many 
migrants are not entitled to full old-age pensions.29 The total number of 
non-German recipients of social assistance in the form of Grundsicherung 
doubled between 2003 and 2011, from 64,000 to 128,000.  
The Netherlands 
Table 2. Social assistance (bijstand) for non-nationals in the Netherlands, 
 31 December 2009 
 Recipients of 
social assistance 
Population of 
the Netherlands 
User 
ratio 
Total 316,570 100% 16,575,000 100%  
Dutch nationals 266,800 84% 15,840,000 95.5% 1:60 
Non-nationals 49,770 16% 735,000 4.5% 1:14 
EU-26 nationals 4,460 1.5% 311,000 2% 1:70 
EU-14 nationals 3,770     
EU-10 nationals 530     
EU-2 nationals 160     
Turkish nationals 7,690 2.5% 91,000 0.5% 1:12 
Other TCN 37,630 12% 333,000 2% 1:9 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from the Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek (CBS). 
In comparison with the same data for 2006, the proportion of total 
recipients made up of resident nationals from the other 26 member states 
                                                   
28 For detailed data on 2009, see Statistisches Bundesamt (2012), “Sozialleistungen, 
Empfänger und Empfängerinnen von Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt und 
Grundsicherung im Alter und bei Erwerbsminderung”, Wiesbaden, p. 9. 
29 J. Proksch (2012), “Soziale Mindestsicherung in Deutschland”, Wiesbaden 
(Statistiche Ämter des Bundes und der Länder), p. 27. 
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increased from 1.1% to 1.5% in 2009 and the absolute number increased 
from 3,720 to 4,460. Less than half of this increase can be attributed to EU-
10 and EU-2 nationals. From the above data on the Netherlands, clear 
similarities with the German situation are apparent. The share of non-
nationals among beneficiaries of assistance is comparable (15% in Germany 
and 12% in the Netherlands), and the share of EU nationals among social 
assistance recipients is very small (between 1% and 2%) in both, and is far 
lower than the share of third-country nationals. Both in the Netherlands 
and in Germany, the percentage of social assistance recipients among 
resident nationals from the other 26 member states is lower than among 
Dutch or German nationals, respectively. The ratio of reliance on social 
assistance among Turkish nationals is five times higher, and even six times 
higher among other third-country nationals, than among Dutch nationals. 
The proportion of social assistance recipients made up of non-nationals has 
gradually increased over the recent decades: in the late 1980s, around 8% of 
the recipients of social assistance and 12% of the recipients of non-
contributory assistance to unemployed workers (Rijksgroepsregeling 
Werkloze Werknemers - RWW) were non-nationals.30 This increase is partly 
due to the admission of refugees. 
In the recently published data on recipients of Dutch social assistance 
at the end of 2011 of persons born abroad (the so-called first generation 
allochtonen), the absolute number and the share of persons born in the other 
26 member states is considerably higher (11,040 and 3%).31 The 2011 data 
include Dutch nationals born in other member states and naturalised 
migrants from other member states. This new way of counting is one of the 
reasons why the absolute number and the share of recipients born in EU-12 
member states are four times higher in the 2011 data (3,360 and 0.8%) than 
in the 2009 data on recipients with EU-12 nationality (690 and 0.2%). From 
the data on 2011, some interesting features do appear. More than half of the 
social assistance recipients born elsewhere in the EU were born in four 
(neighbouring) member states (Germany, Poland, Belgium and the UK). 
Only 7.5% of the recipients of social assistance born in the EU-26 had a 
registered residence in the Netherlands for less than five years; 92.5% had a 
long residence and thus a permanent right of residence under EU law, and 
60% had more than ten years of residence in the Netherlands. The share of 
                                                   
30 Muus (1992), op. cit. 
31 CBS (2012), “Nederlandse uitkeringen naar herkomst en woonland, fase 2”, The 
Hague: CBS Centrum voor Beleidsstatistiek, December, Tables 1a and 1b. 
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those with less than five years of residence among persons born in the EU-
12 was 15%, the large majority having three to five years of residence in the 
Netherlands. Even though these numbers also include Dutch nationals 
born in those states, this is a good indication that the large majority of 
nationals of other member states receiving social assistance in the 
Netherlands are protected against expulsion on those grounds by their 
permanent right of residence and the equal treatment clause in Directive 
2004/38/EC. Far fewer than 10% of the nationals of other member states in 
the Netherlands could be expelled on the grounds of receiving social 
assistance without violation of that Directive.  
Finally, the data on the country of birth of recipients of social 
assistance in 2011 indicate that Dutch nationals born outside the EU, many 
of them having come as refugees, make up a large share of the recipients of 
social assistance. The majority have resided in the Netherlands for more 
than ten years. Their right to social assistance will be particularly affected 
by the new Dutch language requirement proposed in the 2012 coalition 
agreement of the current Dutch government. Since indigenous Dutch 
nationals will hardly ever be affected by the new test, the implementation 
of this proposal may well be incompatible with the prohibition of racial 
discrimination in the Dutch constitution and in the UN Convention against 
racial discrimination (CERD). 
The United Kingdom 
At present, systematic data on the nationality of persons receiving social 
assistance benefits in the UK are not available. The official explanation of 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) is: “The Department’s 
benefit payment systems do not record nationality of people receiving 
benefits. For contributory benefits nationality is not a qualifying factor, as 
eligibility is determined by the National Insurance contributions that the 
claimant has made. For other benefits where residency conditions apply we 
do need to check nationality to ensure that the claimant is lawfully in the 
country. Therefore for these benefits nationality is established as part of the 
claiming process, but since it [is] not required for further processing the 
claim, it is not recorded on our computer systems.”32 In 2011, the 
Department stated that: “Work is underway to consider the development 
                                                   
32 Freedom of information request 2959/2011 published on 22 December 2011 
(http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/foi-2959-2011.pdf).  
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and publication of new statistics on the nationality of DWP benefit 
claimants.”33 What is recorded and published in the National Statistics is 
the number of National Insurance numbers (NINo) allocated to adult 
overseas nationals (i.e. non-UK nationals) entering the UK. NINo 
registration occurs when a person enters the labour market for the first 
time; that date may well be later than the date of first entry in the UK. 
NINo registration data have been merged with DWP benefits data to show 
numbers and proportions of adult overseas nationals claiming benefits 
within six months of registering for a NINo and to estimate the number of 
benefit claimants who were non-UK nationals at the time of the NINo 
registration. On this basis, the total numbers of adult non-UK nationals 
who claimed (read ‘received’) certain benefits within six months of 
registration is known and published (see Table 3).  
Table 3, unlike Tables 1 and 2 for Germany and the Netherlands, does 
not present the total number of non-nationals receiving social assistance 
benefits, but only the politically sensitive number of overseas nationals 
claiming and receiving unemployment benefits. The UK figures include 
both contributory and non-contributory means-tested out-of-work benefits 
(working-age benefits). Recipients of Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA) and Income Support are not expected to be available to the labour 
market due to disability or single parenthood of a young child. The 
Jobseeker’s Allowance is non-contributory. Table 3 does not include tax 
credits, which are in fact also benefits. 
Table 3. Adult overseas nationals in the UK claiming an out-of-work benefit within 
six months of registration, by year of registration (in thousands) 
 2002-03 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
All 43,14 21,16 25,50 26,48 46,22 
Jobseeker’s Allowance 32,53 15,28 19,87 21,48 38,48 
ESA or IB/SDA34 3,37 2,57 2,40 2,28 4,15 
Income support 7,24 3,31 2,23 2,72 3,59 
% all out work claimants 12.5% 2.9% 3.7% 4.6% 6.6% 
Source: National Statistics, Statistical Bulletin 30 August 2012. 
                                                   
33 Ibid. 
34 Employment and Support Allowance or Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disablement 
Allowance. 
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The bottom row in Table 3 represents the proportion of all adult non-
UK nationals claiming an out-of-work benefit within six months of 
registration, as a percentage of the total number of NINos issued to adult 
non-UK nationals in that fiscal year. This table shows that the absolute 
number of claimants in 2010-11 reached the level of 2002-03, but the 
proportion of benefit claimants out of the total number of adult overseas 
nationals issued with a NINo in 2010-11 (6.6%) was only half that of 2002-
03 (12.5%), i.e. prior to the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007. More 
than four-fifths of the claimants received Jobseeker’s Allowance. The 
average share across the four fiscal years from 2007-08 to 2010-11 of those 
receiving benefits within six months was 4.4%. In other words, 95% of adult 
overseas immigrants did not make such a claim. 
Moreover, it is estimated that in February 2012, of all claimants of 
DWP working-age benefits, 6.4% were non-UK nationals at the time they 
first registered for a NINo. These statistics do not take account of non-UK 
nationals who have subsequently been granted British citizenship. From a 
sample exercise to match data on non-EU/EEA claimants who were non-
nationals at their first NINo registration with data from the UK Border 
Agency, it appears that in 54% of the cases where a match between data of 
both agencies was possible, the claimant had in the meantime acquired 
British nationality, another 29% had been granted indefinite leave to 
remain (ILR) after many years of lawful residence, and 10% held refugee 
status.35 Consequently, the share of non-UK nationals among the claimants 
of DWP benefits in February 2011 must have been (considerably) lower 
than the 6.4% just mentioned. 
Of the claimants who were not UK nationals at the time of their NINo 
registration, 25% were nationals of another EU member state (one-third 
from the EU-10 and two-thirds from the ‘old’ member states), the top four 
countries of origin being Poland, the Netherlands, France and Italy. The 
share of working UK nationals claiming DWP working-age benefits (16.6%) 
was considerably higher than among non-nationals at the time of first 
registration (6.6%). The difference would be even greater if claimants who 
acquired British nationality after NINo registration were deducted from the 
latter group and added to the former. For the reasons mentioned above, the 
                                                   
35 Nationality at point of National Insurance number registration of DWP benefit 
claimants: February 2011 working age benefits, DWP January 2012, p. 4 and 11, 
accessed on 5 January 2023 at 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/adhoc_analysis/2012/nat_nino_regs.pdf. 
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data on the UK in Table 3 are different from those in the tables on Germany 
and the Netherlands. The share of non-UK nationals among the total of 
those receiving working-age benefits was 6.4%. The share of non-nationals 
among recipients of social assistance in Germany was 15% in 2011, and 16% 
in the Netherlands in 2009. In Germany and the Netherlands, non-nationals 
receive social assistance more often than nationals of the host country. 
Comparable data for the UK are not available. The difference might partly 
be explained by the restriction of the UK data to working-age benefits; in 
Germany and the Netherlands, a large part of social assistance benefits are 
paid to persons of 65 years or older. However, the differences are too big to 
be accounted for by this one explanation. 
The decision not to register the nationality of persons claiming social 
benefits has not only administrative but clearly also political dimensions. 
This applies all the more to the decision to produce and publish data on 
those international migrants receiving an out-of-work benefit within six 
months of being allocated a national insurance number. Apart from lacking 
relevance for the processing of claims, I can see at least three other reasons 
for not having data on the nationality of non-nationals receiving social 
assistance: a preference not to know facts that could possibly be perceived 
as politically unwelcome, the wish to avoid providing additional 
ammunition to the campaigns of anti-immigration organisations, and a 
desire to be free to voice political speculations (until the European 
Commission compels the British government to become rational). In any 
case, the absence of reliable data makes it hard to verify claims and 
statements of politicians and other actors in the public discussion on this 
issue. The sheer existence of such data in Germany and the Netherlands 
did not provoke large-scale publicity, but such data were produced and 
used by the Dutch government to further its political aim of mobilising 
support for measures restricting the rights to social assistance of 
immigrants from certain member states in Central Europe that acceded to 
the EU in 2004 and 2007. 
4. Conclusions 
The right to social assistance of EU nationals working or living in another 
member state developed slowly over six decades. At first, it depended on 
the 1953 Convention on Social and Medical Assistance and, after 1968, on 
general non-discrimination clauses in Community law. The right was 
developed in the case law of the Court of Justice after 1982, which was 
codified by the member states in Directive 2004/38/EC, and, since 2009, is 
ACCESS FOR MIGRANTS TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE  19 
supported by Article 1 (human dignity) and Article 34 (social security and 
social assistance) of the EU Charter.36 In practice, this right is disputed in 
many member states until a national of another member states has acquired 
the permanent right of residence after five years of lawful residence. 
The political and public debate on social assistance for non-nationals 
tends to focus on the expected or actual use or misuse of social benefits by 
migrants from other member states. Each extension of the geographic or 
personal scope of the rules on free movement appears to provoke the same 
debate and fears. From the data on the three member states discussed in 
this paper, it appears that EU migrants apply for or receive social assistance 
far less often than third-country nationals, even less often than the 
nationals of the host member state themselves. In Germany and the 
Netherlands, nationals of other member states account for only between 1% 
and 2% of the total number recipients of social assistance. In the UK, this is 
estimated at fewer than 1.6% (25% of a total of fewer than 6.4%) of those 
receiving DWP working-age benefits, keeping in mind that the UK data are 
not fully comparable, as explained above. 
The second mismatch between the political debate and the reality of 
social claims relates to the categories of migrants. The political and public 
debate in all three member states focuses on (young) jobseekers moving 
between member states with the aim of applying as soon as possible for 
jobseeker’s allowances rather than genuinely searching for employment. 
From the Dutch and German data, it appears that a large majority of those 
actually receiving social assistance (either nationals of other member states 
or third-country nationals) are long-term residents with more than five or 
ten years of residence in the host member state, or are 65 years or older. 
From the first sample exercise in the UK, it appeared that more than half of 
DWP working-age claimants who were non-UK nationals when they 
started to work in the UK had acquired British nationality, and another 
29% had permanent residence status (ILR). While the fear is over young 
migrants with short-term residence only, the reality points to the opposite – 
older migrants and migrants with long residence. Most migrants with 
short-term residence are apparently aware of the risk that claiming benefits 
may result in them losing their rights of resident. Non-nationals are clearly 
                                                   
36 See W. Frenz (2013), “‘Armutseinwanderung’ zwischen EU-Freizügigkeit und 
Menschenwürde”, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, Vol. 66, No. 17, pp. 1210-1212, 
which in this context stresses the relevance of the guarantee of human dignity in 
Article 1 of the Charter and Article 1 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). 
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over-represented among the persons receiving social assistance in Germany 
and the Netherlands. Obviously, this is related to the over-representation of 
migrants in low-income groups and in jobs with little security of 
employment. Moreover, migrants are rarely entitled to full old-age 
pensions because they started to build up pension rights at a much later 
age or have had more interruptions between jobs than nationals who have 
lived and worked all their life in the country. Social assistance for non-
nationals often supplements old-age pensions that, notwithstanding 
coordination on the basis of Regulation 883/2004, may end up below the 
social minimum level. 
This double mismatch between political debate and reality raises the 
question of the function of this issue in the political debate. Is the focus by 
politicians on this issue an expression of a real fear of “a fundamental 
challenge to the UK’s social contract” (Iain Duncan Smith in 2011) or a fatal 
blow to the solidarity on which our system of social security and social 
benefits is built? And if so, why do responsible politicians not feel a need to 
underpin their statements with reliable figures? Why is there resistance to 
the publication of data on the nationality of recipients of social assistance 
benefits in the UK, while those data are available in Germany and the 
Netherlands? And why did the Dutch government first ask the national 
statistical agency to provide data on the number of nationals of other 
member states receiving social assistance and then, after it appears that 
those numbers were relatively small, commission the agency to provide 
data on the number of persons born in other member states who are 
receiving social assistance, numbers that obviously will be higher because 
they also include Dutch nationals born in those countries? In Directive 
2004/38/EC, the member states intentionally restricted the rights of 
economically non-active EU citizens to social assistance in other member 
states in order to prevent that those rights could become a serious financial 
burden threatening their social welfare systems. W. Frenz rightly 
concludes: “Den Sozialstaat sprengt die ‘Armutseinwanderung’ daher 
nicht.” (“‘Poverty immigration’ will not blow up the social welfare state”).37 
 I suggest that the real function of the political debate on this issue is 
to justify the protective function of the nation state, to send the message to 
the voters that “the state is still able to protect its citizens and their social 
capital against unwanted attacks from abroad. We may have considerably 
                                                   
37 Ibid.  
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reduced our defence capacity, we have agreed to an enlargement of the 
European Union, to a further extension of free movement of nationals of 
other member states or the abolition of controls at the internal borders 
(Schengen countries) and we may have given up our national currency 
(EU-17), but the state is still able to protect you and your capital effectively 
against the plague of ‘welfare tourists’, the others, invading our country 
from abroad.” That these fears were expressed by politicians at each 
enlargement of the Union since 1971 and before the establishment of the 
Internal Market in 1992, that the fears almost always focused on specific 
groups of black sheep among the EU citizens (black Britons, non-European 
French or Dutch, Poles, Roma or Bulgarian nationals of Turkish origin) and 
that the fears hardly ever materialised on any significant scale once the fatal 
date had passed, makes me think that the honeypot of “our” social 
assistance each time acted as a substitute or a focal point for our own 
identity that was seen as being under threat. 
If politicians are interested in a rational debate on immigration, they 
should base their statements on facts rather than on guesses producing 
unfounded fears, avoiding unnecessary unrest and resentment against 
immigrants and avoiding the shameful need to correct previously incorrect 
statements. This issue will remain with us because migration and fear of 
migration will always be with us. Fact-based statements require the 
collection and publication of reliable data and an explanation of their 
limitations, context and meaning.38 It behoves us to know what we are 
talking about. 
 
                                                   
38 See Proksch (2012), op. cit. 
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2. SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY FOR LAWFULLY RESIDENT 
THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS: 
ON THE ROAD TO CITIZENSHIP? 
KEES GROENENDIJK 
1. Social assistance in the new EU migration Directives on 
migrants from third countries 
Between 2003 and 2012, six Directives on legal migration defining the 
admission and rights of different categories of third-country nationals were 
adopted on the basis of the new competence granted to the European 
Union in the Treaty of Amsterdam: the Family Reunification Directive 
2003/86/EC,1 the Long-Term Residents’ Directive 2003/109/EC,2 the 
Students’ Directive 2004/114/EC,3 the Scientists’ Directive 2005/71/EC,4 
the Blue Card Directive 2009/50/EC on highly qualified workers,5 and the 
Single Permit Directive 2011/98/EU also known as the Framework 
                                                   
1 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification.  
2 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents. 
3 Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of 
admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, 
unremunerated training or voluntary service. 
4 Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for 
admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research. 
5 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment. 
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Directive on labour migration.6 At the end of 2012, proposals for two more 
directives were under negotiation between the Council and the Parliament: 
the Directive on seasonal workers, and the Directive on intra-corporate 
transfers.7 These two proposals are not included in this analysis, since they 
do not contain provisions on social assistance. The explanatory 
memorandum to the Commission’s proposal on seasonal labour 
nevertheless states that it “observes the principles recognised by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, with particular 
regard to […] Article 34 on social security and social assistance” (italics 
added).8 The six Directives concerned are applicable in 24 member states. 
Denmark and the UK are not bound by any of these Directives and Ireland 
is only bound by Directive 2005/71/EC on scientists. 
Public debate in member states on these new EU migration Directives 
focused on restrictions through national policies on admission of third-
country nationals, rather than on the rights granted to lawfully resident 
third-country nationals by these Directives or their access to social 
assistance or social security. Before the acquisition of a permanent 
residence status in the host member state, third-country nationals – with 
the exception of asylum seekers or refugees – will apply for social 
assistance in exceptional cases only. Most of them will, without ever having 
read the text of the relevant Directives, be aware or afraid that such an 
application as a rule will result in the loss of their right of residence in the 
member state. That fear is indeed well founded. 
In the six Directives mentioned above, three types of rules regarding 
social assistance can be found: 
(a) Admission depends on fulfilling an income requirement that refers to 
social assistance. 
                                                   
6 Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-
country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a member state and on a 
common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a member state. 
7 European Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in 
the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, COM(2010) 378, 13.7.2010; European 
Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of seasonal employment, COM(2010) 379, 13.7.2010. 
8 Ibid., COM(2010) 379, 13.7.2010, p. 4. 
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(b) Receiving or applying for social assistance is grounds for 
withdrawing the residence permit. 
(c) Equal treatment with respect to social assistance with nationals of the 
state of residence or (explicit or implicit) exclusion from social 
assistance. 
An income requirement explicitly referring to social assistance 
(“without recourse to the social assistance system of the member state 
concerned”) is present in three Directives, those on family reunification, on 
long-term residence and on scientists.9 This requirement was clearly copied 
from the 1990 Directives on rights of residence of economically non-active 
EU nationals. The Court of Justice, in its Chakroun judgement, held that the 
concept of ‘social assistance’ in Article 7(1)(c) of the Family Reunification 
Directive must be interpreted “as referring to assistance which 
compensates for a lack of stable, regular and sufficient resources, and not as 
referring to assistance which enables exceptional or unforeseen needs to be 
addressed”.10 The income requirements in the Directive on highly qualified 
workers and in the Directive on students do not refer to social assistance. 
The first refers to salary levels clearly higher than social assistance levels, 
and the second refers to the costs of living, study and return that may be 
below that level.11 The Single Permit Directive does not define the 
requirements for admission, the decision on admission for employment 
remains in the remit of the member states. The Directive only provides 
procedural rules and rights after admission of third-country nationals 
admitted for employment or entitled to work. 
Actual use of the social assistance system is grounds for withdrawal 
or non-renewal of the residence permit of admitted third-country family 
members, highly qualified workers and long-term resident nationals from a 
third country who have acquired that status in one member state and then 
moved to another member state. The Blue Card Directive on highly 
qualified third-country nationals even goes one step further – completing 
an application for social assistance may already result in withdrawal or 
non-renewal of the residence permit of a highly qualified worker provided 
                                                   
9 Article 7(1)(c) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC, Articles 5(1)(a) and 14(2)(a) of 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC and Article 6(2) of Council Directive 2005/71/EC. 
10 Case C-578/08 Chakroun [2010] ECR I-1839. 
11 Article 5(3) and (2) of Council Directive 2009/50/EC and Articles 7(1)(b) and 
10(b) of Council Directive 2004/114/EC. 
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that the appropriate written information has been provided to that person 
in advance by the member state concerned.12 On the other hand, once a 
third-country national has, after at least five years of lawful residence, 
acquired the long-term residence status in a member state, his residence 
status can no longer be withdrawn on the grounds that he receives social 
assistance.13 In this respect, the residence status equals the permanent right 
of residence of EU nationals under Directive 2004/38/EC. 
The Long-Term Residents’ Directive is the only migration Directive 
granting third-country nationals equal treatment with respect to social 
assistance after they have acquired that status in the relevant member state. 
All other Directives are either silent on the issue or explicitly leave the right 
to social assistance to the national law of the member state. However, even 
the equal treatment of long-term resident third-country nationals may be 
restricted to persons residing in the member states and to ‘core benefits’, i.e. 
minimum income support, assistance in case of illness, pregnancy, parental 
assistance and long-term care.14 According to the Commission’s report in 
2011, only Greece had restricted access to social assistance to core benefits.15 
Full equal treatment with regard to access to social assistance is only 
granted to refugees under the Qualification Directive discussed by 
Madeline Garlick in this volume. 
The equal treatment provisions in the Scientists’ Directive and the 
Single Permit Directive only cover social security, not social assistance. The 
Blue Card Directive and the Single Permit Directive provide that the equal 
treatment clause does “not cover measures in the field of vocational 
training which are covered under social assistance schemes”.16 The explicit 
exclusion of the rather unlikely event that a highly qualified worker would 
apply for vocational training under a social assistance scheme reflects the 
obsession of certain member states with the possibility of third-country 
nationals having access to any form of social assistance.  
                                                   
12 Article 9(3)(d) of Council Directive 2009/50/EC. 
13 Article 9 of Council Directive 2003/109/EC. 
14 Article 11(1)(d), (2) and (4) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC. 
15 Report on the application of Council Directive 2003/109/EC in member 
states, COM(2011)585, 28.9.2011, p. 6. 
16 Article 14(1)(e) of Council Directive 2009/50/EC, Article 12(1)(e) and Recital 27 
of Directive 2011/98/EU. 
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2. A role for the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights? 
Article 34(2) of the EU Charter provides: “Everyone residing and moving 
within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social 
benefits in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices.” 
According to the official explanatory notes, Article 34(2) “is based on 
Articles 12(4) and 13(4) of the European Social Charter and point 2 of the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and 
reflects the rules arising from Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68.” Under Article 34(3) of the EU Charter, the Union – and 
thus the member states when they are implementing European Union law – 
“in order to combat social exclusion and poverty [.…] recognises and 
respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent 
existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the 
rules laid down by European Union law and national laws and practices.” 
The personal scope of these provisions of the EU Charter is not limited to 
EU citizens, they also cover lawfully resident third-county nationals. The 
reference to “national law and practices” appears to grant member states 
the freedom to fully exclude third-country nationals from social assistance, 
unless they are obliged to provide that assistance under international or 
national law or, exceptionally, under secondary EU law. The Court of 
Justice, when interpreting the provisions in the migration Directives on 
social assistance, will no doubt be guided by Article 34 of the EU Charter 
being binding primary EU law. In its recent judgement in Kamberaj on the 
relevance of the equal treatment clause in Article 11 of Directive 
2003/109/EC for the entitlement of a third-country national to housing 
benefits under regional legislation in Italy, the Court of Justice held that “in 
so far as the housing benefit in regional Italian legislation fulfils the 
purpose set out in Article 34 of the Charter, under European Union law, it 
is part of core benefits within the meaning of Article 11(4) of Directive 
2003/109.”17 Thus, Italian legislation may not exclude housing benefit from 
the scope of the equal treatment clause. 
From the above, it appears that the system prevalent in the 
immigration law of many member states is reflected in the new EU 
migration Directives. First, the prospect of reliance on social assistance is 
grounds for refusal of admission. Second, applying for or actually receiving 
                                                   
17 Case C-571/10 Kamberaj [2012], judgement of 24 April 2012, not yet reported, 
para. 92; see also paras. 80-81. 
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social assistance is grounds for withdrawal or non-renewal of the right of 
residence. The scope of access to, or exclusion from, social assistance 
depends mainly on national law, unless international treaties provided for 
that access. Generally, access is only granted to third-country nationals 
with a permanent residence status, to refugees and to beneficiaries of other 
forms of international or national protection. In this light, it is refreshing to 
read that the Commission considers that one of the four areas which merit 
further action to be paid from the European Integration Fund is 
“improving local integration of third-country nationals in housing, schools, 
social assistance, health, education” (italics added).18 
3. Access to (contributive) social security for third-country 
migrants in the new EU migration Directives  
Two of the six migration Directives, those on family reunification and on 
admission of students, do not contain rules on the access to social security 
benefits. The other four Directives contain rules on the right to 
(contributive) social security benefits in case of unemployment, illness, 
invalidity, old age or child benefits. The Blue Card Directive and the 
Directive on admission of scientists both have a clause granting highly 
qualified workers the same treatment as nationals of the host member 
state.19 The non-discrimination principle applies also to persons coming to 
a member state directly from a third country. With regard to third-country 
nationals who have migrated between member states, neither Directive 
confers more rights than those already provided in existing Community 
legislation in the field of social security. The relevant clauses all refer to the 
rules on coordination of the national social security legislation in the old 
Regulation 1408/71 (replaced by Regulation 883/2004) and in the old 
Regulation 859/2003 extending Regulation 1408/71 to third-country 
nationals who moved from one member state to another. The Blue Card 
Directive allows a member state to withdraw the EU Blue Card in case of 
unemployment for three consecutive months or if the worker is 
unemployed twice during the validity of his EU Blue Card, and thus de 
                                                   
18 In its December 2011 report on the implementation of the European Integration 
Fund, COM(2011) 847, 5.12.2011 p. 28. 
19 Article 12(c) of Council Directive 2005/71/EC and Article 14(1)(e) of Council 
Directive 2009/50/EC. 
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facto to restrict unemployment benefits to three months.20 Both Directives 
furthermore do not grant rights to family members residing in a third 
country, because that situation is deemed to lie “outside the scope of 
Community legislation.”21  
The Single Permit Directive follows the same principle. Equal 
treatment of lawfully employed nationals of third countries in the branches 
of social security is covered by Regulation 883/2004, but it allows for 
several restrictions: persons must actually be in employment or registered 
as unemployed after having worked for more than six months, excluding 
family members residing in third countries and with regard to family 
benefits.22 Further, it is stipulated that the right to equal treatment with 
regard to social security benefits does not restrict the right of member states 
to end the rights of residence of those entitled to social security benefits 
under the equal treatment clause.23 The Directive provides for a right to 
export acquired rights to benefits related to old age, invalidity and death in 
case of migration to a third country, but allows member states to pay lower 
benefits if they also pay lower benefits to their own nationals moving 
outside the EU.24 Thus, returning migrant workers or their family members 
can see their acquired rights to old age, widows or invalidity pensions 
reduced because a member state reduces those pensions in the far less 
common case of a national migrating outside the European Union. 
A real right to national treatment with respect to social security is 
granted only to third-country nationals once they have acquired, after at 
least five years of lawful residence in a member state, long-term resident 
status. But member states may still restrict equal treatment to long-term 
residents and their family members residing in the member state 
concerned.25 
                                                   
20 Article 13 of Council Directive 2009/50/EC. 
21 Recital 16 of Council Directive 2005/71/EC and Recital 18 of Council Directive 
2009/50/EC. 
22 Article 12(1)(e) and (2)(b) and Recitals 24-25 of Directive 2011/98/EU; see G. 
Brinkmann (2012), “Opinion of Germany on the Single Permit Proposal”, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 351-366. 
23 On the origin of this restriction in the negotiations in the Council, see ibid., p. 
361.  
24 Article 12(3) and (4) of Directive 2011/98/EU. 
25 Article 11(1)(d) and (2) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC. 
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The access to (contributory) social security benefits under the equal 
treatment clauses in the four migration Directives are below the level of the 
more general (and less restrictive) equal treatment clauses in Article 6 of 
the 1949 ILO Convention no. 97 on migration for employment and the ILO 
Convention no. 118 on social security of migrant workers.26 The 
Commission stated during the early stages of the negotiations that these 
Conventions “had been taken into account” when drafting the proposal,27 
but that statement did not apply to later amendments inserted by the 
Council. If member states are bound by these Conventions28, third-country 
workers can rely on the more favourable rules in these Conventions or in 
the national law.  
4. Conclusions 
From our analysis, it appears that the new EU migration Directives only 
provide for equal access for third-country nationals to social assistance 
after they have been lawfully resident in a member state for more than five 
years or once they are granted refugee status. Receiving or even claiming 
social assistance before a secure residence status has been acquired may 
well result in the loss of a person’s right of residence and in a requirement 
to leave the country. Third-country nationals who are likely to claim social 
assistance will be refused admission on the grounds they do not meet the 
income requirement. The position of refugees and other categories of 
protected persons is the exception to the general rule. On this point, the six 
EU migration Directives adopted between 2003 and 2011 reflect, to a large 
extent, the national law in member states and even in some member states 
the position of EU citizens using their free movement rights under 
Directive 2004/38/EC. 
Our conclusion that the access to (contributory) social security 
benefits under the equal treatment clauses in the four recent EU migration 
Directives is below the level of the 1949 ILO Convention no. 97 on 
migration for employment or the ILO Convention no. 118 on social security 
of migrant workers is a clear indication that the EU lawmakers were half-
                                                   
26 For the discussions on this issue inside and outside the Council, see G. 
Brinkmann (2012), op. cit. 
27 Council document 10807/10, fn. 42 and 56. 
28 Nine member states are bound by ILO Convention no. 97: Belgium, Cyprus, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain and the UK. 
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hearted at best. In some cases, the provisions of the Directives are clearly 
intended to support the integration of the migrants concerned; the migrants 
are seen as and treated as future citizens. However, provisions on social 
security or assistance reflect the image of the immigrant as a temporary 
phenomenon that may be unavoidable or even useful for the time being, 
but will involve costs for the public purse. 
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3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DECISION 3/80 
OF THE EEC-TURKEY ASSOCIATION 
COUNCIL 
PAUL MINDERHOUD 
1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with the significance of Decision 3/80 of the EEC-Turkey 
Association Council and its recent developments.1 Decision 3/80 
established social security measures for workers of Turkish nationality 
moving within the Community (now European Union) and members of 
their family living with them. To my knowledge, Decision 3/80 has mainly 
had an impact in two member states: the Netherlands and Germany. In this 
chapter, I will limit myself to the Netherlands where the social security 
system has become based much more on territoriality since 2000. The 
importance attached to residence in the design of the Dutch social security 
system showcases the revitalisation of nation-state approaches to the 
delivery of welfare at a time when EU rules are interfering more and more 
in the daily life of EU citizens. The second part of this chapter describes the 
current developments at the EU level, where Decision 3/80 is being 
replaced by a new Decision. 
2. Background 
In 1963, the EEC entered into an association agreement with Turkey (the 
Ankara Agreement) that was intended to pave the way for Turkish 
                                                   
1 Decision No 3/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council of 19 September 1980 
on the application of the social security schemes of the member states to Turkish 
workers and members of their families. 
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membership of the EEC.2 Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement committed 
the Contracting Parties to “progressively securing freedom of movement of 
workers between them.” The Ankara Agreement was supplemented, in 
1970, by an Additional Protocol that required the Association Council (a 
body comprising representatives of Turkey, the member states and the 
Commission) to adopt social security measures for workers of Turkish 
nationality moving within the Community and members of their family 
living with them.3 These measures were to provide for:  
- the aggregation of periods of insurance or employment completed in 
individual member states for the purpose of determining entitlement 
to health care and to old age pensions, death benefits and invalidity 
pensions;  
- the payment of family allowances in respect of family members 
resident within the Community; and  
- the export of old-age pensions, death benefits and invalidity 
pensions.  
In 1980, the Association Council adopted Decision 3/80 which 
established more detailed rules for implementing the social security 
measures outlined in the Additional Protocol. This Decision, however, 
required a further implementing regulation which the Commission 
proposed in 1983 but which was never adopted. Decision 3/80 refers 
specifically to, and was a kind of copy of, the first version of Council 
Regulation 1408/71 on the coordination of social security schemes to 
employed EU persons and their families moving within the Community.4  
For a long time, the legal meaning of Decision 3/80 remained unclear. 
In 1996, however, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled 
in the Taflan-Met case that, in the absence of any provision on the Decision’s 
                                                   
2 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic 
Community and Turkey (“Ankara Agreement”) signed at Ankara on 12 September 
1963, OJ C 113, 24 December 1973, p. 1. 
3 Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed at Brussels on 23 November 
1970, annexed to the Agreement establishing the Association between the 
European Economic Community and Turkey and on measures to be taken for their 
entry into force, OJ L 293, 29 December 1972, p. 3. 
4 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons, self-employed persons, and to members of 
their families moving within the Community. 
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entry into force, it follows from the binding character which the Ankara 
Agreement attaches to Decision 3/80 that it entered into force on the date 
on which it was adopted (namely 19 September 1980) and that the 
Contracting Parties have been bound by the Decision since that date.5 But 
the Court of Justice also concluded that the provisions in question (Articles 
12 and 13 of Decision 3/80) could not have direct effect as long as the 
Council had not taken the necessary measures to implement Decision 
3/80.6  
In its judgement of 4 May 1999 in the Sürül case, the CJEU ruled for a 
second time on the scope of Decision 3/80.7 This time, the case specifically 
dealt with the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality, based on Article 3 of Decision 3/80.8 The wording of this 
Article was identical to Article 3(1) of Council Regulation 1408/71. As this 
provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject in its 
implementation or effects to the adoption of any subsequent measure, it 
has direct effect according to the CJEU.9 Turkish nationals covered by 
Decision 3/80 must be treated in the same way as nationals of the host 
member state, which means that the legislation of the member state cannot 
impose upon such Turkish nationals more or stricter conditions than those 
applicable to its own nationals. The CJEU confirmed this obligation for 
equal treatment of Turkish nationals covered by Decision 3/80 in the cases 
of Kocak and Örs10 and Öztürk.11 Based on this case law, one could expect 
                                                   
5 Case C-277/94 Taflan-Met [1996] ECR I-4085, paras. 17-21. This was a case against 
the Dutch Social Insurance Bank. 
6 Article 12 concerns the conditions of entitlement to invalidity benefits when 
subject to legislation of two or more member states. Article 13 deals with the same 
issue regarding old-age and survivors’ pensions. See also H. Verschueren (2009), 
“Social Security Co-ordination in the Agreements between the EU and 
Mediterranean Countries, in particular Turkey and the Maghreb Countries”, in D. 
Pieters and P. Schoukens (eds), The Social Security Co-Ordination Between the EU and 
Non-EU Countries, Antwerp: Intersentia, pp. 19-34. 
7 Case C-262/96 Sürül [1999] ECR I-2685. This was a case against the German 
Federal Labour Agency, which dealt with the entitlement of family allowances. 
8 For details, see H. Verschueren (2009), op. cit., pp. 25-30. 
9 Case C-262/96 Sürül [1999] ECR I-2685, paras. 60-63. 
10 Cases C-102/98 and C-211/98 Kocak and Örs [2000] ECR I-1287. This was a case 
against a German social security agency responsible for old age pensions.  
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that Article 6 Decision 3/80 would also satisfy the conditions imposed for 
direct effect. This Article contains the principle of exportability of benefits 
in the same wording as Article 10 of Council Regulation 1408/71. As we 
will later see, it would take until 2011 before the CJEU was able to provide 
clarity on this issue. 
3. Influence on the Dutch social security system 
Until 2000, the Dutch social security system could be characterised as very 
liberal. The right to almost all social security benefits – unemployment 
benefits being the important exception – was related to the beneficiary and 
not to the territory where the beneficiary was living. This meant that every 
Dutch or non-Dutch citizen could export his or her social security benefits 
to any other country in the world. This did not count for social assistance 
benefits, which were linked to territory. Turkish beneficiaries could 
therefore keep their social security benefits when they moved permanently 
to Turkey. 
This system changed drastically in 2000 when the Act Restricting 
Export of Benefits entered into force,12 introducing the so-called 
territoriality principle for all social security benefits. From then on, only 
when a bilateral social security agreement was concluded which 
established the right of portability of benefits (which can vary by country 
and by benefit) was it possible to export the benefit to that specific country. 
These agreements had to include special rules authorising the Dutch 
government to control compliance. With Turkey, such a bilateral agreement 
had already existed since 1972 but had to be adapted to these new 
authorisation demands. The possibility of export of social security benefits 
within the EU did not change, due to Article 10 of Council Regulation 
1408/71 (now Article 7 Regulation 883/2004). 
For some non-contributory benefits, however, the possibility of 
export was abolished completely by this Act. This especially affected the 
Supplementary Benefits Act (Toeslagenwet), which supplements the amount 
of (amongst others) a low invalidity benefit up to the minimum subsistence 
level, to a maximum of 30% of the minimum wage. In this context, it is seen 
                                                                                                                                 
11 Case C-373/02 Öztürk [2004] ECR I-3605. This was case against an Austrian social 
security agency responsible for old age pensions.  
12 See P. Minderhoud (2003), “Ontwikkelingen inzake de Wet Beperking Export 
Uitkeringen”, Migrantenrecht, pp. 308-317. 
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as a supplementary invalidity benefit. By inscribing this Act on Annex IIa 
of Council Regulation 1408/71 (now Annex X of Regulation 883/2004), this 
supplementary benefit was rendered not exportable within the EU as well.  
The non-exportability of this supplementary benefit triggered a range 
of court cases in the Netherlands, cumulating in 2007 in a case before the 
highest social security court (The Central Appeals Tribunal), which had to 
decide whether this absolute restriction was in line with Article 6 of 
Decision 3/80. 
Article 6 Decision 3/80 reads: “Save as otherwise provided in this 
Decision, invalidity, old-age or survivors’ cash benefits and pensions for 
accidents at work or occupational diseases, acquired under the legislation 
of one or more member states, shall not be subject to any reduction, 
modification, suspension, withdrawal or confiscation by reason of the fact 
that the recipient resides in Turkey or in the territory of a member state 
other than that in which the institution responsible for payment is 
situated.” 
This was the first time in Dutch case law, and to my knowledge in 
any case law, that Article 6 Decision 3/80 was invoked. The Dutch Court 
did not decide directly on the case itself, but asked the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling on the issue. It took the CJEU more than three years to 
come to a decision, but the result was well worth waiting for. The CJEU 
ruled in Akdas on 26 May 2011 that Article 6 was directly applicable and 
that Turkish nationals who, after having worked in an EU member state (in 
casu the Netherlands), have returned to Turkey can rely on Article 6 of 
Decision 3/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council to claim this 
supplement to an invalidity benefit. This application of Article 6 of 
Decision 3/80 led to a situation in which Turkish nationals enjoyed a right 
that was denied to EU citizens. As it was questionable whether this 
differential treatment was compatible with Article 59 Additional Protocol 
which stipulates that “Turkey shall not receive more favourable treatment 
than that which member states grant to one another pursuant to the EC 
Treaty”, the CJEU had to provide an answer.13 After all, this supplementary 
benefit was not exportable within the EU for EU nationals who had moved 
to another member state. 
                                                   
13 See K. Eisele and A.P. van der Mei (2012), “Portability of Social Benefits and 
Reverse Discrimination of EU Citizens vis-à-vis Turkish Nationals: Comment on 
Akdas”, European Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 204-212. 
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First, the Court used the argument that extending the rules of Council 
Regulation 1408/71 on the non-exportability of special non-contributory 
benefits to Decision 3/80 would constitute an amendment of this Decision 
and the power for this was exclusively reserved to the Association 
Council.14 Second, a Turkish national who has participated in the labour 
force of a member state has no right under Decision 1/80 to remain in the 
territory of that state following an accident at work rendering him 
permanently incapacitated for work. According to the CJEU, such persons 
cannot be said to have left the territory of the host member state of their 
own volition without legitimate reason. Accordingly, the situation of 
former Turkish migrant workers such as Akdas et al. cannot, for the 
purposes of applying Article 59 Additional Protocol, usefully be compared 
to that of EU citizens inasmuch as the latter, who retain their right of 
residence in the member state which awarded the benefit in question, first, 
can choose to leave the territory of that state and thus lose that benefit and, 
second, have the right to return at any time to the member state 
concerned.15 
4. New restrictions in the Netherlands 
A next step towards more restrictions in the Netherlands was the 
introduction in 2011 of the so-called “residence principle” in the Dutch 
Child Benefit Act. According to this principle, the amount of child benefit 
paid for children living outside the EU (and of course only in a country 
with which a bilateral agreement has been concluded) will be based on the 
cost of living in the country where that child lives. This same residence 
principle has been introduced for survivor’s pensions under the Dutch 
General Survivors Act and for disability benefit under the Dutch Partially 
Disabled Act (Wet Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsongeschikten - WGA). For Turkey, this 
means that beneficiaries of a survivor’s pension or disability benefit will 
only receive 60% of the amount they would receive if they stayed in the 
Netherlands. For children living in Turkey, 60% of the amount of the child 
benefit allowance is also granted. Although various bilateral social security 
agreements explicitly prohibit the Netherlands from reducing the amount 
of the relevant benefits in case of export (especially for the survivor’s 
pension and disability benefits), both Chambers of Parliament approved 
                                                   
14 Case C-485/07 Akdas [2011] ECR I-04499, para. 91. 
15 Case C-485/07 Akdas [2011] ECR I-04499, paras. 92-95. 
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this Act. According to the (then) Minister of Social Affairs, there was no 
question of a reduction in the amount of the benefit but only of 
differentiation, depending on the cost of living. However, that there is no 
real differentiation is evident from the fact that the benefit cannot exceed 
100%, even if the cost of living in the country in question is higher than in 
the Netherlands.16  
After the adoption of the Act, a complaint was filed by a Turkish 
NGO with the European Commission stating that this Act was in breach of 
Articles 3 and 6 Decision 3/80. In an answer of 16 November 2012, the 
Commission partially agreed with the plaintiffs.17 The introduction of the 
residence principle is not allowed under Article 6 Decision 3/80, which 
waives this kind of residence clauses. Regarding the export of child 
benefits, however, the Commission concluded that Decision 3/80 cannot be 
used for the protection of this right. Child benefits do not fall under the 
material scope of Article 6 and neither do they fall under the personal scope 
of the equal treatment clause of Article 3 Decision 3/80. Only Turkish 
children living in the territory of one of the EU member states are covered. 
As this Act, introducing this residence principle, only fully entered into 
force as of 1 January 2013, there is no case law yet. 
A further step taken by the Dutch government in 2012 was the 
introduction of a bill aiming at the complete cessation of the export of child 
benefits for children living outside the EU.18 In order to achieve this goal, 
more than 20 bilateral social security agreements will have to be adapted. 
At the moment, it is not clear whether this Bill will become an Act. 
Although it was adopted without any problems in the Second Chamber, 
the First Chamber questioned the legal consistency of the Bill in light of 
international agreements and, in December 2012, asked the State Council 
for further advice. Decision 3/80 is not applicable in this situation, because 
child benefits do not fall under the material scope of Article 6 Decision 3/80 
(waiving the residence clauses) and children living outside the EU (i.e. in 
Turkey) do not fall under the personal scope of the equal treatment clause 
of Article 3 Decision 3/80. But this leaves unanswered the question of 
whether this cessation is in breach of Article 9 of the Ankara Agreement, 
                                                   
16 See P. Minderhoud (2012), “Houdt het woonlandbeginsel in de sociale zekerheid 
bij de rechter stand?”, Tijdschrift Recht en Arbeid, Vol. 4, No. 8/9, pp. 16-19. 
17 Letter of 11 November 2012, ref.no. 3757/12/EMPL (on file with the author). 
18 Kamerstukken II, 2012/2013, 33612. 
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which provides that within the scope of the Agreement any discrimination 
on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. As this Act will affect 
Turkish citizens much more than Dutch citizens, its discriminatory nature 
is beyond doubt. In the Akdas judgement, the CJEU left open the possibility 
of applying Article 9 Ankara Agreement.19 The argument that (in this case) 
Turkish children cannot always come to or return to the Netherlands, while 
Dutch children can, could be valid. In 2011, Dutch child benefit allowances 
were paid for 2,100 children living in Turkey. Based on the advice of the 
State Council, which was published in July 2013, the Minister of Social 
Affairs has announced his intention to proceed with the contested Bill.20 
5. New initiative from the Commission 
The Akdas decision resulted in an initiative by the Commission to adapt 
Decision 3/80. The Commission had already been reconsidering this 
because Decision 3/80 was outdated; the new Regulations which 
coordinate the social security schemes within the EU for EU citizens 
(Regulation 883/2004) and for third-country nationals (Regulation 
1231/2010) have been drastically changed over the last few years, while for 
Decision 3/80 the text established in 1980 is still applicable.21 
In March 2012, the Commission published, as a replacement for 
Decision 3/80, a proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken 
on behalf of the European Union within the Association Council set up by 
the Agreement establishing an association between the EEC and Turkey 
with regard to the provisions on the coordination of social security 
systems.22 
                                                   
19 Case C-485/07 Akdas [2011] ECR I-04499, paras. 97-101. 
20 Kamerstukken I, 2012/2013, 33162, no. G.  
21 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems; Regulation (EU) No 
1231/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
extending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
22 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be 
taken on behalf of the European Union within the Association Council set up by 
the Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic 
Community and Turkey with regard to the provisions on the coordination of social 
security systems, COM(2012) 152, 30.3.2012. 
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This draft Decision was announced as part of a package of four 
proposals including similar proposals with regard to Albania, Montenegro 
and San Marino,23 which are largely based on the decisions adopted by the 
Council in October 2010 with regard to Algeria, Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia.24 
Although the four proposals might look similar, there are some 
differences. 
The equal treatment clause of the proposal for Turkey and San 
Marino covers all benefits, mentioned in Article 3 of Regulation 883/2004.25 
These benefits are:  
(a) sickness benefits 
(b) maternity and equivalent paternity benefits 
(c) invalidity benefits 
(d) old-age benefits 
(e) survivors’ benefits 
(f) benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases 
(g) death grants 
(h) unemployment benefits 
(i) pre-retirement benefits  
(j) family benefits  
The proposals for Montenegro and Albania cover a more limited list 
of benefits, namely old-age pensions, survivors’ pensions, pensions in 
respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases, invalidity pensions 
related to accidents at work and occupational diseases, and family 
allowances. Another difference is the legal basis for the Turkish proposal, 
which is based on Article 48 TFEU, and for the other three, which are based 
on Article 79(2) TFEU. I will discuss this later.  
A main difference between the new Decision with Turkey and the old 
Decision 3/80 concerns the non-exportability of the special non-
contributory benefits. But in this regard, it is fully in line with Regulation 
                                                   
23 See European Commission, COM(2012) 158 for Albania, COM(2012) 156 for 
Montenegro and COM(2012) 157 for San Marino, 30.3.2012. 
24 See the various Council Decisions of 21 October 2010 with regard to the adoption 
of provisions on the coordination of social security systems, OJ L 306 of 23 
November 2010, respectively p. 14, p. 35, p. 28, p. 21, p. 1 and p. 8. 
25 See Article 1(1)(h) of both proposals, COM(2012) 152, 30.3.2012 for Turkey and 
COM(2012) 157 for San Marino, 30.3.2012. 
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883/2004, which excludes these benefits (which are placed on Annex X to 
this Regulation) for export as well.26 Another important difference concerns 
the fact that the exportability based on this Decision is now limited to 
Turkey and not to other EU member states as well, as under Article 6 
Decision 3/80.27 Under the new regime, the export of social security 
benefits for Turkish beneficiaries who move within the EU is covered by 
Regulation 1231/2010, as for all third-country nationals. 
6. Questions in the European Parliament 
The Akdas judgement and the Commission proposal led to questions being 
asked in the European Parliament by Emine Bozkurt.28 She asked what the 
Commission will do to ensure that all EU member states respect the 
provisions of Decision No 3/80, which are an integral part of the EU acquis, 
as ruled by the CJEU in Akdas. She also enquired whether the Commission 
intended to circumvent the judgement of the CJEU by introducing the new 
proposal, stripping Turkish workers of their acquired rights. On 31 May 
2012, Commissioner Andor answered that the Commission proposal fully 
respects the right of Turkish workers to equal treatment to that of EU 
citizens in matters of social security and to payment of certain categories of 
pensions in Turkey without reduction in line with the judgements of the 
Court of Justice in Sürül and Akdas. The CJEU’s judgement in Akdas 
recognises that benefits falling within the category of special non-
contributory cash benefits (benefits that top up income to a minimum level) 
should be paid in Turkey in very restricted circumstances. The Commission 
proposes that such benefits, which have not been exportable from one EU 
member state to another for EU citizens since 1992, should not be payable 
in Turkey either. Furthermore, the rules applicable to the EU and Turkey 
should be brought into line with those applicable under nine other 
association agreements. Commissioner Andor stressed that the 
                                                   
26 See Article 70(4) Regulation 883/2004. 
27 Article 4(i) of the new Decision reads: “Exportable benefits within the meaning of 
Article 1(1)(i) to which the persons as referred to in Article 2(a) and (c) are entitled 
shall not be subject to any reduction, modification, suspension, withdrawal or 
confiscation by reason of the fact that the beneficiary is residing, (i) for the purpose 
of a benefit under the legislation of a member state, within the territory of Turkey”  
28 Parliamentary question posed by Emine Bozkurt on 13 April 2012 on the 
“exportability of social security benefits to Turkey for Turkish workers working, or 
having worked, in one or more member states” (E-003882/2012). 
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Commission’s aim is not to circumvent the Court’s judgement in Akdas, but 
to enhance the legal certainty of the rules governing social security 
coordination between the EU and Turkey. The proposal contains a 
transitional provision to protect the rights of persons in Turkey to whom 
special non-contributory cash benefits are provided at the date of entry into 
force of the proposed Association Council Decision. 
7. Current situation 
The EU Council agreed upon this new Decision on 6 December 2012 and 
the new Decision has already been published in the Official Journal.29 
However, it can only enter into force after adoption by the EU-Turkey 
Association Council and this adoption has to take place unanimously. At 
this moment, it is unclear whether the Turkish government will vote in 
favour of it. Until then, the old Decision 3/80 is still applicable. 30 
Another unsolved problem concerns the legal basis for the new 
Decision with Turkey. As mentioned above, this Decision was a part of a 
package of four proposals (now Decisions31), including also Albania, 
Montenegro and San Marino, which are largely based on the Decisions 
adopted by the Council in 2010 with regard to Algeria, Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia.32  
Unlike for all these other Decisions, the legal basis proposed by the 
Commission for the Decision concerning Turkey is Article 48 TFEU, which 
provides for the adoption of “such measures in the field of social security 
as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers”. For all the 
other decisions, the legal basis is Article 79(2) TFEU, which provides for the 
                                                   
29 Council Decision of 6 December 2012 on the position to be taken on behalf of 
the European Union within the Association Council set up by the Agreement 
establishing an association between the European Economic Community and 
Turkey, with regard to the adoption of provisions on the coordination of social 
security systems (2012/776/EU), OJ L 340, 13 December 2012, p. 19. 
30 For this discussion, see http://www.habermonitor.com/en/haber/detay/mep-
emine-bozkurt-holds-rights-on-the-agenda/29542/ (last visited 25 January 2013). 
31 See Council Decisions OJ L 340, 13 December 2012, p. 1 for Albania OJ L 340, 13 
December 2012, p. 7 for Montenegro and OJ L 340, 13 December 2012, p. 13 for San 
Marino. 
32 Council Decisions OJ L 306, 23 November 2010, respectively p. 14, p. 35, p. 28, p. 
21, p. 1 and p. 8.  
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adoption of measures defining the rights of third-country nationals 
residing legally in a member state, including the conditions governing 
freedom of movement and residence in other member states. The content of 
all of these Decisions is very similar. Besides the legal basis, the main 
differences between them are the scope of the equal treatment clause (in the 
case of Turkey, it concerns all social security benefits) and the scope of the 
provisions on exportable benefits, in particular with regard to invalidity 
benefits.33 
Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK did not accept Article 48 TFEU 
as a legal basis for measures intended to apply to persons other than 
employed or self-employed member state nationals and their dependents 
moving within the EU. Only Article 79(2) TFEU, by its express terms, 
provides the power to confer rights upon third-country nationals residing 
legally within the EU, according to the three member states. The reason 
behind the interest of Ireland and the UK in this respect is obvious – if the 
Decision were to be based on Article 79(2) rather than on Article 48 TFEU, 
they would not be bound unless they opt in. This would be rather curious, 
as both member states are today bound by Decision 3/80. The reason for 
the Netherlands’ concern over the legal basis is less obvious, as it would be 
bound by the Decision either way. 
To solve this problem for the moment, the new Decision was in the 
end adopted in the Council with a statement that the Council recalls cases 
C-431/11 and C-656/11 pending before the Court of Justice, where the 
Court is examining the same question of the correct legal basis for 
adopting.34 It concerns, respectively, Council Decision 2011/407/EU of 6 
June 2011 on the position to be taken by the European Union within the 
EEA Joint Committee concerning an amendment to Annex VI (social 
security) and Protocol 37 to the EEA Agreement, and Council Decision 
2011/863/EU of 16 December 2011 on the position to be taken by the 
European Union in the Joint Committee established under the Agreement 
between the European Community and its member states, and the Swiss 
                                                   
33 See Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Decision on the 
position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the Association 
Council set up by the Agreement establishing an association between the European 
Economic Community and Turkey with regard to the provisions on the 
coordination of social security systems of 13 November 2012, document number: 
16127/12, point 8. 
34 Ibid., see Annex to this Council Document. 
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Confederation, on the free movement of persons as regards the 
replacement of Annex II to that Agreement on the coordination of social 
security schemes.35 
As the proposed legal basis for the Decision of the Council 
establishing an association between the European Economic Community 
and Turkey is the same as for these two Decisions above, the EU will accept 
a Decision to be adopted by the Association Council only after the 
judgement of the Court of Justice is issued on these two cases. 
It is interesting to note that given the structure of the new Decision, 
the EU has chosen to treat Turkish nationals the same as third-country 
nationals, but at the same time underlines that Turkish nationals are 
comparable to EEA and Swiss nationals for the coordination of social 
security given the chosen legal basis.  
In the meantime, the Dutch Central Appeals Tribunal is in the process 
of asking new preliminary questions to the CJEU on the significance of 
Article 6 Decision 3/80 in a case in which the beneficiary of the contested 
supplementary benefit not only has Turkish nationality, but Dutch 
nationality as well. 
Must Article 6(1) of Decision No 3/80, having regard to Article 59 of 
the Additional Protocol, be interpreted as precluding a legislative provision 
of a member state, such as Article 4a of the Toeslagenwet (TW), which 
withdraws the supplementary benefit awarded on the basis of national 
legislation if the persons in receipt of that benefit no longer live in the 
territory of that state, even if those persons, while retaining Turkish 
nationality, have acquired the nationality of the host member state?  
If, in answering the first question, the Court of Justice concludes that 
the persons concerned may rely on Article 6(1) of Decision No 3/80, but 
that such reliance is restricted by the effect of Article 59 of the Additional 
Protocol, must Article 59 of the Additional Protocol be interpreted as 
precluding continuation of entitlement to the supplementary benefit for 
Turkish nationals, such as the persons concerned, as from the point in time 
at which EU nationals can no longer claim entitlement to that benefit on the 
                                                   
35 In February 2013, the UK filed an action for annulment of the new Council 
Decision before the CJEU, see Case C-81/13: Action brought on 15 February 2013 
— United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland vs. Council of the European 
Union. 
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basis of EU law, even if EU nationals retained that benefit for a longer 
period of time on the basis of national law?36 
In light of the judgement in Kahveci & Inan, this will not be an easy 
task for the Court of Justice.37 In that case, the Court decided that Article 7 
of Decision No 1/80 of 19 September 1980 must be interpreted as meaning 
that the members of the family of a Turkish worker duly registered as 
belonging to the labour force of a member state can still invoke that 
provision once that worker has acquired the nationality of the host member 
state while retaining his Turkish nationality. 
                                                   
36 Case C-171/13: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Centrale Raad van 
Beroep (Netherlands), lodged on 8 April 2013 — Raad van bestuur van het 
Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen (Uwv) vs.  M.S. Demirci and Others. 
37 Joined Cases C-7/10 & C-9/10 Kahveci and Inan [2012], judgement of 29 March 
2012, not yet reported; see also K. Eisele (2013), “Meer Turks of toch meer 
Europees?”, Over de grens, Vol. 4, No. 6, pp. 3-5. 
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4. SOCIAL SECURITY RIGHTS OF THIRD-
COUNTRY NATIONALS UNDER THE 
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ASSOCIATION 
AGREEMENTS 
ANJA WIESBROCK 
1. Introduction 
In the late 1970s, the European Community concluded a series of bilateral 
Cooperation Agreements with some Mediterranean countries, including 
Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Under the framework of the 1995 Barcelona 
process,1 this first set of cooperation agreements was replaced with the 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs). Between 1998 and 
2005, the EU concluded EMAAs with seven countries in the southern 
Mediterranean, namely Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco 
and Tunisia. All seven Agreements contain some provisions on social 
benefits, but the nature of the rights granted varies significantly. The 
EMAAs concluded with Israel,2 Tunisia,3 Morocco4 and Algeria5 contain the 
most far-reaching social security rights, most notably the right to equal 
treatment with nationals in the field of social security.  
The social security provisions in the EMAAs have been subject to 
litigation before the European Courts. Migrant workers from the Maghreb 
states and their family members have invoked their social security rights 
before national courts, giving the CJEU the opportunity to reaffirm and 
                                                   
1 See the Final Declaration of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial 
Conference of 27 and 28 November 1995 and its work programme. 
2 Decision 2000/384/EC, OJ L 147, 21.6.2000. 
3 Decision 98/238/EC, OJ L 97/1, 30.3.1998. 
4 Decision 2000/204/EC, OJ L 70/1, 18.3.2000. 
5 Decision 2005/690/EC, OJ L 265/1, 10.10.2005. 
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develop them. It is likely, however, that the few cases that have reached the 
CJEU represent only the tip of the iceberg. It is only if a judge becomes 
doubtful whether a refusal to equal treatment is in compliance with EU law 
and can be persuaded to raise a preliminary question that the European 
Courts become involved. Besides, considering the limited number of cases 
that have been decided by the CJEU since the adoption of the EMAAs in 
the 1970s, one might question the visibility of the rights contained in the 
EMAAs amongst migrant workers and their family members.  
Nonetheless, the cases that have been decided by the EU Court 
provide a good illustration of the key controversies surrounding the scope 
of application of the right to equal treatment in social security for workers 
and their families as contained in the EMAAs. In particular, it highlights 
the proactive role of the CJEU in interpreting those rights vis-à-vis a more 
restrictive reading of the EMAAs by the member states. Over the years, the 
member states have developed different arguments in order to try and limit 
the impact of the Association Agreements with the Maghreb states on their 
social security systems. First, they have tried to argue on various occasions 
that the equal treatment provisions contained in the Agreements are not 
capable of having direct effect in the EU. Another approach has been to 
attempt to limit the personal and material scope of the equal treatment 
provisions.  
It is notable that the case law is dominated by the frequent 
reoccurrence of some member states, namely Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands.6 There are several possible explanations for this concentration 
of case law on three member states. First, all three countries received a 
rather large number of guest workers from the southern Mediterranean, 
whereas in other member states, such as Germany, migrant workers are 
mostly of Turkish origin. It is also possible that, in comparison with other 
member states, Belgium and the Netherlands have a relatively developed 
network of immigration lawyers who inform migrant workers of their 
rights and who have the necessary knowledge and experience to plead 
cases before the courts and to argue successfully for a preliminary reference 
procedure.  
                                                   
6 Other member states, such as Germany and the UK, have been subject to rulings 
before the CJEU in relation to other provisions in the EMAAs, such as the right to 
equal treatment as regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal. See, 
for example, Case C-416/96 El-Yassini [1999] ECR I-1209; Case C-97/05 Gattoussi 
[2006] ECR I-11917. 
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After presenting an overview of the social security rights contained in 
the different EMAAs, this chapter discusses the major controversies 
regarding the enforcement of social security rights contained in the EMAAs 
as they have come to the fore in the case law. It concludes that the CJEU has 
been reluctant to accept any arguments from the side of the member states 
trying to limit the scope of the right to non-discrimination in the field of 
social security. To the contrary, it has interpreted the social security rights 
contained in the EMAAs extensively and has decided in favour of the 
migrant workers and their family members in the large majority of cases. In 
its case law on the EMAAs, the Court of Justice has vigorously defended 
the rights of migrant workers and has pursued a maximalist approach to 
enforcement that has parallels with the approach to internal EU law.7 
Where it has departed from internal EU reasoning and has refrained from 
relying on internal market case law, this has been done to the benefit of the 
migrant workers concerned. The combination of an expansive 
interpretation of the non-discrimination clauses and the increasing 
regulation of migrants’ admission conditions in other EU secondary 
legislation, such as the Directives on students8 and family reunification,9 
has limited the ability of member states to control access by third-country 
nationals to their social security systems.  
2. Social security rights in the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements 
The EMAAs concluded with Tunisia,10 Morocco11 and Algeria12 provide 
that nationals of these three countries legally employed in a member states 
                                                   
7 For a more general argument of (international) Treaty enforcement by the CJEU, 
see M. Mendez (2010), “The Legal Effects of Community Agreements: Maximalist 
Treaty Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques”, The European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 83-104. 
8 Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of 
admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, 
unremunerated training or voluntary service. 
9 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification. 
10 Decision 98/238/EC, OJ L 97/1, 30. 3.1998. 
11 Decision 2000/204/EC, OJ L 70/1, 18.3.2000. 
12 Decision 2005/690/EC, OJ L 265/1, 10.10.2005. 
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and their legally residing family members shall enjoy, in the field of social 
security, treatment free of any discrimination based on nationality relative 
to the nationals of the host country in which they are employed.13 The right 
to equality of treatment covers the following social security benefits: 
sickness and maternity benefits, invalidity, old-age and survivor’s benefits, 
industrial accident and occupational disease benefits, death, 
unemployment and family benefits. The Association Councils recently 
adopted new provisions to implement the principles on the coordination of 
social security systems contained in the EMAAs,14 which contain a new 
equal treatment clause and refer to all benefits contained in Regulation 
883/2004, including paternity and pre-retirement benefits. The Agreement 
with Israel15 has only recently been supplemented with an equal treatment 
clause.16 Since the entry into force of a Decision of the Association Council 
on the coordination of social security systems in 2010, Israeli workers and 
their family members have enjoyed equal treatment with nationals of their 
country of employment as regards the same types of social security benefits 
listed above.  
Furthermore, all four EMAAs provide that periods of insurance, 
residence or employment completed in the different member states in 
respect of old-age, invalidity and survivor’s benefits, family, sickness and 
maternity benefits and medical care shall be aggregated.17 Workers from 
Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Israel also have the right to receive family 
allowances for family members residing in the host state. The Agreements 
further provide for the transfer to the workers’ home states of all their 
pensions and allowances for old-age, survivor’s, accident at work, 
occupational illness or invalidity benefits, with the exception of non-
contributory payments. The recent Association Council decisions contain a 
waiving of residence clauses, implying that any exportable benefits listed 
                                                   
13 See Article 68 of the EMAA with Algeria and Article 65 of the EMAAs with 
Morocco and Tunisia. 
14 Council Decision 2010/697/EU, OJ L 306/1, 23.11.2010; Council Decision 
2010/698/EU, OJ L 306/8, 23.11.2010; Council Decision 2010/699/EU, OJ L 
306/14, 23.11.2010. 
15 Decision 2000/384/EC, OJ L 147, 21.6.2000. 
16 Council Decision 2010/700/EU, OJ L 306/21, 23.11.2010. 
17 Article 68 of the EMAA with Algeria; Article 65 of the EMAAs with Morocco and 
Tunisia; Article 64 of the EMAA with Israel. 
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shall not be subject to any reduction, modification, suspension, withdrawal 
or confiscation on grounds of a change of residence to the worker’s country 
of origin.  
The rights regarding social security benefits in the remaining EMAAs 
are much more limited. The Agreements with Egypt and Lebanon go no 
further than a vague reference to the fair treatment of Egyptian/Lebanese 
workers and an agreement to initiate talks on social security rights at the 
request of one of the parties.18 The references to social benefits in the 
Agreement with Jordan are even more limited. It merely envisages the 
establishment of a dialogue on all social issues of mutual interest as a 
means to foster the movement of workers and the equal treatment and 
social integration of legal residents in their respective host countries.19 
Similar clauses on dialogue in social matters of mutual interest can be 
found in the Agreements with the other Mediterranean states.  
3. Key controversies in the enforcement of social security 
rights contained in the EMAAs 
3.1 The direct effect and immediate applicability of the non-
discrimination provisions 
As mentioned above, on the basis of Articles 65 and 68 of the respective 
Association Agreements, Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian workers and 
their family members living in a host state enjoy equal treatment with 
nationals with respect to social security benefits. The same applies to Israeli 
workers on the basis of the Decision of the Association Council. The Court 
held for the first time in 1991 in Kziber20 that Article 41(1) (now Art. 65(1)) of 
the Cooperation Agreement with Morocco had direct effect. The national 
authorities argued that Article 41(1) did not have direct effect, since its 
application was subject to action by the Association Council. The CJEU did 
not accept this argument and found that even though Article 42(1) foresaw 
Association Council implementing measures, the non-discrimination 
provision was directly applicable and not subordinated in its execution or 
effects to any further implementing measures. It was thus sufficiently 
                                                   
18 Article 62 of the EMAA with Egypt; Joint Declaration relating to workers (Article 
65 of the Agreement) of the EMAA with Lebanon. 
19 Article 80 of the EMAA with Jordan. 
20 Case C-18/90 Onem vs. Kziber [1991] ECR I-199. 
50  ANJA WIESBROCK 
precise and unconditional to have direct effect. Moreover, the foreseen 
adoption of Council implementing measures did not call into question the 
immediate applicability of the principle of non-discrimination.21  
The national authorities further argued that the purpose and nature 
of the agreement, which was essentially intended to promote the economic 
development of Morocco and did not refer to Morocco’s association with or 
future accession to the EU, prevented the provision from being directly 
applicable. The CJEU equally rejected this as an argument liable to prevent 
certain provisions of the Agreement from having direct effect. It 
emphasised the overall objective of the Cooperation Agreement, namely 
the promotion of cooperation between the Contracting Parties.22  
The CJEU has applied the same reasoning to the identically worded 
non-discrimination provisions contained in the Agreement with Algeria 
and Tunisia. In Krid, it held that the non-discrimination provision in the 
Cooperation Agreement with Algeria had direct effect. It stressed the 
similarities in content and objectives of the Moroccan and the Algerian 
Agreements and underlined their objective of promoting economic and 
social relations between the Contracting Parties.23  
After the Cooperation Agreements were replaced with the second 
generation of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, it was 
challenged whether the relevant case law was still applicable. The Court of 
Justice swiftly addressed this question in Echouikh, finding that the non-
discrimination clauses in the new Agreements were formulated in identical 
terms and that the new Agreements furthermore had complementing 
objectives. The reasoning on direct effect of the non-discrimination 
provisions was thus directly transposable to the new Association 
Agreements.24 
Hence, the CJEU has firmly rejected any attempts by the member 
states to contest the direct effect of the right to non-discrimination in the 
field of social security of Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian migrant 
workers and their family members. Undoubtedly, the same reasoning 
                                                   
21 Ibid., para. 19. 
22 Ibid., paras. 20 and 21. 
23 Case C-103/94 Krid [1995] ECR I-719, para. 22 ff.; see also Case C-113/97 
Babahenini [1998] ECR I-183. 
24 Case C-336/05 Echouikh [2006] ECR I-5223, para. 40. 
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applies to the identical provision contained in the implementation decision 
of the Association Council on the Agreement with Israel.  
3.2 The material and personal scope of the non-discrimination 
provisions 
The member states have tried to limit the access to social security benefits 
of workers and family members from the Maghreb states by interpreting 
the scope ratione materiae and ratione personae of the non-discrimination 
provisions restrictively. The CJEU has turned a deaf ear to any such 
arguments. It underlined in cases such as Echouik25 and El Youssfi26 that the 
principle of non-discrimination implied a right to claim social security 
benefits “on the same basis as nationals of the host member state”, barring 
member states from imposing additional or stricter conditions for migrant 
workers than those applicable to nationals of that state. Nonetheless, 
national authorities have now and again stirred controversies and raised 
objections in front of the European Courts as regards the material scope of 
the provision (i.e. the types of social security benefits covered) and its 
personal scope (i.e. the categories of persons who can rely on the right to 
non-discrimination before the national courts). 
Regarding the scope ratione materiae of the non-discrimination 
provisions, the CJEU has consistently held that the term ‘social security’ 
must be interpreted by analogy with the same concept in the Regulation on 
the coordination of social security systems as applicable in the member 
states of the EU (now Regulation 883/2004).27 This means that all kinds of 
social security benefits covered by Regulation 883/2004 must also be 
guaranteed to migrant workers and their family members on the same 
basis as to nationals of the host state. The EMAAs contain an explicit list of 
social security benefits covered in conformity with Article 4 of the 
previously applicable Council Regulation 1408/71 and the relevant case 
law. These include sickness and maternity benefits, invalidity, old-age and 
survivor’s benefits, industrial accident and occupational disease benefits 
and death, unemployment and family benefits. Since the recently adopted 
implementation decisions of the Association Councils explicitly refer to 
                                                   
25 Ibid., paras. 55–58. 
26 Case C-276/06 El Youssfi [2007] ECR I-2851, paras. 51–56. 
27 Case C-126/95 Hallouzi-Choho [1996] ECR I-4807, para. 25; Case C-113/97 
Babahenini [1998] ECR I-183, para. 26. 
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Regulation 883/2004 as the relevant frame of reference,28 the right to non-
discrimination must also cover paternity and pre-retirement benefits, 
which were newly added under this Regulation.  
3.3 The reframing of what is social security and social assistance 
Be that as it may, the member states have continuously questioned whether 
certain types of benefits fall under the notion of social security and are 
covered by the right to non-discrimination under the EMAAs. A particular 
challenge in this context has been the need to distinguish between social 
security and social assistance, which is not covered by the equal treatment 
clause. National benefits that have been investigated by the Court of Justice 
as regards their categorisation as social security benefits for the purpose of 
the EMAAs include guaranteed income for elderly persons, allowances for 
disabled persons and unemployed young workers and armed forces 
invalidity pensions, as well as supplementary pension allowances from a 
national solidarity fund and seniority supplements to unemployment 
benefits. The CJEU has consistently rejected the exclusion of certain types 
of benefits from the notion of social security that also demonstrate some 
characteristics of a social assistance measure.  
In El Youssfi,29 the Moroccan widow of a migrant worker living in 
Belgium applied for the Guaranteed Income for Elderly Persons on the 
same basis as Belgian nationals. According to the national authorities, she 
was not eligible to receive such benefits. They argued that a guaranteed 
income for elderly persons, which is aimed at ensuring their minimum 
means of subsistence, should be categorised as social assistance, falling 
outside the scope of Article 65(1) of the Association Agreement with 
Morocco. The CJEU came to a different conclusion. It held that there was no 
doubt that a guaranteed minimum income for elderly persons that is aimed 
at ensuring a minimum level of subsistence falls within the concept of 
social security under Article 65(1) of the Association Agreement, in spite of 
the fact that it might also possess some characteristics of a social assistance 
measure.30  
                                                   
28 Article 1(b) of the Decision of the Association Council. 
29 Case C-276/06, El Youssfi [2007] ECR I-2851, paras. 51–56. 
30 Ibid., para. 60. 
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The CJEU has also made clear that special non-contributory benefits,31 
such as social minimum benefits, which fall in the grey area between social 
security and social assistance, fall under the scope of the Association 
Agreements. In Krid,32 the widow of an Algerian worker, who received a 
survivor’s pension, was refused a supplementary allowance from the 
National Solidarity Fund paid to the recipients of old-age or invalidity 
pensions who have insufficient means of their own. The CJEU found that 
the right to such supplementary benefits was designed to increase the 
amount of pensions paid by way of social security, without any assessment 
of individual needs or circumstances, which is a characteristic of social 
assistance. Hence, even though the same law provided for certain 
advantages which could be classified as assistance, this did not alter the 
social security character of a benefit linked to an invalidity, old-age or 
survivor’s pension.33  
In some early cases, the member states tried to argue that certain 
benefits, such as disability or unemployment benefits, did not fall under the 
concept of social security of the Association Agreements, because they were 
not explicitly mentioned in Council Regulation 1408/71 or because they 
were not listed as a type of benefit to which the aggregation of insurance or 
employment periods applies. The CJEU made clear in cases such as Yousfi 
and Alami that certain benefits not listed in one or other provisions were 
not necessarily excluded from the scope of the non-discrimination 
provision, in particular where such benefits were traditionally regarded as 
a branch of social security and had been treated as such in the case law. In 
Yousfi, the CJEU held that disability benefits fell within the scope of Article 
41(1) of the Association Agreement with Morocco. Even though such 
benefits were not specifically mentioned in Council Regulation 1408/71 
(before its amendment), the CJEU had always included disability benefits 
within the scope of the Regulation under the concept of invalidity 
                                                   
31 These are non-contributory benefits that provide supplementary, substitute or 
ancillary cover against the classic social security risks covered by Regulation 
1408/71 and guarantee the person concerned a minimum subsistence income, or 
solely specific protection for the disabled. Such benefits are included in the 
material scope of Regulation 1408/71 but are confined to the territory of the 
competent state and cannot be exported. They are also excluded from the free 
transfer of benefits to the home country under the Association Agreements. 
32 Case C-103/94 Krid [1995] ECR I-719. 
33 Ibid., paras. 34 and 35. 
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benefits.34 Hence, Mr Yousfi, a Moroccan worker suffering permanent 
incapacity for work following an industrial accident, had to be granted a 
disability benefit on the same terms as nationals (provided that the 
applicable period of residence of five years was fulfilled). In Alami, it was 
held that unemployment benefits must be considered as falling under the 
concept of social security. Since unemployment benefits have traditionally 
been regarded as a branch of social security and are listed as such under 
Regulation 1408/71, a seniority supplement to unemployment benefits had 
to be regarded as falling within the scope of the non-discrimination clause. 
It was irrelevant in this context that unemployment benefits were not 
mentioned under Article 41(2) of the Association Agreement as a type of 
benefit to which the aggregation of insurance or employment periods 
applies.35  
Furthermore, even benefits that are granted purely on the basis of 
residence, rather than on the basis of contributions made, may fall within 
the scope of the concept of social security under the Association 
Agreements. This was held in Hallouzi-Choho,36 which concerned the spouse 
of a Moroccan worker who had to be granted a transitional benefit under a 
national old-age insurance scheme. She was denied such benefits, granted 
on the basis of a transitional arrangement for the years prior to the entry 
into force of the General Law on Age Insurance, solely on grounds of her 
nationality. The national authorities emphasised the special nature of the 
transitional arrangement, consisting of the fact that the periods prior to the 
entry into force of the new law were not actual periods of insurance, since 
the beneficiary did not have to pay any contributions and mere residence in 
the Netherlands was sufficient for insurance purposes. The CJEU did not 
accept this reasoning, emphasising that the refusal to grant social security 
benefits was solely based on the fact that the claimant did not have Dutch 
nationality, running counter to her right to be treated, in the field of social 
security, as if she were a national of the member state concerned.37 
                                                   
34 Case C-58/93 Yousfi [1994] ECR I-199, para. 25. 
35 Case C-23/02 Alami [2003] ECR I-1399 , paras. 24-26. 
36 Case C-126/95 Hallouzi-Choho [1996] ECR I-4807. 
37 Ibid., paras. 33-35. 
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3.4 The requirement of applying the same conditions to migrant 
workers and nationals 
The CJEU has also ruled out any possibility to subject migrant workers to 
additional criteria not applied to nationals of the host state in order to 
benefit from social security benefits. For instance, in the previously 
mentioned Alami case,38 a Moroccan worker could not be denied a seniority 
supplement to an unemployment benefit on the grounds that he was 
previously working in another member state, since no such condition was 
imposed on national workers. At the same time, member states are free to 
alter their social security systems, provided that the same rules apply to 
nationals and migrant workers. In Fahmi,39 the CJEU found that member 
states were permitted to abolish a dependent child’s allowance in respect of 
students aged between 18 and 27 years and replace it with a right to study 
finance. It emphasised that the member states were free to organise their 
own social security systems, in particular by determining the conditions for 
entitlements to benefits, provided that they do not infringe EU law. Since 
the dependent child allowance in respect of students aged between 18 and 
27 was abolished without regard to their nationality, no discrimination 
based on nationality could be established.40 
3.5 An inclusive notion of ‘worker’? 
Next to their attempts to limit the material scope of the non-discrimination 
clause, the member states have tried to exclude certain types of workers or 
certain types of family members from the right to non-discrimination in the 
field of social security. The non-discrimination provisions apply to workers 
of Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian or Israeli nationality as well as to family 
members residing with the worker in the member state of employment. In 
Kziber, the CJEU made clear that not only active workers benefit from the 
provision, but also those who have reached retirement age or who have 
become entitled to allowances under one of the other social security 
branches, such as an invalidity pension.41 It emphasised in particular that 
matters such as old-age or invalidity pensions and annuities enjoyed by 
                                                   
38 Case C-23/02 Alami [2003] ECR I-1399. 
39 Case C-33/99 Fahmi [2001] ECR I-2415. 
40 Ibid., para. 30.  
41 See Case C-18/90 Onem vs. Kziber [1991] ECR I-199, para. 27; see also Case C-
58/93, Yousfi vs. Belgian State [1994] ECR I-1353, para. 21. 
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retired workers are mentioned as regards the benefit of aggregation and the 
possibility of transferring benefits to Morocco in Article 41(2) and (4) of the 
Agreement. The same does not apply, however, to unemployed nationals 
of the Maghreb states and their family members. In Haddad,42 the Court 
concluded that an unemployed Moroccan student married to an 
unemployed Moroccan national could not rely on Article 41(1) of the 
Cooperation Agreement with Morocco, since she could not be considered 
to be a family member of a Moroccan worker.43 In spite of the fact that the 
couple was insured voluntarily under the national sickness insurance 
scheme, Ms Haddad could not prove that she had a close family 
relationship with a Moroccan worker and therefore could not benefit from 
the equal treatment clause. Thus, even though the concept of worker for the 
purpose of the EMAAs appears to be rather inclusive, rights are strictly 
limited to nationals of the southern Mediterranean states who have 
acquired social security rights in an EU member state on the basis of their 
status of worker or family member.  
3.6 Equal rights of migrant workers’ family members  
The concept of family members under Articles 65 and 68 of the EMAAs has 
been interpreted broadly by the CJEU. It includes not only the spouse and 
minor children of the migrant worker, but also other close relatives, such as 
relatives in the ascending line. According to the Court of Justice in 
Mesbah,44 it follows from the very wording of that provision that the rule of 
equal treatment is not exclusively for the benefit of the migrant worker’s 
spouse and children. The more general expression of family members is 
capable of covering other relatives, including those in the ascending line. In 
addition, the CJEU emphasised that the term ‘family members’ was not 
confined to members of the same blood as the worker, but could also cover 
persons related to him by marriage, provided that they were living under 
the same roof. Consequently, the mother of a migrant worker’s spouse who 
had been resident in the household of her son-in-law had to be considered 
                                                   
42 Case C-358/02 Haddad [2004] ECR I-1563. 
43 If the person concerned had qualified as the family member of a Maghreb 
worker, however, he/she had had the right to unemployment benefits or similar 
allowances provided for young persons in search of employment. See Case C-
18/90 Onem vs. Kziber [1991] ECR I-199, para. 29. 
44 See Case C-179/98 Mesbah [1999] ECR I-7955. 
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to be a member of the family of that worker.45 Similarly, in El Youssfi, the 
CJEU held that in addition to being the widow of a migrant worker, the 
applicant could be covered by Article 65(1) of the Association Agreement if 
she resided with her son in Belgium and the latter was both a worker and 
of Moroccan nationality. 46 The same reasoning can be applied to other close 
family members residing in the household of the migrant worker whether 
related to him by blood or marriage, such as siblings of the worker or his 
spouse.  
Furthermore, the CJEU has consistently rejected all attempts by 
national authorities to make a distinction between the rights enjoyed by the 
migrant worker himself and his/her family members. In cases such as 
Hallouzi-Choho and Babahenini, the member states argued that certain types 
of rights, such as the old-age transitional benefit in Hallouzi-Choho,47 could 
not be relied upon by family members of the migrant workers, since the 
right to such benefits was intended by the relevant legislation to be a 
personal right and not a derived right acquired through the status of family 
member of a migrant worker. The CJEU concluded that no distinction 
could be made between personal rights and derived rights for the purpose 
of applying the non-discrimination provisions contained in the Association 
Agreements. Interestingly, it departed (to the benefit of the applicant) from 
a parallel interpretation of the right to non-discrimination in the EMAAs 
and the internal EU social security Regulation 1408/71. According to the 
CJEU, the family members covered by the non-discrimination clause were 
not the same as those covered by Article 2 of Regulation 1408/71, so that 
the case law distinguishing between derived rights and personal rights 
could not be applied.48  
Similarly, in Babahenini,49 the Belgian authorities argued that the 
family member of an Algerian migrant worker could not rely on the non-
discrimination clause for the purpose of receiving a disability allowance, 
since such a benefit was treated as a personal and not a derived right under 
national law. The CJEU reiterated that the case law on derived rights and 
personal rights given in the context of Regulation 1408/71 was not 
                                                   
45 Ibid., paras. 44-47. 
46 Case C-276/06 El Youssfi [2007] ECR I-2851, para. 70. 
47 Case C-126/95 Hallouzi-Choho [1996] ECR I-4807. 
48 Ibid., para. 30. 
49 Case C-113/97 Babahenini [1998] ECR I-183. 
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applicable to the case at hand and that the applicant fell within the personal 
scope of the non-discrimination clause, irrespective of whether the benefit 
for which she had applied was awarded as a personal right or in her 
capacity as the family member of an Algerian migrant worker.50 It follows 
from this case law not only that no distinction may be made between 
personal rights and derived rights within the context of the right to non-
discrimination in social security matters, it can also be concluded that the 
CJEU is willing to depart from the case law on EU social security 
legislation, in spite of an explicit reference in the Decisions of the 
Association Council to the concept of family member as defined in Article 
1(i) of Regulation 883/2004.51  
4. Conclusions 
The right to social security benefits on the same terms as nationals of the 
host state and the possibility to aggregate and export certain entitlements 
are key elements of promoting labour migration and ensuring the 
successful integration of third-country nationals in the EU. This is 
increasingly recognised by the EU institutions. The European Commission, 
in particular, has emphasised the merits of more effective social security 
coordination with third countries as a way to facilitate labour mobility.52  
The preceding analysis has shown that the social security rights 
contained in the EMAAs, in particular the application and interpretation of 
the right to non-discrimination in social security matters, have not been free 
from controversy. The defendant and intervening member states have tried 
to argue for a restrictive interpretation of the non-discrimination clause, 
challenging its direct effect and direct applicability and arguing for a 
limited material and personal scope of application. The CJEU has 
confirmed the broad scope of the principle of non-discrimination laid down 
                                                   
50 Ibid., para. 25. 
51 See Article 1(f) of Council Decision 2010/697/EU. 
52 See European Commission Communication, The External Dimension of EU 
Social Security Coordination, COM(2012) 153 final, 30.03.2012. In addition, the 
right to non-discrimination in the field of social security can be found as a standard 
clause in the recently adopted or scheduled directives on labour migration. See 
Directive 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for a single permit, 
Directive 2009/50/EC on highly qualified workers, Directive 2005/71/EC on 
researchers, Proposal for a Directive on seasonal workers, COM(2010) 379 final, 
Proposal for a Directive on intra-corporate transferees, COM(2010) 378 final. 
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in EMAAs, thereby strengthening the social security rights of workers from 
the Mediterranean countries in the EU. It has repeatedly confirmed the 
direct effect of said provisions and has rejected any attempts by national 
authorities to exclude certain types of social security benefits or certain 
categories of persons from the scope of the right to non-discrimination. It is 
crucial to note that the concepts of ‘social security’, ‘worker’ and ‘family 
member’ in the EMAAs are open, meaning that they do not have a 
restricted or fixed meaning on the basis of one or other legal or policy 
document. In spite of the fact that both the EMAAs themselves and EU 
social security legislation contain specific references to the meaning of these 
concepts, it is clear from the case law that these references are in no way 
binding to the CJEU. To the contrary, the relevant concepts are to be 
interpreted dynamically and may cover more benefits or a wider range of 
persons than indicated in the relevant legislation. Even social benefits that 
possess certain characteristics of social assistance or that are not granted on 
the basis of contributions but on grounds of residence are covered by the 
non-discrimination clause. The same applies to family members in the 
broad sense of the word, going beyond the nuclear family of spouse and 
children.  
In spite of the fact that the social protection of migrant workers from 
the Mediterranean still leaves much to be desired,53 the extensive 
interpretation of the non-discrimination provisions by the CJEU has 
provided them and their family members with a solid right to enjoy access 
to a wide range of social benefits on the same terms as nationals of their 
host state. In fact, it appears that the CJEU has interpreted the social 
security provisions in the EMAAs in a manner that shares parallels with the 
‘maximalist treaty enforcement logic’ that it applies to internal EU law.54  
At the same time, the cases discussed above illustrate the tensions 
and inconsistencies between the different governmental departments and 
the need for a more integrated, comprehensive approach to migration 
management. The Association Agreements were concluded in the 1970s 
(and renewed in the 1990s and 2000s) against the background of a wider 
foreign affairs agenda to foster cooperation between the EU and the 
                                                   
53 See A. Boudahrain (2000), “The Insecure Social Protection of Migrant Workers 
from the Maghreb”, International Social Security Review, Vol. 53, pp. 47-73. 
54 M. Mendez (2010), op. cit.; see also C. Eckes (2010), “International law as law of 
the EU: The role of the Court of Justice”, CLEER Working Papers No. 2010/6, 
Asser Institute, The Hague. 
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countries of the southern Mediterranean. The objective of promoting 
cooperation between the Contracting Parties has been a crucial element in 
the CJEU’s teleological interpretation of the social security clause in the 
EMAAs, which justifies an expansive approach to the application of 
individual rights.  
At first sight, it may not seem that surprising that the application of 
the Association Agreements that were agreed upon by the representatives 
of national foreign ministries in the European Council has been challenged 
by the interior ministries. Whilst the former pursue a broader agenda and 
often grant rights to migrant workers from third countries as part of a 
‘package’ that includes closer economic and trade cooperation, interior 
ministers are inherently eager to defend national sovereignty and are 
concerned about ‘losing control’ over who is admitted and who is a 
beneficiary of social benefits. As a consequence of CJEU case law, the 
possibilities of the member states to restrict access to their social security 
systems for migrant workers from the Mediterranean states are limited. In 
addition, it has to be underlined that the Association Agreements interact 
with the legislation applicable to third-country nationals in general. As the 
EU increasingly regulates the admission of third-country nationals, be it as 
family members, students, researchers, highly qualified workers, intra-
corporate transferees or seasonal workers, national interior ministries lose 
more and more control in respect of who is admitted to their territory.55 As 
soon as the person is residing legally on their territory and becomes 
employed, the equal treatment provisions apply. This occurs regardless of 
whether the persons concerned have previously been admitted as workers 
or in a different capacity, such as students or family members.56 Hence, the 
dynamics of a non-discrimination provision may go further than desired by 
the interior ministries of the member states, as CJEU case law and newly 
adopted secondary legislation provide for an extended scope of rights.  
At the same time, it should not be forgotten that Association 
Agreements are so-called mixed agreements that were not only agreed 
                                                   
55 Moreover, migrant workers from the Mediterranean may be able to enjoy the 
benefits granted under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 987/2009, once they find themselves in a cross-border 
situation and are not already covered by these Regulations solely on grounds of 
their nationality. Regulation (EU) No 1231/2010 of 24 November 2010, OJ L 344/1, 
29.12.2010. 
56 And, by analogy, Turkish workers. See Case C-294/06 Payir [2008] ECR I-203. 
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upon in the Council but that also had to undergo a lengthy ratification 
process by the national parliaments of the member states. At least at this 
stage, an intensive national debate should have taken place so as to ensure 
consistency between the policy objectives and strategies of the various 
national ministries. It seems, however, that the interior ministries of the 
member states are hesitant to apply the rights granted in the EMAAs and 
intend to limit their scope by applying a restrictive reading to the social 
security provisions. Within the context of the further development of the 
EMAAs, not least in the application of the recently adopted 
implementation decisions of the Association Councils, it is crucial to ensure 
greater consistency between national ministries and to guarantee that 
broad international relations policy objectives do not become compromised 
by a restrictive interpretation of rights. 
The case of the EMAAs reveals the limited extent to which the social 
security rights of migrant workers from the southern Mediterranean are 
subject to national discussions and debate. At the same time, this means 
that migrant workers are often not sufficiently informed about their social 
security rights under EU law. It is individuals who keep those rights 
visible, by exercising them and invoking them before courts and other 
national authorities. A lack of knowledge and information about their 
existence and scope means that the social security rights are not as 
frequently invoked as they could be. In order to allow for a greater reliance 
upon the rights contained in the agreements, it is crucial to ensure that 
information is available to national immigration officials, judges and, most 
importantly, individual migrants. 
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5. ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND PEOPLE IN 
NEED OF INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION 
MADELINE GARLICK* 
1. EU legal basis for support for asylum-seekers and 
protection holders 
The rights of asylum-seekers and people found to be in need of 
international protection in the European Union to social benefits in member 
states1 are governed by EU Directives, and national laws adopted there 
under. These measures have been the subject of considerable public and 
political debate, particularly in member states experiencing economic 
difficulties in recent years, where they have been perceived by at least some 
observers to place considerable financial burdens on the societies and 
governments hosting those seeking or in need of protection.  
Asylum-seekers are entitled, under Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 
January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers 
(the Reception Conditions Directive), to “material reception conditions to 
ensure a standard of living adequate for the health of applicants [for 
protection] and capable of ensuring their subsistence”.2 They also have 
defined rights to housing, the means of subsistence, health care, education 
                                                   
* The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s personal opinion and do not 
necessarily reflect the position of the United Nations or UNHCR. 
1 Unless otherwise specified, the terms ‘social benefits’, ‘social welfare’, ‘social 
assistance’ and ‘material reception conditions’ will be used to refer to various 
forms of State support, direct and indirect, financial or otherwise, to asylum-
seekers and international protection beneficiaries in the EU, in accordance with the 
respective instruments laying down these entitlements.  
2 Article 13(2) of the Reception Conditions Directive; see also Recital 7 of the 
Reception Conditions Directive. 
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and support to address special needs.3 These entitlements are expressed in 
the Directive, which was the subject of a recast proposal issued by the 
European Commission in 20094 and subsequently revised in June 2011.5 
Agreement on the recast Directive is expected in early 2013. The debates 
around the recast proposals have cast into sharp relief the sensitivities and 
concerns about the perceived high cost of social welfare and other 
entitlements of asylum-seekers, the majority of whom are expected not to 
qualify for protection. The question of whether EU member states’ citizens 
are ready to support extensive and costly assistance schemes for such 
people played a significant role in the political discussions on these 
changes. At the same time, the degree of leadership that governments and 
EU institutions have been ready to show in calling for solidarity and a 
humanitarian approach in this context has also influenced the negotiations 
in important ways.  
People in need of international protection in the EU – including those 
qualifying as refugees and those entitled to subsidiary protection – are 
defined6 by criteria laid out in Directive 2011/95/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), 
known as the Qualification Directive. This instrument, which repeals and 
replaces a 2004 Directive7 on the same subject, also sets out the entitlements 
                                                   
3 Articles 10, 13, 14, 15, 20 of the Reception Conditions Directive; amended 
provisions related to similar areas are expected to be adopted in the recast 
Qualification Directive in 2013.  
4 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers (Recast), COM(2008) 815, 3.12.2008. 
5 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers, 
COM(2011)320, 1.6.2011. 
6 Qualification Directive, Article 2(d) on definition of a refugee; Article 2(f) defining 
a person eligible for subsidiary protection, and related articles. 
7 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification of 
third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, 
OJ L 304/12, 30.9.2004 (2004 Qualification Directive). 
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of refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries to social benefits and 
other forms of support in the member state which has granted them 
protection.8 The entitlements of refugees to social benefits and other 
support under EU law broadly reflect the obligations in the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees, to which all EU member states are 
signatories, and have been relatively undisputed in political discussions on 
the issue in recent years. The rights of subsidiary protection beneficiaries, 
by contrast, were extensively debated in the course of negotiations on the 
original 2004 Directive, as well as the 2011 recast, in ways that suggest 
member states see subsidiary protection needs as less compelling, or less 
durable, than those of refugees.  
This chapter aims to explore briefly the main debates around 
entitlements of asylum-seekers, refugees and subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries in the EU. It will examine some of the key assumptions and 
premises underlying these discussions in light of the limited data available 
on the cost of state-funded benefits. It concludes by proposing that further 
research and analysis is needed, based on empirical data on the financial 
demands placed by asylum-seekers and protection beneficiaries on public 
funds and also in light of the contributions they could potentially make to 
their host societies. 
2. Reliance on social benefits: available research and data 
2.1 Social benefits and support to asylum-seekers 
Several public reports have sought to assess the implementation of the 
Reception Conditions Directive in practice, including in relation to its 
provisions on material support and other social benefits. The first in-depth 
analysis of the application of the Directive, published in a 2006 synthesis 
report by the Odysseus Academic Network9 under contract for the 
European Commission, contained a qualitative assessment of the adequacy 
of the support provided. It did not, however, set out the monetary sums 
provided or total support budgets for asylum-seekers in the member states.  
                                                   
8 Article 29, Qualification Directive. 
9 Odysseus (2006), Comparative overview of the implementation of the Directive 2003/9 of 
27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers in 
the EU member states, Odysseus Reception Study, Academic Network for Legal 
Studies on Immigration and Asylum in Europe. The report was made public via 
the internet some time after its submission to the European Commission.  
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The Odysseus Network reached several key conclusions on the 
provision of ‘material support’. First, where material reception conditions 
were provided exclusively or mostly in kind (rather than in the form of 
cash grants), and solely or mostly in state-supported collective reception 
centres in the member states, they were “generally deemed adequate.”10 
However, the study observed that no or insufficient provision was made 
for asylum-seekers’ clothing in support provided by some member states11, 
and the material conditions in some reception centres12 were inadequate.  
Second, the study concluded that where social benefits were 
provided in the form of financial allowances (the practice for all applicants 
in some member states, but only for applicants for whom no state-provided 
accommodation was available in others), those allowances were 
“inadequate to ensure the health and/or subsistence of asylum-seekers.”13 
The Odysseus Reception study also found that at the time of the 
research, asylum-seekers in several member states were entitled to benefits 
that were lower (in some cases far lower) than those available to that 
member states’ nationals, 14 an approach which at least one state considered 
as justified on the grounds that protection was seen as ‘temporary.’15 Other 
states provided assistance which was similar or equivalent to the levels 
enjoyed by nationals, being considered the minimum required to allow a 
person to live in dignity.  
Since 2009, the European Migration Network (EMN) has gathered 
data from EU member states and others in western Europe from responses 
to questions including the level and form of benefits offered to asylum-
seekers. This has offered an updated – if often partial – picture of the costs 
                                                   
10 Odysseus (2006), op. cit., Analysis of findings on question 12B, p. 28. 
11 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
12 Problematic conditions were observed in closed reception centres in Belgium, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia, and in open centres in 
Lithuania and Greece.  
13 Odysseus (2006), op. cit., p. 29: Austria, Cyprus, France, the Netherlands 
(policy/attitude), Portugal, Spain, Slovenia and the UK (delays), p. 31. 
14 Austria, France, Germany, Lithuania Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK. 
15 German authorities based their position on Administrative Court jurisprudence 
(Odysseus (2006), op. cit., p 31). However, this view disregards the fact that even 
during a potentially ‘temporary’ stay for the purposes of seeking or receiving 
protection, immediate material needs of the protected individual must be met. 
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to member states of support drawn by those seeking protection. The results 
are incomplete in some cases because of the limited number of states that 
have replied or agreed to disclosure of their responses. The data is also 
limited in that states often appear to provide information that is not in a 
comparable form, because it is calculated in different ways or takes into 
account different forms of support and omits others. A sample of some 
interesting findings and published data is set out below. 
In October 2009, in response to an ad hoc query submitted via the 
EMN, 19 states16 answered several questions on the amount of benefits paid 
to asylum-seekers living in reception centres, and what factors determined 
or affected their entitlements. As an illustration of the range of entitlements 
available, Belgium reported that accommodation, food, clothing, medical, 
social and psychological help, interpretation and legal representation, 
training and voluntary return were provided free of charge. In addition, 
asylum-seekers receiving this support were provided with ‘pocket-money’ 
totalling €6.50 per week for each adult or child at school below 12, with €5 
for unaccompanied minors. The amount could be increased if the asylum-
seeker performed community services. 
In Cyprus, by contrast, it was reported that single asylum-seekers in 
the limited available state-provided accommodation could receive €85.43 
per month. Germany provided support in kind to those in state 
accommodation, plus an allowance of €40 per week for those above 14 
years of age. Those living in other accommodation could receive €184 (for 
the head of the household), with €158 for other adults and €117 for children 
under seven. 
In Slovenia, all benefits were supposedly provided in kind, including 
for minor expenses such as bus fares. Additional money could only be 
obtained by performing jobs “in connection with the maintenance of the 
centre.”  
According to the EMN data, Spain took a different approach, 
providing support for those lacking economic resources based on item-by-
item requests, with a fixed scale for different forms of support (e.g. €175 for 
the purchase of clothing/footwear; €175 connected with the birth of a child; 
and €49.80 for a single adult’s “personal and transportation expense”).  
                                                   
16 Austria and Finland provided responses but did not consent to their publication 
on-line.  
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In case of a change in circumstances, the October 2009 survey results 
indicated that several states withdrew financial allowances after a negative 
asylum decision – including in cases where an appeal was lodged and a 
decision pending from the courts.  
An EMN report of October 2010 compiled information relating to the 
“daily reception cost per person” for asylum-seekers in 2009, based on a 
query from Sweden. With 17 respondents (most of whom agreed to 
publication of their information)17, it was noted that the daily cost to the 
state – calculated by dividing the sum of all officially-recorded costs 
(including provision of accommodation in reception centres, specialised 
care, salaries and administration for state authorities) by the number of 
applicants drawing from the services – varied significantly across the EU 
and its near neighbours. For instance, Belgium calculated that the average 
cost per day was €43, close to the cost of the preceding two years. In 
Cyprus, taking into account salaries, financial allowances for residents, 
food and expenses such as transportation, the average emerged at around 
€27 per day. Estonia did not provide a figure, simply saying the costs had 
‘increased’ over recent years. Poland presented the comparatively high 
figure of €280 per person per day, but this included costs of building 
construction/maintenance and vehicle maintenance in connection with 
transport costs which were apparently not taken into account in the 
calculations of some other states.  
In 2012, several queries in relation to the costs of supporting asylum-
seekers were launched again. One was a specific question relating to the 
amount and form of allowances and in-kind benefits provided to asylum-
seekers. This information was sought by Luxembourg explicitly in 
connection with the tripling in 2011 of asylum applications from nationals 
of Serbia and Montenegro, and the government’s reflections on whether to 
reduce the amount of support offered. Among the interesting responses 
from the participating states, Belgium reported that the amount of ‘pocket 
money’ for people receiving support in kind in reception centres had 
increased slightly in comparison with the 2009 level, to €7.10 for adults per 
week, and €5.30 for unaccompanied children. In the survey, Belgium also 
described its own ‘asylum crisis’, in which asylum-seeker numbers 
drastically exceeded capacity, and a court had fined the national reception 
authority for failing to provide accommodation and other entitlements as 
                                                   
17 The exceptions being Austria, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK. 
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required by law. As a result, some accommodation had to be rented by the 
state from hotels. Thereafter, Belgian law was changed to remove 
entitlements for those filing a second asylum application after an earlier 
rejection. 
France, which had not responded to some of the previous queries, 
indicated that single adults in reception centres received €91 per month if 
catering was provided, or €202 if they were required to cater for themselves 
– a relatively modest sum when taking into account the cost of living in 
some parts of the country. Italy provided a sobering picture of the level of 
entitlements available in that country, indicating that, apart from those who 
secured limited accommodation places at the regional level, asylum-seekers 
outside official centres would only have the right to financial assistance for 
their first 45 days in Italy. This amounted to a total of approximately €1,000 
for the duration of the asylum process. Other reports have indicated that 
this support budget is sufficient for only 3,150 persons in total, and that 
those who do not fall within this number must find their own means of 
support.18 
In April 2012, the EMN published responses to a question on the total 
estimated cost of the reception system in 2012. Among the 20 responses, 
Belgium indicated that the estimated cost of personnel in the reception 
authority was some €57 million, while the cost of running the collective 
centres came to just over €53 million. Funds provided to NGOs and local or 
other authorities in connection with some accommodation and services 
dispensed were close to €84 million.  
By contrast, the total budget for reception (scope undefined) in 
Bulgaria in 2012 was set at €1.6 million. In other countries in Central 
Europe, it ran to the hundreds of thousands – Romania at approximately 
€546,000, and Slovenia at €662,000. Meanwhile, Estonia’s sole reception 
centre cost €232,162 in 2012 (a jump of over €100,000 compared to the 
previous year).  
Germany did not provide a figure, as the 16 Länder had independent 
reception systems for which total costs were not available. Italy estimated 
its costs at around €35 million per year, and Luxembourg at approximately 
€17 million. On a different scale, the costs in the Netherlands were €425 
million, while Sweden set its support budget at €554 million. 
                                                   
18 E. Povoledo (2012), “The Italian Paradox on Refugees”‘, quoting UNHCR Italy, 
New York Times, 27 December. 
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In sum, the limited available data from cross-European sources 
provide a clear demonstration of the unequal financial burdens borne by 
different states, and also the different levels of investment in their systems 
and of the standard and quality of services and entitlements on offer. In 
some states, in absolute euro terms (while noting differences in GDP) and 
in terms of the amounts provided to individuals, it would appear that 
social support for asylum-seekers is extremely low. 
The limited survey conducted for this chapter also indicates that 
comparative data is difficult to obtain or analyse. The extreme divergences 
in the way in which states quantify and report the entitlements of asylum-
seekers – even for the purposes of an EU-supported research and policy 
body such as the EMN – indicate the lack of readiness or ability to 
harmonise data-gathering and reporting. This absence of coherent 
information and calculation methods for social benefits and support to 
asylum-seekers renders meaningful policy debate and exchange among 
European states difficult or impossible. It also would appear likely to 
hamper the ability of states to develop well-informed policies and budgets 
for support of asylum-seekers even at national level, without useful 
indicators of good practice or standards. 
2.2 Social benefits and support to refugees and subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries 
The financial costs for states in providing support to refugees and 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries, recognised as being in need of 
international protection under international and EU law, prove extremely 
difficult to identify through public sources. Available comparative research 
and data gathered by or on behalf of the European Commission assesses in 
qualitative terms only the implementation of the Qualification Directive’s 
obligations to provide support to those recognised as needing protection. 
The Commission noted in the 2009 Impact Assessment accompanying its 
proposal for a recast Qualification Directive19 that “there is no information 
available on the overall costs of hosting beneficiaries of protection”, and 
                                                   
19 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the 
proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection and the content of the 
protection granted: impact assessment, SEC(2009)1373, 21.10.2009 (Qualification 
Directive Impact Assessment). 
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concedes that it was able to gather only “scant information [...] on specific 
aspects” which did not allow for “plausible estimates.”20 The 
administrative burden associated with compiling disaggregated data for 
recipients of social benefits and public support, in all its forms, may mean 
that states are unable or unprepared to compile disaggregated data on 
support for refugees and holders of subsidiary protection, as distinct from 
other categories of welfare beneficiaries. If and where it is gathered, it 
would appear that data is not compiled in comparable form across states. 
This remains therefore an area in which further primary research would be 
needed to obtain a clear picture of the cost of providing social benefits to 
holders of protection in the EU.  
Some insights into the practical implementation of the obligations 
under the Qualification Directive to provide support to refugees and 
subsidiary protection holders are available from research published by the 
Odysseus Academic Network in 2007,21 by the European Council for 
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)/European Legal Network on Asylum 
(ELENA) in 2008,22 and by France Terre d’Asile in 2008,23 as well as the 
European Commission’s analysis in its Impact Assessment, which drew on 
information provided by member states in response to questionnaires. 
These reports examined, among other things, the application of Article 
28(1) of the 2004 Qualification Directive, requiring that beneficiaries of 
refugee status and subsidiary protection receive “the necessary social 
assistance as provided to nationals” of the member state that granted them 
protection.  
Odysseus concluded that the concept of “necessary social assistance” 
was construed differently across member states. While some states 
considered that it should include only financial allowances, others 
extended it to some other benefits not otherwise covered by the 
                                                   
20 Ibid. 
21 Odysseus (2007), Directive 2004/83: Qualification Directive Synthesis Report, 
Study on the ‘conformity checking of the transposition by member states of 10 EC 
Directives in the sector of asylum and immigration’ done for DG JLS of the 
European Commission, Odysseus Qualification Study, Academic Network for 
Legal Studies on Immigration and Asylum in Europe. 
22 ECRE/ELENA (2009), “The impact of the EU Qualification Directive on 
international protection”, October. 
23 France Terre d’Asile (2008), “La protection subsidiaire en Europe: une mosaique 
de droits”, 5 September.  
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Qualification Directive, including at least some forms of housing support, 
clothing, assistance in job-seeking, health and other insurances, disability 
allowances, old-age and child benefits, or language courses.24 It confirmed 
also that in several member states, the levels of social assistance for 
refugees or for subsidiary protection beneficiaries were not equivalent to 
those of nationals.25  
The available sources confirmed that the provision allowing member 
states to limit social assistance for subsidiary protection beneficiaries to 
“core benefits” only, under Article 28(2) of the 2004 Qualification Directive, 
was utilised by very few member states. The Commission’s impact 
assessment26 cited the Odysseus Qualification study finding that Austria 
and Portugal made use of the discretion to limit social assistance to “core 
benefits”, the level of which varied in Austria across host regions.27 A 
further Commission evaluation of the Qualification Directive in 2010 
observed that Lithuania went so far as to “exclude” beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection from social assistance “due to the temporary nature 
of their residence permit.”28  
The Commission also noted that Germany imposed additional 
preconditions upon grants of assistance for children and education, 
providing them to subsidiary protection beneficiaries only after three years 
of legal residence in the country.29 
The available sources also document differing approaches, involving 
restrictive approaches in some cases, to the provision of other forms of state 
support to subsidiary protection beneficiaries. Article 29(1) of the 2004 
Qualification Directive required member states to provide health care 
                                                   
24 Odysseus (2007), op. cit., Section 3.3.10.1, p. 111. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Op. cit., SEC(2009)1373, 21.10.2009; Annex 8. 
27 Ibid.; see also Odysseus (2007), op. cit., Section 3.3.10.2, pp. 113-4. 
28 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 
2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted, COM(2010) 314 
(Qualification Directive Evaluation), 16.6.2010, section 5.5.11. 
29 Op. cit., SEC(2009)1373, 21.10.2009, Annex 8; ECRE/ELENA (2009), op. cit., p. 
256 ; France Terre d’Asile , op. cit., p. 49.  
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“under the same eligibility conditions as nationals” to those needing 
protection, but Article 29(2) permitted such health care to be restricted to 
“core benefits” in the case of subsidiary protection beneficiaries. The 
Commission noted that only Lithuania and Malta appeared to have used 
the possibility to limit health care in this way, while at least in Germany, 
certain forms of medical treatment were not available to subsidiary 
protection holders.30 The obligation under Article 29(3) of the 2004 
Directive to provide adequate health care to subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries with special needs was reportedly not transposed into 
national law in certain member states,31 while its implementation was 
problematic in others.32 
According to the Commission’s findings and research by other 
bodies, obligations to provide other state-funded entitlements under the 
Directive were also implemented in varying ways, with some notable gaps 
but some other positive approaches. While the 2004 Directive required 
access to accommodation “under equivalent conditions as other third 
country nationals” legally resident in the member states, under Article 21, 
the Commission observed that some states provided entitlements 
equivalent to those of nationals.33 Evidence of states offering higher levels 
of entitlements than the Directive’s minimum standards was also apparent 
in relation to integration facilities, required under Article 33 of the 2004 
Qualification Directive for refugees, but optional (“where it is considered 
appropriate by the member states”) for subsidiary protection beneficiaries. 
At least four member states were found to offer the same integration 
programmes to both categories of protection beneficiaries, including 
language courses and in some cases other elements such as social 
orientation and labour market integration support.34 
                                                   
30 European Commission, Qualification Directive Evaluation, section 5.5.12; on 
health care entitlements, see also Odysseus (2007), op. cit., pp. 114-115. 
31 These states included Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia and the UK: Ibid. 
32 Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Spain: Ibid. 
33 Ireland, Romania and Sweden: Ibid.; see, however, Odysseus Qualification 
study, p. 125, which noted that access to accommodation was subject to limits on 
freedom of movement and residence in certain member states.  
34 Ireland, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK (contrast Germany, with clear 
differentiation between two categories): Odysseus (2007), op. cit., p. 127; France 
Terre d’Asile (2008), op. cit. 
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A further interesting observation emerges from the Odysseus 
Qualification study’s analysis of the implementation of Articles 20(6) and 
(7). These paragraphs, which entitle member states to reduce benefits under 
the 2004 Qualification Directive where a person has engaged in activities 
“for the sole or main purpose of being recognised” as a refugee (paragraph 
6) or as a person eligible for subsidiary protection (paragraph 7), were 
apparently not implemented in any of the 23 states examined in the study.35 
The insertion of this paragraph in the Directive appears to suggest that a 
perception of ‘abuse’ of the asylum system existed among states taking part 
in the legislative process. At the same time, it would also appear that states 
had found it impracticable or undesirable to penalise protection 
beneficiaries whose actions might have deliberately created their protection 
needs by depriving them of basic entitlements to support.  
In sum, while the available data and analysis did not provide 
quantitative information about the cost of providing social benefits and 
other forms of assistance to refugees and subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries, they revealed significant differences in approaches to 
implementing the support obligations established by EU law. Moreover, 
research undertaken on the application of the 2004 Qualification Directive – 
including, notably, its provisions on assistance – underlined the 
differentiation in treatment between refugees on the one hand, and 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries on the other. According to the 
Commission and some states, a perception that subsidiary protection needs 
were in some way more temporary than refugee status underlies this 
differential treatment. However, this perception does not address the needs 
of subsidiary protection holders, which are not necessarily less than those 
of refugees or other people during their ‘temporary’ stay. Lack of 
familiarity with the concept of subsidiary protection36 may explain the 
                                                   
35 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK: Odysseus Qualification 
study, pp. 85-86. 
36 K. Hailbronner states that some member states were ‘not familiar with the legal 
status’ of subsidiary protection beneficiaries in explanation of some of their 
positions n the negotiations leading to the 2004 Qualification Directive; see K. 
Hailbronner (ed.) (2010), EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Commentary on EU 
Regulations and Directives, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 1168; on differential 
entitlements to social welfare in particular (Article 28), see ibid., p. 1192. 
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lesser readiness of some member states, who had not applied this form of 
protection in national law prior to the 2004 Qualification Directive, to 
invest in the same levels of support for subsidiary protection holders as for 
refugees, in a political context where the overall costs of the asylum system 
were perceived by the public as excessive. 
3. Policy debates around social benefits and other forms of 
support 
3.1 Asylum-seekers 
Differing views about the appropriate levels of support for asylum-seekers 
have emerged most starkly in EU discussions in recent years in the 
negotiations on the recast Reception Conditions Directive. The 
Commission’s original recast proposal of 2008,37 which sought to raise 
standards and fill gaps in the 2003 Directive, proved so controversial with 
member states that in June 2011, the Commission issued a revised proposal 
which aimed at facilitating a swifter agreement.38 However, difficulties in 
reaching consensus persisted,39 including on provisions concerning state-
funded social assistance. This section describes four key provisions which 
highlight, on the one hand, the concerns of states to limit costs and the 
possibility of ‘abuse’ of reception entitlements by asylum-seekers and, on 
the other hand, the efforts of the European Commission, Parliament, 
UNHCR, civil society and others to ensure adequate standards of treatment 
and support.  
In relation to material assistance, the Commission had proposed to 
address problems identified by the Odysseus Reception study in relation to 
inadequate standards of support by increasing the minimum level of 
material assistance member states must provide. It had proposed to 
strengthen former Article 13 of the 2003 Directive by requiring material 
assistance, under proposed recast Article 17, which would ensure an 
                                                   
37 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers (Recast), COM(2008) 815, 3.12.2008. 
38 See S. Peers (2012), “The EU Directive on Reception Conditions: A weak 
compromise”, Statewatch Analysis, July, p. 1. 
39 This is noteworthy in light of some observers’ critical assessment that the 
amended proposals did not require member states to raise their standards much; 
Ibid. 
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“adequate standard of living for applicants for international protection, 
which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental 
health”. To ensure this, it proposed that such entitlements “shall be 
determined on the basis of the point(s) of reference established by the 
member state concerned either by law or practice to ensure adequate 
standards of living for nationals, such as the minimum level of social 
welfare assistance.” However, member states were not prepared to accept 
such a specific commitment, maintaining that the level entitlements should 
be those established by member states, with no reference to minimum 
social welfare assistance. 
“Necessary” health care for asylum-seekers had been limited under 
the 2003 Reception Conditions Directive to “at least, emergency care and 
essential treatment of illness”. The Parliament had proposed to extend this 
to include treatment of “mental disorders”, a provision which would 
inevitably increase the cost of care for states and which could, in the view 
of some states, be vulnerable to misuse. The Council, which had opposed 
any extension to the health care provisions, agreed finally to additional 
entitlements to treatment for “serious mental disorders”, a narrower (but 
important) category of asylum-seekers in need of support. 
Provisions relating to the possibility to reduce or withdraw benefits, 
in recast Article 20, also proved extremely sensitive. While the European 
Parliament had proposed to prohibit the withdrawal of benefits from 
asylum-seekers, the Council by contrast had pressed for a far-reaching 
discretion to do so. The final agreement foresees that withdrawal may be 
possible “in exceptional and duly justified cases”, where one of several 
specified criteria applies.  
The Commission had proposed, in the revised recast proposal, to 
abolish a provision allowing member states to reduce material assistance 
for asylum-seekers submitting applications later than at the first 
opportunity. The Council had pressed to retain broad discretion to reduce 
benefits, while the Parliament had argued in support of the Commission’s 
proposal to retain the same level of assistance for all asylum-seekers, 
including those applying late. The compromise which was finally achieved 
on recast Article 20(2) foresees that member states may reduce benefits, but 
only where they can demonstrate that the asylum-seeker had not applied as 
soon as “reasonably practicable”, and where the delay was due to “no 
justifiable reason”.  
Another area of significant policy controversy around asylum-
seekers’ rights concerns their access to the labour market. It could be 
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argued that ensuring early access to the labour market could reduce the 
burden imposed on the states by asylum-seekers claiming benefits. This 
reasoning holds that if such people can support themselves, the cost of 
social assistance will be lower, and may even be offset by contributions that 
working asylum-seekers could make to state revenues through taxation 
and economic activity.  
However, the debate around this issue has revealed that this potential 
saving is not accepted by, or is not a political priority for, member states. 
On the contrary, when the Commission in the revised recast proposed to 
reduce the maximum period after which asylum-seekers would have access 
to the labour market, it proved to be among the most divisive elements in 
the negotiations.  
Article 11 of the 2003 Reception Conditions Directive had required 
states to permit an asylum-seeker to work after a maximum of one year 
following his or her application, if a decision on the claim was not taken by 
that date. The Commission, with the support of the Parliament, had 
proposed to reduce the waiting period to six months. After extensive 
negotiations, the maximum period was set at nine months, precisely 
between the two positions. The debate brought to the fore member states’ 
acute sensitivities about rising unemployment, with evident fears that the 
public would see more extensive work rights for asylum-seekers as 
depriving EU citizens of jobs. Paradoxically for a time of economic 
difficulty, the possibility of cost savings for European taxpayers through 
potentially reduced social benefit expenditures were not seen by member 
states as sufficient to justify a more flexible approach to the proposals. 
3.2 Policy debates: Refugees and subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries 
The recast negotiations leading up to the adoption of the revised 
Qualification Directive in December 2011 also highlighted the extensive 
range of concerns around the costs to EU member states of providing 
international protection. Four issues demonstrate this particularly clearly.  
The first related to the differential levels of rights conferred on 
refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries under the 2004 Directive, 
including in relation to various forms of state-funded support benefits. The 
Commission, in its recast proposal, sought to remove states’ discretion 
under the 2004 Directive to limit social assistance and health care for 
subsidiary protection holders to “core benefits” only. However, the 
proposal was contested in the negotiations, with at least some states 
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evidently concerned about costs. In the final text, the right of states to limit 
health care support to “core benefits” was removed, decreeing that health 
care must be available both to refugees and subsidiary protection holders at 
the same level as nationals. However, member states were not prepared to 
agree to a similar change in relation to social assistance, which under recast 
Article 29(2) can thus be restricted to “core benefits”.  
This limitation had been severely criticised by observers including 
ECRE40 and UNHCR, which had urged member states not to implement the 
provision. UNHCR noted the potential interlinkage between this Article 
and the 2004 Directive’s provisions allowing member states to restrict 
access for subsidiary protection beneficiaries to the labour market, as well 
as narrow family unity provisions that meant family members might 
receive no independent entitlements. Together, it was noted that these 
provisions had the potential to deprive subsidiary protection beneficiaries 
and their family members of the basic means of survival. It is noteworthy 
that states had insisted on maintaining this limitation in the absence of any 
clear economic data demonstrating that increased assistance to subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries would impose any unacceptable cost burden in the 
future.  
The provision on state-funded integration facilities, by contrast, was 
strengthened in the 2011 Qualification Directive. A new mandatory 
obligation to “ensure access” to integration facilities (going beyond the 
previous requirement to “make provision”) now extends to subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries as well as to refugees. Recast Article 34 also 
establishes more detailed and demanding requirements on the content of 
integration programmes, which must “take into account the specific needs 
of beneficiaries of refugee status or of subsidiary protection.” The European 
Commission had proposed yet more far-reaching requirements, which 
would have confirmed that integration programmes “could include 
induction programmes and language training,” tailored “as far as possible” 
to respond to the needs of individual protection beneficiaries. This change 
would have addressed the insufficient national programmes it had 
observed in research on the implementation of the 2004 Directive.  
                                                   
40 European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ECRE information note on 
Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, 
October 2004, pp. 16-17.  
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Given that expanded integration programmes would also potentially 
have significant cost implications, it is noteworthy that member states were 
prepared to agree to these changes. Persuasive arguments can be made that 
swifter integration into society can mean earlier self-reliance for refugees 
and subsidiary protection beneficiaries, which has the potential to reduce 
the time during which they are dependent on state support. However, this 
would also speak in favour of extending other entitlements, including more 
rights and support for family members of subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries, or residence permits of duration longer than one year – 
proposals that were not taken up in the recast process. Therefore, economic 
imperatives would not necessarily appear to be the sole factors influencing 
member states’ positions on these issues in the recast process.  
In an amendment which significantly strengthens the rights of both 
refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries, the recast Directive deletes 
the previous paragraphs permitting the reduction of the entitlements of 
refugees or subsidiary protection beneficiaries who had engaged in 
activities “for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions 
for being recognised.” This change, which responds to recent jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights on non-discrimination,41 also 
reflects the view of UNHCR, which had recalled that the Geneva 
Convention did not permit sanctions or lesser entitlements for refugees 
who had undertaken activities for the purpose of securing protection.42 
Where a risk of persecution or serious harm is found, UNHCR highlighted 
that the subjective intent or motivation of the applicant is irrelevant to his 
or her need for protection and entitlement to associated basic rights. This 
international legal requirement, it is argued, must prevail over perceived 
political or cost benefits associated with withdrawing entitlements from a 
person who might have consciously taken risks that put him or her under 
threat of persecution or serious harm, regardless of his or her bona fide or 
other motivations.  
4. Use of data 
The limited review above suggests that reliable, comprehensive and 
comparable EU-wide data on costs of social assistance in the asylum field is 
                                                   
41 European Court of Human Rights, Okpisz v Germany, 59140/00, 15 February 
2006; Niedzwiecki v Germany, 58453/00, 25 October 2005. 
42 UNHCR (2005), Comment on Article 20(6), UN Refugee Agency, p. 36. 
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not readily available. This has severely limited the scope for rational 
discussion on cost arguments in favour of (or against) legislative change.  
The lack of data has undermined the economic and logical 
foundations of some discussions during the recast negotiations, and 
increased the focus on subjective and political arguments. Some recent 
political discussions appear to have been predicated on broad assumptions 
that social welfare is costly, and state support vulnerable to potential 
‘abuse’ by asylum-seekers, at least some of whom have no genuine 
protection needs. But at the same time, economic arguments in favour of 
giving asylum-seekers earlier access to the labour market, and affording 
protection beneficiaries the means to integrate and become self-reliant, 
were not accepted or fully explored. Data could not be used effectively by 
either supporters or opponents of increased work rights and other 
entitlements for asylum-seekers and subsidiary protection holders to 
support their cases and ensure a more informed debate.  
The limited available secondary material, primarily in Commission, 
academic or civil society research and survey data, offers qualitative 
assessments and information about the implementation of some welfare 
obligations, but does not provide figures on costs across the EU. This 
indicates that further work could usefully seek to gather more data on the 
costs of social benefits and other forms of support from member states. This 
could provide a sounder basis for comparison, analysis and informed 
policy-making and budgeting than readily available material allows.  
The Commission, in its impact assessment for the recast Qualification 
Directive proposal,43 acknowledged the “severe strains” of the economic 
crisis upon member states’ budgets, and that these could undermine public 
support for measures to improve the situation of protection beneficiaries. 
However, it also cited Eurobarometer research suggesting that attitudes 
towards ‘genuine refugees’ among EU citizens were broadly positive, and 
the humanitarian rationale underlying refugee protection was more widely 
accepted than some negative press coverage would suggest.44 This view 
may explain, at least in part, why agreement was reached relatively swiftly 
                                                   
43 Op. cit., SEC(2009)1373, 21.10.2009, section 2.2.8. 
44 See also T.J. Hatton (2005), “European Asylum Policy”, National Economic 
Institute Review, Vol. 194, No. 1, pp. 106-119, 113, cited in the European 
Commission’s Qualification Directive Impact Assessment: Op. cit., SEC(2009)1373, 
21.10.2009. 
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on the Qualification Directive recast – covering people positively identified 
as needing refugee status or subsidiary protection – including its 
provisions on more extensive social benefits. By contrast, public 
perceptions of asylum-seekers – a significant proportion of whom will, on 
average, be rejected under EU asylum procedures – have undermined 
states’ interest in raising basic standards of assistance in the Reception 
Conditions recast. This is despite the fact that asylum-seekers’ basic human 
and material needs during their legal stay in the EU are the same as those 
of others with longer-term residence rights. Better compilation and use of 
economic data on the actual cost of legislative and policy options could 
help inform debate and encourage sounder, more sustainable and publicly 
justifiable choices in the future. 
5. Policy recommendations 
1. Competent EU institutions and agencies are encouraged to consider 
further research, undertaken by independent experts with specialised 
skills in economic data compilation and analysis, and knowledge of 
the asylum field on comparative costs of social assistance to asylum-
seekers on the one hand, and protection beneficiaries on the other, 
based on the recast Directives. 
2. Member states should be encouraged, with well-argued and clear 
explanations, to make available for comparative EU analysis all 
relevant budgetary information on expenditures relating to the 
support of asylum-seekers and protection holders. This should be 
seen as consistent with their own interests in more effective, efficient, 
consistent and well-informed policy and practice in this field.  
3. Discussions on the use of EU financial instruments relevant to asylum 
and migration, including under the Asylum and Migration Fund 
(AMF) forming part of the Multiannual Financial Framework for 
2014-2020, should be informed by analytical tools and research, 
including on the needs for and current levels of social benefits and 
other forms of support.  
4. Attention should be paid to systems for the distribution of resources 
under the AMF, with the objective of ensuring a more efficient and 
targeted use of resources foreseen for support of those seeking and in 
need of protection. As part of this, distribution of funding under the 
AMF could be undertaken with reference to actual sums provided in 
support of asylum-seekers and protection beneficiaries, rather than 
overall budgets for reception and associated costs. 
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5. Detailed analysis of the impact on EU member states’ labour markets 
should be undertaken to assess the respective costs of increasing or 
maintaining current limits on access to the labour market for 
protection seekers and beneficiaries. This analysis should take into 
account changing EU demographics and longer-term economic 
forecasts.  
6. Analysis should be undertaken of the potential economic impacts of 
increasing mobility for refugees and protection beneficiaries in the 
EU. Given that limited long-term residence rights are only available 
after several years of lawful stay in a member state, economic 
opportunities may be being missed under current arrangements. This 
analysis should take into account the potential implications of 
introducing a transfer of protection mechanism, as foreshadowed in 
the Commission’s 2008 Policy Plan on Asylum45. 
7. To help address member states’ concerns about the risk of abuse of 
asylum systems, research should be undertaken into the cost 
implications of more efficient, high-quality asylum procedures, 
maintaining all essential safeguards, which can rapidly and 
accurately identify those in need of protection. Different models 
could be examined, with a view to identifying good practices in 
procedures and support among the member states. 
                                                   
45 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Policy Plan on Asylum, an integrated approach to 
protection across the EU, COM(2008) 360, 17.6.2008. 
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6. EU REGULATIONS ON THE 
COORDINATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
SYSTEMS AND SPECIAL NON-
CONTRIBUTORY BENEFITS: A SOURCE 
OF NEVER-ENDING CONTROVERSY 
ROB CORNELISSEN* 
1. Introduction: Aim and legal basis of the EU Regulations 
The objective of the EU Regulations on the coordination of social security 
systems is to make the right to free movement a reality by ensuring that a 
person is not penalised with regards to social security for having moved 
from one member state to another.  
The EU Regulations only coordinate, and do not harmonise, the 
various social security schemes. They do not affect the freedom of member 
states to determine their own systems. Member states are, in principle, free 
to decide who is to be insured, what benefits should be granted, how they 
should be calculated, and for how long they should be granted.1 However, 
when exercising those powers, member states must comply with the law of 
the Union.2  
Depending on the social and political history of each state, member 
states limit the boundaries of their solidarity systems, sometimes on the 
                                                   
* This chapter only reflects the personal views of the author and does not 
necessarily reflect the position of the European Commission. 
1 Case C-347/10 Salemink [2012], judgement of 17 January 2012, not yet reported, 
para. 38. 
2 Ibid., para. 39. 
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basis of nationality, but mostly on the basis of territoriality.3 In general, this 
means that each state confines the scope of its national scheme by using 
territorial elements such as working or residing in that state. The objective 
of the EU Regulations is to overrule the application of these criteria based 
on nationality and territoriality. Without such an ambition, the goal of the 
EU Regulations to remove all barriers in the sphere of social security, which 
impede genuinely free movement, would not be met. Therefore, the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality (i.e. equal 
treatment), the export of cash benefits, the aggregation of periods of 
insurance for entitlement to benefits and the removal of residence 
conditions for family benefits have, for many years, formed the basis of the 
European coordination of national social security systems.  
From day one, the Treaty included a strong legal basis for legislation 
in the field of coordination of social security, in order to make the free 
movement of workers a reality. Under Article 51 EEC, the legislature was 
formed by the Council acting by unanimity. Article 51 EEC was, after the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, renumbered Article 42 EC. It introduced the co-
decision procedure involving the Parliament and Council, but it still 
required unanimity within the Council.  
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 48 TFEU has brought two major 
changes in comparison with the old Article 42 EC. First, it provides a legal 
basis for the coordination of social security for employed and self-
employed migrant workers and their dependents. The second change is 
that the Council and the Parliament continue to form the legislature 
together, but unanimity within the Council is replaced by a qualified 
majority, accompanied by a brake procedure. Article 21(3) TFEU 
constitutes a supplementary basis for all EU citizens not covered by Article 
48 TFEU. There seems to be no doubt that, in the light of the general scope 
of the Treaty, Article 48 TFEU is the adequate and sufficient legal basis for 
future changes of the Coordination Regulations.4 
                                                   
3 R. Cornelissen (1996), “The principle of territoriality and the Community 
Regulations on social security (Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72)”, Common Market 
Law Review Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 439-471. 
4 For the arguments, see R. Cornelissen (2012), “How difficult is it to change EU 
social security coordination legislation?”, Pravnik,  Vol. 129, No. 1-2, pp. 57-78. This 
issue of Pravnik (a Slovenian journal for legal researchers and practitioners) 
contains the presentations in English made by various speakers at the annual 
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A couple of years ago, we celebrated 50 years of European 
coordination of social security. In fact, Regulations 3 and 4 came into effect 
on 1 January 1959. These Regulations were replaced in 1972 by Regulations 
1408/71 and 574/72. Subsequently, the coordination system was extended 
to self-employed persons in 1981,5 and students in 1999.6 These extensions 
of scope required, however, that recourse be made to the additional legal 
base in the predecessors of Article 352 TFEU. 
In 2010, Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 were replaced by the 
current Regulations 883/20047 and 987/2009. These new Regulations apply 
to all EU nationals who are insured under national law, whether they are 
employed, self-employed, students or, indeed, non-active. 
The abundant case law of the Court of Justice played an essential role 
in the development of the early coordination system set up under 
Regulation 3 into the system under Council Regulation 1408/71 and then 
into today’s modernised Regulation 883/2004. In its very first judgement8 
concerning the old Regulation 3, the Court of Justice clarified that all 
provisions laid down in the Regulations on social security should be 
interpreted in the light of the objective pursued by their legal basis, which 
aimed to facilitate freedom of movement.  
                                                                                                                                 
conference of the European Institute of Social Security (EISS) held in Ljubljana, 
September 2011. 
5 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1390/81 of 12 May 1981 extending to self-employed 
persons and members of their families Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the 
application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families 
moving within the Community. 
6 Council Regulation (EC) No 307/1999 of 8 February 1999 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within 
the Community and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 laying down the procedure for 
implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 with a view to extending them to 
cover students. 
7 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, modified by 
Regulation (EC) No 988/2009 the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 and by Regulation (EU) No 465/2012 the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 May 2012. 
8  Case 75/63 Unger [1964] ECR 177. 
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2. Controversy around ‘overprotection’ offered by the EU 
Regulations 
Over the years, the EU Regulations on the coordination of social security 
systems have been well received, both by the persons covered as well as by 
the member states. Hardly anybody would contest that the EU Regulations 
provide a high standard of protection in the field of social security for 
people moving across borders within the EU.  
On the contrary, there have always been voices claiming that the 
protection offered by these Regulations, as interpreted by the CJEU, goes 
too far and that member states with the highest level of social protection 
have to pay disproportionately favourable benefits to people covered by 
these Regulations. In 1988, for example, a social security professor in the 
Netherlands published her inaugural lecture, in which she suggested that 
the EU Regulations as interpreted by the CJEU constituted a threat to the 
residence-based social security schemes of the Netherlands.9 Not only in 
the Netherlands, but also elsewhere in Europe, the impression was 
sometimes given that the EU Regulations, as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice, could jeopardise the high level of protection given by the social 
security schemes of the northern member states.10 When I visited the 
Nordic states in the early 1990s during the process of negotiations leading 
to the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, virtually all questions 
asked at seminars and conferences reflected the fear that the introduction of 
the EU Regulations on social security would lead to a massive influx of 
persons from the south of Europe to the Nordic states in order to benefit 
from the high level of social protection there. 
                                                   
9 W.M. Levelt-Overmars (1988), “Halen de volksverzekeringen het jaar 2000?” (“Will 
the Dutch residence based schemes still exist in the year 2000?”), Deventer: Kluwer. My 
critical review of her publication in SMA (Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid), March 1989, 
triggered a rather polemic discussion between Prof. Levelt-Overmars and me, 
published in the May and October 1989 editions of SMA under the title: 
“Herziening van de Nederlandse volksverzekeringen in Europees perspectief”. 
10 P. Clever (1993), “Evaluation de la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice en matière 
sociale”, Bulletin de liaison et d’information, Nos. 1 and 2, p. 20, Centre de sécurité 
sociale des travailleurs migrants : “La Communauté (ou la jurisprudence 
communautaire) devient ainsi un frein pour une politique nationale progressiste. 
En exagérant un peu: si on veut tout accorder à tout le monde et partout, plus 
personne ne recevra rien et nulle part.”  
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Nowadays, the participation in national solidarity systems on the 
same basis as nationals is less disputed than previously, provided that the 
people coming from other member states are economically active.11 But 
even in the case of economically active people, the EU Regulations are still 
criticised from time to time for the ‘overprotection’ they offer migrant 
workers. The attempt, a couple of years ago, by the Irish government to 
modify the rule laid down in Regulation 883/2004 according to which 
Polish and Lithuanian persons working in Ireland are entitled to Irish 
family benefits for their children residing in their country of origin, is just 
an illustration of such criticism.12 It goes without saying that the provision 
in question13 is an expression of the principle of equal treatment required 
by Article 45 TFEU.14  
3. A never-ending controversy: Special non-contributory 
benefits  
No other part of the EU Regulations has been the source of such long-
lasting and vivid controversy as the so-called “special non-contributory 
benefits”. 
The current controversy concerns, in particular, access to minimum 
subsistence benefits in the host state by economically non-active people 
coming from other member states. In this context, it is useful to recall that 
the current Regulation 883/2004 applies to all EU citizens who are insured 
under national law, whether they are economically active or not.  
When citizens coming from other member states are not economically 
active in the host state and do not have any other previous attachments to 
that state, the host state is naturally concerned to protect the financial 
balance of its social security system. In many circles, in particular in the 
popular press of some member states, the perception exists that the 
entitlement to certain benefits constitutes a decisive or perhaps the only 
motivation to exercise the right to free movement within the EU. Fears of 
                                                   
11 H. Verschueren (2007), “European (Internal) Migration Law as an Instrument for 
Defining the Boundaries of National Solidarity Systems”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 307-346. 
12 It seems that this attempt has recently been abandoned (see Irish Times of 12 
October 2012). 
13 Article 67 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
14  Case 41/84 Pinna [1986] ECR 1, para. 24. 
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benefit tourism are indeed inextricably linked to the free movement of 
economically non-active persons. Until now, we have lacked convincing 
facts and figures showing that the current system imposes an unreasonable 
burden on the public finances of those member states with the most 
generous minimum subsistence benefits (see below).  
In this context, we should not forget that the majority of non-active 
persons were already covered by the old Council Regulation 1408/71. The 
concept of “employed person” within the context of Council Regulation 
1408/71 referred to all persons who were covered by a social security 
scheme applicable to employed persons, even when they performed only 
work of a marginal extent15 excluding them from the scope of Article 45 
TFEU. The actual nature of their work or even the question of whether they 
worked at all was irrelevant.16 The sphere of application was (and is) 
determined by a social security criterion and not by labour law.17 Indeed, 
the concept of “worker” used in the context of Article 45 TFEU and 
Regulation 492/2001 does not coincide with the definition applied in 
relation to Article 48 TFEU.18 All this means that the concept of “employed 
person” had to be interpreted extensively. 
As the Court underlined in its case law, the concept of “self-
employed person” used in Council Regulation 1408/71 was intended to 
guarantee to such persons the same protection as was accorded to 
employed persons and therefore had to be interpreted broadly, covering, 
for example, a missionary priest.19  
The circle of persons covered by Council Regulation 1408/71 was not 
limited to persons who were “employed” or “self-employed”, but extended 
also to persons who had been “employed” or “self-employed”. In its 
original version, Council Regulation 1408/71 contained numerous 
provisions applicable to pensioners, such as the provisions that determined 
                                                   
15  Case C-2/89 Kits van Heijningen [1990] ECR I-01755. 
16  Case C-543/03 Dodl and Oberhollenzer [2005] ECR I-05049, para. 30 and Case C-
516/09 Borger [2011] ECR I-01493, para. 28. 
17  Case C-543/03 Dodl and Oberhollenzer [2005] ECR I-05049, para. 31. 
18  Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691, paras. 31,32,35 and 36, Case C-
543/03 Dodl and Oberhollenzer [2005] ECR I-05049, para. 27 and Case C-208/07 Von 
Chamier-Glisczinksi [2009] ECR I-06095, para. 68. 
19  Case 300/84 Van Roosmalen [1986] ECR 3097, para. 20. 
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which member state was competent for providing health care to pensioners 
residing in another member state.  
In addition, Council Regulation 1408/71 not only covered 
“employed” and “self-employed” persons, and retired “employed” and 
“self-employed” persons, it also covered the “members of the family”20 and 
the “survivors”, whatever their nationality, of the aforementioned persons.  
All this means that the group of European citizens not covered by 
Council Regulation 1408/71 was restricted to a very limited group of 
people, namely persons who had never been an “employed person” or 
“self-employed person” in any member state and who were neither a 
member of the family nor a survivor of such a person.21 For this reason, the 
substantive impact of the extension of the personal scope of Regulation 
883/2004 to also include non-active people was rather limited.22  
3.1 The legislature: EU Regulations apply to social security, not to 
social assistance 
As with the current Regulation 883/2004, Regulations 3 and 1408/71 
applied only to legislation concerning social security. These Regulations 
made it clear, from the very beginning, that they applied to all statutory 
social security schemes, whether contributory or non-contributory.  
Also in the same way as Regulation 883/2004, Regulations 3 and 
1408/71 excluded explicitly social (and medical) assistance from their 
material scope. However, a definition of the term “social security” or 
“social assistance” was (and is) not to be found in any of these Regulations.  
                                                   
20 Since the 1996 Cabanis-Issarte judgement (Case C-308/93 Cabanis-Issarte [1996] 
ECR I-02097), we know that members of the family can fully invoke the Regulation 
(including the equal treatment provisions) unless it concerns provisions which are 
applicable only to workers, such as the chapter “unemployment benefits”.  
21 In addition, Council Regulation (EC) No 307/1999 extended the scope of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 to students even when they were no longer members 
of the family (e.g. students no longer fulfilled the age limits in order to be 
considered as a “member of the family”). 
22 Obviously, the extension of the personal scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
to include all EU nationals, including non-active people, had a strong symbolic 
importance and reinforced European citizenship.  
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3.2 The court: Mixed type benefits brought under the material scope 
of Regulation 1408/71  
As G. Perrin indicated in 1961,23 there are a number of non-contributory 
benefits – financed not by contributions but by taxes – which can be 
considered borderline benefits arising from the progressive integration, in 
various legislations, of social assistance into social security. These benefits 
were initially called “non-contributory benefits of a mixed type”, since they 
have the characteristics of social security and social assistance.  
It was clear from the abundant case law of the CJEU that the question 
of how a benefit was classified under national legislation was not decisive. 
According to the Court, a benefit which had characteristics of “social 
assistance” – in that the payment of benefit was dependent upon the proof 
of need (“means test”) and the entitlement to benefit did not depend upon 
the completion of periods of insurance or periods of employment – could 
nevertheless be a social security benefit within the meaning of Council 
Regulation 1408/71. The CJEU clarified that such a benefit could be 
regarded as a “social security” benefit falling within the scope of Council 
Regulation 1408/71 in so far as it was granted to recipients on the basis of a 
legally defined position provided that it concerned one of the risks 
expressly listed in Article 4(1) of Regulation 1408/71. This meant that a 
number of benefits which were considered “social assistance” under the 
definition of the national legislation of the member state concerned actually 
fell within the material scope of Council Regulation 1408/71.24  
In other words, if a benefit aimed at meeting family expenses was 
granted automatically to families meeting certain objective criteria, it had to 
be treated as a family benefit under the definition of Council Regulation 
1408/71 with all its consequences; the residence clauses provided for by 
national legislation as a condition for entitlement to the benefit in question 
were simply disapplied by virtue of the effect of Article 73 of Council 
                                                   
23 G. Perrin (1961), “Les prestations non contributives et la sécurité sociale”, Droit 
social, p. 179. 
24 Examples: guaranteed income for old people in Belgium (Case 1/72 Frilli [1972] 
ECR 457), mobility allowance in the UK (Case C-356/89 Stanton Newton [1991] ECR I-
03017), allowances of the Fonds National de Solidarité in France (Case 24/74 Biason 
[1974] ECR 999 and Joined Cases 379,380,381/85, and 93/86 Giletti [1987] ECR 955), 
social pension in Italy (Case 139/82 Piscitello [1983] ECR 1427). 
90  ROB CORNELISSEN 
Regulation 1408/71.25 Likewise, insofar as the benefit in question was to be 
considered a pension – being linked to the risks of invalidity, old age or 
survival – the benefit had to be exported, by virtue of Article 10, even if 
national legislation confined the benefit in question to persons residing in 
its national territory.26 
There was, however, one important condition that the person 
claiming the mixed type benefit in a member state had to fulfil: having 
previously worked as an employed or self-employed person in that 
member state. This condition was imposed by the Court of Justice 
implicitly in the Castelli judgement27 and explicitly in its Stanton Newton 
judgement. In the latter judgement, the Court of Justice said that only a 
person who “by reason of his previous occupational activity was already 
covered by the social security system of the State whose legislation was 
invoked” could invoke Council Regulation 1408/71 to be entitled to the 
mixed-type benefit in question.28  
3.3 The reaction of the legislature: Creating a separate 
coordination system with Council Regulation 1247/92 
The reaction of the EU’s legislature to the CJEU’s judgements on “mixed-
type” benefits was to adopt a new Council Regulation (EEC) No 1247/92.29 
The objective of this Regulation was two-fold. First, it “translated” the case 
law of the CJEU into the wording of the Regulation, by stipulating in 
Article 4(2a) that Council Regulation 1408/71 also applied to “special non-
contributory” benefits.  
The second objective of this Regulation was to create an exception 
from the case law of the CJEU by introducing a separate coordination 
system for “special non-contributory” benefits in order to avoid their 
exportability. The new Article 10a(1) of Council Regulation 1408/71 
stipulated that persons “to whom this Regulation applies” should be 
                                                   
25  Case C-78/91 Hughes [1992] ECR I-04839. 
26  Joined Cases 379,380,381/85, and 93/86 Giletti [1987] ECR 955. 
27  Case 261/83 Castelli [1984] ECR 3199. 
28  Case C-356/89 Stanton Newton [1991] ECR I-03017, paras. 15-18. 
29 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1247/92 of 30 April 1992 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No. 21408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within 
the Community. 
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granted the special non-contributory benefits listed in Annex IIa 
“exclusively in the territory of the member state in which they reside, in 
accordance with the legislation of that state”. Such benefits should be 
“granted by and at the expense of the institution of the place of residence.”  
To compensate for the non-exportability of these benefits, member 
states took up full responsibility for granting “special non-contributory 
benefits” to every person covered by Council Regulation 1408/71 residing 
within their territory.30 In fact, three special provisions31 were inserted into 
the Regulation to reinforce the legal position of persons residing in a 
member state claiming a “special non-contributory benefit” there. Persons 
covered by Council Regulation 1408/71 should have access to “special non-
contributory benefits” in their member state of residence on the same 
conditions as nationals of that state. 
In other words, the position of member states was reinforced, because 
they were liberated from the obligation to export “special non-contributory 
benefits”, provided that these benefits were listed in Annex IIa (Article 10a 
(1)). This was mirrored by the reinforcement of the position of persons 
covered by Council Regulation 1408/71 towards the institution of the 
member state of residence, through the special aggregation and 
assimilation provisions of Articles 10a(2), (3) and (4).32 These reinforcing 
provisions meant that it was no longer necessary to prove that the person 
claiming the “special non-contributory benefit” in the member state of 
residence had previously worked there. In the very first judgement in 
which it was asked to give its view on the validity of the new separate 
coordination system for the “special non-contributory benefits”, the CJEU 
explicitly underlined that “benefit entitlement is not conditional on the 
claimant’s having previously been subject to the social security legislation 
of the state in which he applies for the benefit, whereas this was the case 
prior to the entry into force of Regulation 1247/92.”33  
                                                   
30 H. Verschueren (2009), “Special Non-Contributory Benefits in Regulation 
1408/71, Regulation 883/2004 and the Case Law of the ECJ”, European Journal of 
Social Security, Vol. 11, pp. 217-234. 
31 Articles 10a (2), (3) and (4) of Regulation 1408/71. 
32 See also the conclusions of Advocate General Léger in Case C-20/96 Snares 
[1997] ECR I-06057, paras. 92 and 93. 
33  Case C-20/96 Snares [1997] ECR I-06057, para. 48. 
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It is also important to recall that when Council Regulation 1247/92 
was adopted, the Council had, only two years earlier, adopted three 
Directives on the right of residence for students,34 pensioners35 and non-
active people.36 These Directives granted the EU nationals concerned the 
right of residence in another member state subject to certain conditions. The 
latter two Directives concerning pensioners and non-active people included 
having “sufficient resources” as a condition.37 As set out above, the 
majority of non-active people were covered by Council Regulation 1408/71. 
According to Council Regulation 1247/92, they should have access to 
“special non-contributory benefits” in their member state of residence on 
the same basis as nationals of that state. Council Regulation 1247/92 did 
not make any reference to Directives 90/364 or 90/365 at all. If the person 
covered by Council Regulation 1408/71 could prove that he was residing in 
the member state where the claim for “special non-contributory benefit” 
was made, then he was entitled to this benefit in the same way as nationals 
of that state.  
3.4 The court: A separate system is compatible with the Treaty 
In three judgements concerning UK benefits listed in Annex IIa as inserted 
by Council Regulation 1247/92, the Court confirmed the validity of the 
separate coordination system for special non-contributory benefits. On the 
one hand, this meant that these benefits were no longer exportable.38 On 
the other hand, the Court of Justice made it clear that, under this new 
system, payment of such benefits was conditional upon the claimant 
residing in the territory of the member state concerned. In the Swaddling 
case, the CJEU clarified that the term “residence” had a Community-wide 
                                                   
34 Council Directive 90/366/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for 
students; by judgment of 7 July 1992 (Case C-295/90 Parliament vs. Council [1992] 
ECR I-04193) the Court annulled this Directive while maintaining the effects of the 
annulled Directive until the entry into force of Directive 93/96. 
35 Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for 
employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity. 
36 Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence.  
37 Higher than the level of resources below which the host member state may grant 
social assistance to its nationals. 
38  Case C-20/96 Snares [1997] ECR I-06057and Case C-297/96 Partridge [1998] ECR 
I-03467. 
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uniform meaning, based on criteria defined in Community law and not on 
criteria used in the national legislation of the various member states. In fact, 
the objective of the EU Regulations on social security is to avoid people 
being penalised for having moved from one member state to another. A 
nationally defined residence concept could lead to a situation where a 
person, despite having lived all his life in the EU, was not considered a 
resident by the legislation of any member state.39 
Mr Swaddling had worked in France for several years before being 
made redundant there. He returned to the UK, his member state of origin, 
where he lived with his brother. His application for income support was 
refused because he did not satisfy the conditions laid down in UK 
legislation in order to be considered as “habitually resident” in the UK. 
According to this legislation, the habitual residence presupposed an 
appreciable period of residence in the UK in addition to the intention of 
residing there. The case was finally considered by the Court of Justice, and 
the CJEU ruled that the concept of “habitual residence” in the context of 
Council Regulation 1408/71 referred to the member state where the 
person’s habitual centre of interests is to be found. In that context, account 
should be taken of a number of factors specified by the CJEU. The length of 
residence in the member state in which payment of the benefit is sought 
cannot be regarded as an intrinsic element of the concept of residence 
within the meaning of Council Regulation 1408/71. The CJEU made clear 
that Mr Swaddling did satisfy the condition concerning residence within 
the meaning of Council Regulation 1408/71. 
In all three judgements, the Court of Justice concluded that the 
benefits in question had to be considered as “special non-contributory 
benefits” by reason of the fact that they were listed in Annex IIa.40  
In subsequent case law, however, the CJEU ruled that the simple fact 
that a benefit was listed in Annex IIa was not in itself sufficient to mean 
that the benefit in question was a “special non-contributory benefit”. On 
the contrary, for every benefit in question it had to be examined whether it 
was indeed a “special” and “non-contributory” one. The Jauch judgement41 
concerning the Austrian care allowance, listed in Annex IIa, marked this 
                                                   
39 Verschueren (2009), op. cit. 
40 Case C-20/96 Snares [1997] ECR I-06057, para. 32; Case C-297/96 Partridge [1998] 
ECR I-03467, para. 33; Case C-90/97 Swaddling [1999] ECR I-01075, para. 24. 
41 Case C-215/99 Jauch [2001] ECR I-01901. 
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new phase of case law. Referring to the objective of Articles 39-42 EC, the 
CJEU stated that, even when it is permissible for the Community 
legislature to adopt provisions which derogate from the principle of 
exportability of social security benefits, such derogations must be 
interpreted strictly. After careful examination of the Austrian benefit in 
question, the CJEU came to the conclusion that, notwithstanding its listing 
in Annex IIa, the benefit was neither “special” nor “non-contributory”. 
According to the CJEU, the Austrian benefit was a sickness benefit in the 
sense of Article 4(1) of Council Regulation 1408/71 and could therefore not 
be a “special non-contributory benefit” in the sense of Article 4(2a). 
A couple of months later, the Court of Justice examined in the Leclere 
judgement42 whether the Luxembourg maternity allowance, listed in Annex 
IIa, was “special”. The Court of Justice replied in the negative and declared 
this part of Annex IIa invalid.  
These two judgements showed that a benefit which satisfied the 
conditions of a “social security benefit” within the meaning of Article 4(1) – 
a family benefit or a sickness benefit, for example – could not be considered 
a “special non-contributory benefit”43 in the sense of Article 4(2a) of 
Council Regulation 1408/71.  
3.5 Regulation 647/05: Tightening the conditions for benefits to fall 
under the separate system 
The Jauch and Leclere judgements were an encouragement for the legislature 
to review the whole coordination system for “special non-contributory” 
benefits. In 2003, The Commission presented44 a proposal for criteria that 
had to be fulfilled for benefits to be considered “special” and “non-
                                                   
42 Case C-43/99 Leclere and Deaconescu [2001] ECR I-04265. 
43 This was later confirmed by the judgement in Case C-286/03 Hosse [2006] ECR I-
01771. 
44 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of 
social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to 
members of their families moving within the Community and Regulation (EEC) 
No 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71, COM(2003) 468, 31.7.2003. 
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contributory.” When adopting Regulation 647/2005,45 the legislature 
accepted the Commission’s proposal for the wording of the new criteria 
with hardly any changes.46 
Having in mind the broad interpretation of the terms “sickness 
benefit”47 and “family benefit”48 as given by the Court of Justice, within the 
meaning of Article 4(1), the legislature tightened the conditions for a 
benefit to be considered as a “special non-contributory” one within the 
meaning of Article 4(2a) of Council Regulation 1408/71. 
 In addition, the distinction between the two categories of “special 
non-contributory benefits” – Article 4(2a)(i) on the one hand, and Article 
4(2a)(ii) on the other – became much clearer. The first category covers 
benefits aimed at helping people in financial need (“guarantee a minimum 
subsistence income having regard to the economic and social situation of the 
member state concerned”). The second category concerns benefits aimed at 
helping people who are in need of assistance in order to participate in daily 
life of society (“solely protection for the disabled, closely linked to the said 
person’s social49 environment in the member state concerned”).  
The current Regulation 883/2004 contains the same criteria as 
Regulation 647/05. 
To reflect the fact that the coordination system for “special non-
contributory benefits” had really been revised, and not merely adapted by 
Regulation 674/05, the content of Annex IIa was amended as a whole. 
A large number of benefits which had been listed in Annex IIa prior 
to the coming into force of Regulation 647/05 were not included in the new 
                                                   
45 Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 April 2005 amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application 
of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to 
members of their families moving within the Community, and (EEC) No 574/72 
laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. 
46 There was only a slight difference in the wording of the criterion “non-
contributory” contained in Article 4 (2a). 
47  Case C-160/96 Molenaar [1996] ECR I-00843 and Case C-215/99 Jauch [2001] ECR 
I-01901. 
48  Joined Cases C-245/94 and C-312/94 Hoever and Zachow [1996] ECR I-04895; 
Case C-275/96 Kuusijärvi [1998] ECR I-03419; Case C-255/99 Humer [2002] ECR I-
01205; Case C-333/00 Maaheimo [2002] ECR I-10087. 
49 No reference is made to “economic” environment as is the case in the first category.  
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Annex, since they had to be considered either as “family benefits” or as 
“sickness benefits” covered by Article 4(1) of Council Regulation 1408/71. 
In accordance with the general principle of exportability of cash social 
security benefits required by Council Regulation 1408/71, benefits no 
longer listed in Annex IIa had to be paid to the persons fulfilling the 
conditions for entitlement, even when they did not reside in the member 
state from which they claimed the benefit.  
3.6 Controversy continued: Dispute over five entries in Annex IIa 
of Regulation 1408/71 
When negotiating the Commission proposal, three member states insisted 
on having five entries in the new Annex IIa that did not, in the opinion of 
the Commission, correspond to the concept of “special” benefits because 
they concerned “sickness benefits” or “family benefits” within the meaning 
of Article 4(1) of Council Regulation 1408/71, as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice. However, the UK made it clear that it would never accept the 
Commission’s proposal unless its three entries concerning disability living 
allowance50, attendance allowance and carer’s allowance were included in 
Annex IIa. Sweden took the same position regarding its disability 
allowance, and Finland concerning its childcare allowance.  
To avoid blocking the progress made in the other parts of the 
proposal, the other member states felt that they had to accept, at least for 
the time being, the inclusion of these benefits in the Annex.51 Following the 
adoption of Regulation 647/2005, the Commission brought an action 
against the legislature (Council and Parliament) before the Court of Justice 
under former Article 230 EC.52 The purpose of the action, which was 
without precedent in the field of social security, was to annul Regulation 
647/2005 in so far as it retained the five entries in Annex IIa.53 With its 
                                                   
50 Only the care component of the disability living allowance was disputed. The 
mobility component clearly fulfilled the conditions of being “special” in the sense 
of Article 4 (2a) of Regulation 1408/71. 
51 The negotiations took place under former Article 42 EC: co-decision by Council 
and Parliament and unanimity within Council required. 
52 Corresponding to the current Article 263 TFEU. 
53 As to the disability living allowance of the UK, the request only concerned the 
care component. 
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judgement of 18 October 200754 the CJEU indeed annulled the five entries55 
concerned. According to the CJEU, the benefits in question were sickness 
benefits within the meaning of Article 4(1) and therefore could not be 
“special” benefits in the sense of Article 4(2a) of Council Regulation 
1408/71.  
3.7 Current controversy: The relationship with Directive 
2004/38/EC 
Where in the past, controversy concentrated mainly on whether the 
benefits in question were “special” benefits (non-exportable) or classical 
social security benefits (exportable), current controversy relates to the other 
side of the separate coordination system. More specifically, it concerns the 
question of which conditions apply to persons to have access to special 
non-contributory benefits listed in Annex X of the current Regulation 
883/2004 in their member state of residence. As said before, this 
controversy mainly concerns non-active people and brings us to another 
question: What is the relationship between Directive 2004/38/EC and the 
separate coordination system set up by Regulation 883/2004 for the 
“special non-contributory benefits”?  
3.7.1 Residence rights for economically inactive EU citizens in the host 
state under Directive 2004/38/EC  
The right of EU citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
members states is enshrined in Article 21 TFEU and Article 45 of the EU 
Charter.  
Directive 2004/38/EC56 specifies the rights of residence of EU citizens 
(and members of their family) who move within the European Union and 
defines certain conditions and limitations. This Directive repealed a 
number of old legal instruments, such as the three Directives dating from 
the 1990s concerning students, pensioners and non-active people. The 
                                                   
54 Case C-299/05 Commission vs. Council and Parliament [2007] ECR I-08695. 
55 As to the disability living allowance of the UK, the annulment only concerned 
the care component. 
56 Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004. 
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Directive has also repealed two Articles of Council Regulation 1612/68,57 
but makes no reference to Regulation 883/2004. 
Contrary to Regulation 883/2004, there is no definition of “residence” 
to be found in Directive 2004/38/EC; the term seems to cover both habitual 
residence and temporary stay.  
By virtue of Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC, the right of 
residence for more than three months for economically inactive persons is 
subject to the condition that they have sufficient resources for themselves 
and their family members so as not to become a burden on the social 
assistance system of the host member state, as well as to the condition that 
they have comprehensive sickness insurance. These conditions regarding 
sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness insurance do not apply to 
workers and self-employed people.58 
3.7.2 Entitlement to “social assistance” for economically inactive EU 
citizens in the host member state 
Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC guarantees to all EU citizens residing 
on the basis of the Directive in the territory of the host member state equal 
treatment with the nationals of that state within the scope of the Treaty. 
However, as regards social assistance, Article 24(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC stipulates that the host member state shall not be obliged to 
confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of 
residence. Likewise, Article 14(1) of the Directive only guarantees the 
retention of the right of residence for the first three months as long as the 
EU citizen does not become an unreasonable burden on the social 
assistance system of the host state.  
3.7.3 Directive 2004/38/EC and the separate coordination system of 
Regulation 883/2004 for “special non-contributory benefits” 
According to Article 11(3)(e) of Regulation 883/2004, non-active people are 
subject to the legislation of the member state of residence. As said before, 
the concept of “residence” defined by Regulation 883/2004 has an EU-wide 
                                                   
57 The repealed Articles were Articles 10 and 11 of Regulation 1612/68. Regulation 
1612/68 has been codified and replaced in 2011 by Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of 
movement for workers within the EU. 
58 Article 7(1)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
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meaning. According to Article 1(j) of Regulation 883/2004, this refers to the 
place where a person habitually resides. It depends on a number of factors, 
as indicated by the CJEU in the Swaddling judgement, aimed at determining 
the centre of interest of the person concerned. Where there is a difference in 
views between the institutions of two or more member states over the 
determination of the residence of a person, Article 11 of Regulation 
987/200959 stipulates that these institutions shall establish by common 
agreement the centre of interests of the person concerned based on an 
overall assessment of all available information and taking into account a list 
of factors.  
A number of member states, however, have imposed on the 
entitlement to “special non-contributory benefits” listed in Annex IIa of 
Regulation 883/2004 for non-active people coming from another member 
state the condition that they have a residence right there in accordance with 
Directive 2004/38/EC. The question is whether such conditions laid down 
in national legislation for entitlement to “special non-contributory benefits” 
within the meaning of Regulation 883/2004 are compatible with EU law. 
3.7.4 Two pending preliminary cases 
It is expected that the judgements to be delivered by the Court of Justice in 
two pending preliminary cases will soon give us the answer to this 
question. The first case concerns Mr Brey, a German national who is in 
receipt of a modest German invalidity pension. In 2011, he transferred his 
residence to Austria where he applied for an Austrian compensatory 
supplement – a “special non-contributory benefit” – listed in Annex X of 
Regulation 883/2004. This benefit is aimed at guaranteeing the person 
concerned a minimum subsistence income in Austria. If, for instance, a 
person receives a pension lower than the minimum subsistence income 
applicable in Austria, then he will be entitled to the supplement. However, 
Austrian legislation restricts the entitlement to such supplements to 
persons who are legally residing in Austria. Mr Brey’s claim for the 
supplement was refused by Austrian because, in order to reside legally in 
Austria, a (non-active) person must have sufficient resources for himself 
and the members of his family. Since Mr Brey only receives a pension that 
                                                   
59 Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004. 
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is lower than the minimum subsistence level in Austria, he did not, in the 
view of the Austrian authorities, have legal residence in Austria. The case 
eventually reached the Court of Justice. The main issue here concerns the 
question of whether or not Mr Brey is entitled to the Austrian supplement. 
However, the question referred to the CJEU focuses on the right of 
residence. The Court is asked to give judgement on the question of whether 
the Austrian compensatory supplement is “social assistance” within the 
meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC. As stated above, Article 
7(1) of Directive 2004/38 applies to the right of residence for more than 
three months for non-active people the condition that they have sufficient 
resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden 
on the social assistance system of the host state.  
The second case concerns UK legislation. By virtue of UK legislation, 
entitlement to all “special non-contributory benefits” listed in Annex X 
Section UK is subject to the condition that the claimant has a right to reside 
in the UK. The right to reside may arise under either domestic or EU law. 
In 2006, Ms Saint Prix, a French national, came to the UK. After 
having worked in various jobs, she became a student. Having become 
pregnant, she withdrew from her studies in order to start agency work. She 
stopped working in March 2008 and made a claim for Income Support, a 
special non-contributory benefit listed in Annex IIa of Regulation 
1408/71.60 Ms Saint Prix’s claim was refused by the UK authorities on the 
grounds that she did not have a right to reside in the UK. Ms Saint Prix 
appealed against this decision and the case reached the UK Supreme Court. 
As in the Brey case, the nub of the matter concerned the claimant’s right to 
be paid a “special non-contributory benefit” within the meaning of Council 
Regulation 1408/71. However, the questions addressed to the CJEU focus 
on the right of residence of the claimant. In fact, the Supreme Court asks 
whether Ms Saint Prix was a worker within the meaning of Directive 
2004/38/EC. As stated above, the conditions concerning sufficient 
resources required by Directive 2004/38/EC for economically non-active 
people do not apply to workers. In this context, it is relevant to mention 
that the compatibility of the right-to-reside test with EU law, in particular 
with the right of equal treatment guaranteed by Article 3 of Council 
Regulation 1408/71, was brought before the UK’s Supreme Court in 2011 in 
                                                   
60 Regulation 1408/71 was replaced by Regulation 883/2004 only on 1 May 2010. 
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the case of Patmalniece,61 but that the UK Supreme Court did not see fit to 
refer the legality of the right-to-reside test to the Court of Justice.  
It is possible that the CJEU will stick to the questions raised and limit 
itself to answering the question of whether or not Ms Saint Prix was a 
worker within the meaning of Article 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC. Hopefully 
the CJEU will also give its view on the compatibility of the right-to-reside 
test with EU law, in particular as regards Council Regulation 1408/71.62  
3.7.5 Does “social assistance” within the meaning of Directive 
2004/38/EC include special non-contributory benefits within the 
meaning of Regulation 883/2004? 
There seem to be arguments for the conclusion that the term “social 
assistance” used in Directive 2004/38/EC does not cover benefits falling 
within the material scope of Regulation 883/2004 such as special non-
contributory benefits and other social security benefits.  
The EU Regulations on the coordination of social security systems 
have, from the very beginning, excluded from their scope “social and 
medical assistance.”63 It is true that “special non-contributory benefits” 
have some characteristics of social assistance, but they also display 
characteristics of social security. That is the very reason why the CJEU has 
made clear in its abundant case law dating from the 1970s that such 
benefits fall within the scope of the EU Regulations on the coordination of 
social security systems. In 1992, this case law was “translated” into the text 
of Council Regulation 1408/71 and later into Regulation 883/2004.  
The Commission’s proposal for Directive 2004/38/EC was clearly 
marked by the consideration that social assistance within the meaning of 
Articles 7(1)(b) and 24(2) of the Directive could only be benefits which “at 
the present stage (were) not covered by Community law.”64 Indeed, there was –
                                                   
61 Patmalniece vs. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, (2011) UK SC 11. 
62 This Regulation was still applicable on the date Ms Saint Prix made her claim. 
63 Article 2(3) of Regulation 3, Article 4 (4) of Regulation 1408/71 and Article 5 of 
Regulation 883/2004. 
64 Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission’s proposal on Article 7(1) and 
Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC as adopted: European Commission, Proposal 
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States, COM(2001) 257, 23.5.2001. 
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and still is – no specific coordination regime at the EU level for social65 and 
medical assistance. Likewise, there is still no specific coordination regime at 
the EU level for maintenance aid for studies.66 This explains the very 
existence of the specific provisions on maintenance aid for studies in Article 
24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC corresponding to Article 21(2) of the 
Commission proposal.  
However, as stated above, it had been clear since the 1970s that 
special non-contributory benefits fell within the scope of application of the 
EU Regulations on the coordination of social security systems. Therefore, in 
the Commission’s view, special non-contributory benefits could not be 
considered to be “social assistance” within the meaning of Directive 
2004/38/EC.  
In this context, it is also important to refer to the CJEU’s judgement in 
the Vatsouras case.67 This judgement concerned the right of EU citizens to 
“benefits to cover subsistence costs under the basic provision for 
jobseekers.”68 As regards these benefits, the CJEU ruled: “Benefits of a 
financial nature which, independently of their status under national law, are 
intended to facilitate access to the labour market cannot be regarded as constituting 
“social assistance” within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38”. 
Very recently, the CJEU confirmed that Article 24(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC must be interpreted narrowly and in accordance with the 
principles of the Treaty.69 In a general way, there is no indication 
whatsoever that the EU legislature, when adopting Directive 2004/38/EC, 
sought to limit the rights to benefits already existing under Council 
Regulation 1408/71 and Regulation 883/2004. Directive 2004/38/EC does 
                                                   
65 That does not exclude, of course, a possible application of Regulation 492/2011: 
Case 249/83 Hoeckx [1985] ECR 973 and Case 122/84 Scrivner and Cole [1985] ECR 
1027. 
66 This does not exclude, of course, a possible application of Regulation 492/2011: 
Case C-33/99 Fahmi and Cerdeiro-Pinedo Amado [2001] ECR I-02415. 
67 Joined Cases C-22/08 and 23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] ECR I-04585, in 
particular para. 45. 
68 This is a “special non-contributory benefit” listed in Annex X of Regulation 
883/2004. 
69  Case C-46/12 L.N. [2013], judgment of 21 February 2013, not yet reported, para. 
33. 
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not contain any reference to the aforementioned Regulations.70 In its Metock 
judgement,71 the Court ruled that “Union citizens cannot derive less rights 
from this directive [Directive 2004/38/EC] than from the instruments of 
secondary legislation which it amends or repeals.” It seems obvious that 
this is all the more true for secondary legislation which is neither repealed 
nor amended by Directive 2004/38/EC.  
However, in its conclusions of 29 May 2013 in the Brey case,72 the 
Advocate General is of the opinion that the Austrian benefit in question 
does constitute “social assistance” for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of 
Directive 2004/38. There seem to be some inconsistencies in his 
argumentation. Referring to the Hosse judgment73 he states that “the 
concepts of “social security benefit” and “special non-contributory benefit” 
are thus mutually exclusive”.74 This is wrong. In the Hosse judgement, the 
Court ruled that a social security benefit within the meaning of Article 4(1) 
of Regulation 1408/71 cannot be analysed as a “special non-contributory 
benefit”. In other words, if a benefit is a ‘classical’ social security benefit, it 
cannot be a “special non-contributory benefit”. In the Hosse, judgement the 
Court acknowledged that a “special non-contributory benefit” is 
nevertheless a social security benefit covered by Regulation 1408/71! 
Moreover, the Advocate General says75 that “the aim of Articles 3(5)(a) and 
70(4) of Regulation 883/2004 is to prevent the export of the benefits which 
they govern”. It is surprising that the Advocate General treats Article 
3(5)(a), which concerns social assistance being excluded from the material 
scope of the Regulation, on the same footing as Article 70(4), which deals 
with “special non-contributory benefits”. True, the purpose of the first 
sentence of Article 70(4) is to prevent export of “special non-contributory 
benefits”. But the purpose of the second sentence of Article 70(4) is to 
guarantee the access of “special non-contributory benefits” to all persons 
                                                   
70 Directive 2004/38/EC and Regulation 883/2004 were adopted on the same day 
(29 April 2004)! 
71 Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-06241, para. 59. 
72 Case C-140/12: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof 
(Austria), lodged on 19 March 2012 — Pensionsversicherungsanstalt vs. Peter Brey. 
73 Case C-286/03 Hosse [2006] ECR I-01771.  
74 See Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-140/12, delivered on 29 May 
2013, para. 49. 
75 Ibid., para. 56.  
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covered by Regulation 883/2004 who reside in the host state on the basis of 
equal treatment as nationals of that state. This second sentence of Article 
70(4) of Regulation 883/2004 is ignored in the conclusions of the Advocate 
General.   
3.7.6 Is the right-to-reside test compatible with EU law? 
As set out above, the conditions for the granting of special non-
contributory benefits in the host state have, since 1992, been exhaustively 
regulated by EU law. After 1992, it was no longer necessary to prove that 
the person claiming the “special non-contributory” benefit in the member 
state of residence had previously worked there; he was entitled to be 
treated in the same way as nationals of the host state. For the purpose of 
Regulation 883/2004, the term “residence” has an EU-wide meaning as 
indicated in the Swaddling judgement. It is of a factual nature: where is the 
person’s centre of interests? The idea of “residence” within the meaning of 
Council Regulation 1408/71 (or Regulation 883/2004) never depended on 
the legality of that residence. If the person concerned could prove that his 
centre of interests was in the host state, then he was entitled to “special 
non-contributory benefits” provided by the legislation of that state. 
Implicitly, the EU legislature at that time accepted that a person covered by 
Council Regulation 1408/71, who proved that his centre of interests was in 
the host state, had shown he had a sufficient genuine link with the host 
state in order to claim payment of special non-contributory benefits.  
A requirement in national legislation that claimants comply with an 
additional condition, namely the right to reside, as a basis for accepting that 
they actually “reside” in the host state within the meaning of Regulation 
883/2004 seems to be incompatible with this Regulation. Moreover, it 
constitutes indirect discrimination based on nationality. In fact, this 
additional requirement is intrinsically liable to affect nationals of other 
member states to a greater extent than nationals of the host state.76  
3.7.7 Does “residence” demonstrate a sufficient genuine link with the host 
state? Case law on European citizenship 
As referred to above, member states, with a view to protecting the financial 
balance of their social security systems, ask that persons coming from other 
member states can demonstrate a certain degree of integration in the host 
                                                   
76  Case C-124/99 Borawitz [2000] ECR I-07293, in particular, paras. 25-27. 
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state before they can be eligible for special non-contributory benefits.77 In a 
number of judgements concerning non-contributory benefits, the Court of 
Justice has stated that such aims are legitimate and are capable of justifying 
restrictions on the rights on freedom of movement and residence under 
Article 21 TFEU.78 Most of this case law concerned benefits falling outside 
the scope of Regulations 1408/71 and 883/2004, such as genuine social 
assistance benefits,79 benefits for war victims80 and study loans or grants81, 
or benefits where Council Regulation 1408/71 could not be applied, given 
the circumstances of the specific case.82 The Court of Justice has also 
referred to this requirement in relation to a non-contributory benefit falling 
within the scope of Council Regulation 1408/71.83 With regards to this last 
judgement, we should not forget that the benefit in question was not a 
“special” non-contributory benefit within the meaning of Council 
Regulation 1408/71. Therefore, the benefit in question in the Stewart case 
fell under the classical coordination rules, including the exportability laid 
down in Article 10 of Council Regulation 1408/71.  
The CJEU also underlined that measures restricting the free 
movement of EU citizens, where they pursue a legitimate objective, must 
                                                   
77 See F. Van Overmeiren, E. Eichenhofer and H. Verschueren (2011), “Social 
security coverage of non-active persons moving to another Member State”, 
Analytical Study, Network on the Coordination of Social Security Schemes in the 
European Union, TrESS (Training and Reporting on European Social Security) 
(retrievable from www.tress-network.org). 
78  Case C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-06191. 
79  Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-06193 and Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] 
ECR I-07573. 
80  Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen [2006] ECR I-10451; Case C-499/06  Nerkowska [2008] 
ECR I-03993; Case C- 221/07 Zablocka-Weyhermüller [2008] ECR I-09029. 
81  Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-02119 and Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I-
08507. 
82  Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-02703; Case C-212/05 Hartmann [2007] ECR 
I-06303 and Case C-213/05 Geven [2007] ECR I-06347. 
83  Case C-503/09 Stewart [2011] ECR I-06497; in para. 92 of this judgment the Court 
stated that “where acquisition of entitlement to a non-contributory benefit is not 
subject to conditions as regards contributions, it can be considered to be legitimate 
for a Member State to award such benefit only after it has been established that 
there was a genuine link between the claimant and the competent State”.  
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not go further than is necessary to achieve that goal.84 The proportionality 
principle requires that a person should be enabled to demonstrate his 
degree of integration via a variety of relevant connecting factors or criteria, 
taking into account all individual circumstances of the case. A dominant 
connecting factor or criterion for the establishment of the genuine link 
should be avoided.  
The concept of “residence” in Regulation 883/2004 seems to be in line 
with the CJEU’s case law concerning the requirement of a certain degree of 
integration. The variety of elements to be taken into account in order to 
establish whether a person does indeed have habitual residence in a 
member state appears to fit into this case law concerning the genuine link. 
It was the CJEU which introduced this variety of factors when interpreting 
the term “residence” in Council Regulation 1408/71.85 The concept has now 
been elaborated further and codified in Article 11 of Regulation 987/2009. 
The evaluation based on all relevant individual circumstances referred to in 
Article 11 of Regulation 987/2009 seems to align with the way the CJEU has 
interpreted the establishment of a certain degree of integration between the 
claimant of social benefits and the member state granting the benefit.  
It would be wrong to conclude that under the current system, every 
non-active EU citizen could go to another member state and claim special 
non-contributory benefits there. This right is restricted to those persons 
who do actually reside in the host state. The practice shows that often a 
social security institution assumes that the place of residence is identical to 
the place that a person has declared as his home address. A clarification of 
the term “residence” within the meaning of Regulation 883/2004 could 
exclude a number of possibly unjustified claims.  
To this end, the Administrative Commission for the coordination of 
social security systems last year created an ad hoc group to provide 
guidance on the determination of the place of residence within the meaning 
of Regulation 883/2004. This group has very recently presented its final 
report which contains a number of concrete examples aimed at drawing 
attention to specific characteristics that might be common to many cases 
                                                   
84  Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-02703; Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen [2006] ECR 
I-10451; Case C- 221/07 Zablocka-Weyhermüller [2008] ECR I-09029 and Case C-
503/09 Stewart [2011] ECR I-06497. 
85  Case 76/76 Di Paolo [1977] ECR 315; Case C-102/91 Knoch [1992] ECR I-04341 
and Case C-90/97 Swaddling [1999] ECR I-01075. 
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(e.g. students, pensioners, and inactive highly mobile persons). The report 
will be discussed by the Administrative Commission, most probably before 
summer 2013.  
The mere fact that the EU legislature accepted in 1992 the habitual 
residence condition of Council Regulation 1408/71 (now Regulation 
883/2004) as creating a sufficient genuine link between the claimant and 
the host member state for entitlement to “special non-contributory 
benefits” does not mean, of course, that this is an irreversible choice. If 
there was convincing evidence showing, on the basis of facts and figures 
(see below), that the current system leads to unreasonable consequences for 
member states with the most generous minimum subsistence benefits, then 
the EU legal framework could and should be revised. The Think Tank of 
the network of independent (academic) experts on coordination of social 
security systems, trESS, presented in 2011 an analytical report containing 
an interesting idea on how the current legal framework could be modified 
without affecting the principles of coordination.86 In fact, the report 
suggests a modified notion of “residence” in Regulation 883/2004 for the 
application of the separate coordination system of “special non-
contributory benefits”. A waiting period could be introduced before the 
person is entitled to such benefits in the host state. It would mean that 
during the first period of “residence” within the meaning of Directive 
2004/38/EC, a person is not yet considered to be a resident of the host state 
within the meaning of Regulation 883/2004, unless this person can prove 
the opposite.87 During this waiting period, the person concerned would be 
considered as having kept his residence within the meaning of Regulation 
883/2004 in the member state of origin. In other words, the member state of 
origin continues to be the competent state for entitlement to special non-
contributory benefits during the waiting period.  
This suggestion is interesting, because it respects the principles of the 
coordination system whilst also meeting the concerns of the member states 
in relation to the coverage of non-active persons. If the waiting period were 
to be fixed at three months, then the period would also correspond to the 
social assistance exception of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC.  
                                                   
86 See F. Van Overmeiren, E. Eichenhofer and H. Verschueren (2011), op. cit. 
87 This possibility to provide proof of a really existing genuine link with the host 
State is important given the need to take into account the principle of 
proportionality when restricting the free movement of persons.  
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However, we should be very careful envisaging any further 
modification of the conditions for entitlement to “special non-contributory 
benefits”. In the first place, the habitual residence condition of Council 
Regulation 1408/71 (now Regulation 883/2004) to create a sufficient 
genuine link between the claimant and the host member state for 
entitlement to “special non-contributory benefits” was a crucial element of 
the balance achieved by the EU legislature when agreeing to end the export 
of these benefits. Perhaps even more importantly, we should not forget that 
this balance also played a role for the CJEU when it decided that the non-
exportability of such benefits was not incompatible with the objective of 
former Article 42 EC, namely to protect people who make use of their right 
to free movement.88  
3.7.8 The importance of facts and figures 
Claims that the current system leads to benefit tourism in the member 
states with the most generous “special non-contributory benefits” have 
become more and more vociferous, and we should take the concerns 
expressed by several member states seriously. But before deciding on any 
change to the current legal framework (see above), we need to collect and 
consider facts and figures.  
In 2011, the Think Tank of trESS made an effort to gather, through a 
questionnaire sent to member states, statistical information on the number 
of cases related to possible issues with non-active people. The vast majority 
of the member states responding to the questionnaire declared that no such 
data was available in their systems.89 Uncertainty still remains over the size 
and the impact of the alleged problematic issues.  
Therefore, the Commission launched in late 2012 a study to obtain 
statistical data on past, current and potential future flows of non-active 
intra-EU migrants, breaking down the data by category of migrant, such as 
jobseekers, pensioners, students, people with disabilities and other non-
active migrants. The study aims to cover the drivers for migration as well 
as access to special non-contributory benefits of non-active intra-EU 
migrants and its impact on member states’ social security systems.  
                                                   
88  Case C-20/96 Snares [1997] ECR I-06057, paras. 46-49. 
89 See Van Overmeiren, Eichenhofer and Verschueren (2011), op. cit. 
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4. Conclusions 
It is apparent that, in the current state of EU law, Directive 2004/38/EC 
does not restrict access to special non-contributory benefits covered by 
Regulation 883/2004. On the one hand, no provision of Directive 
2004/38/EC refers to Regulation 883/2004. On the other hand, the 
application of Regulation 883/2004, in particular its provisions granting 
access to special non-contributory benefits in the state of residence and its 
definition of the term “residence”90, has not been made subject to the need 
to fulfil the criteria for obtaining a right of residence under Directive 
2004/38/EC. Likewise, the Court of Justice has never referred to Directive 
2004/38/EC, or to the legal instruments repealed by this Directive, when 
interpreting the term “residence” within the meaning of the EU 
Regulations on the coordination of social security systems. Entitlement to 
special non-contributory benefits listed in Annex X of Regulation 883/2004 
depends only on the condition that persons have their habitual centre of 
interests in a member state. Any other interpretation would undermine the 
balance agreed by the EU legislature in 1992 between the limitations on the 
export of these benefits in the event of migration and the obligation for the 
new member state of residence to grant the benefits listed in Annex X.91 
Any other interpretation would also deprive the provisions of Regulation 
883/2004 of their effectiveness.92 
The concept of “residence” in Regulation 883/2004 seems to be in line 
with the CJEU’s case law concerning the requirement of a certain degree of 
integration in the host state.  
Before deciding on any change to the current legal framework, we 
need to have the facts and figures. As mentioned above, an initiative to 
obtain statistical data on past, current and potential future flows of non-
active EU migrants has been launched recently. 
The preparatory works leading to Directive 2004/38/EC seem to 
indicate that special non-contributory benefits within the meaning of 
Regulation 883/2004 cannot be considered as “social assistance” in the 
                                                   
90 Laid down in Article 11 of the implementing Regulation 987/2009. 
91 The benefits are listed in Annex X on the explicit request of the member state 
concerned (and after careful examination by the legislature whether the conditions 
for being “special” and “non-contributory” are fulfilled)! 
92 Verschueren (2007), op. cit. 
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sense of Directive 2004/38/EC. It is, therefore, difficult to imagine that the 
mere act of invoking Regulation 883/2004 in the host state in order to 
obtain access to special non-contributory benefits would result in “having 
become un unreasonable burden on its social assistance system” within the 
meaning of Article 14(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC.  
All this would imply that an EU citizen who resides, within the 
meaning of Regulation 883/2004, in the host member state and who has, 
thanks to this Regulation, obtained a special non-contributory benefit there, 
probably fulfils the subsistence requirement under Directive 2004/38/EC 
for obtaining or maintaining a right of residence in the host State. But, of 
course, it is up to the Court of Justice to rule on this question. 
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7. DOES GENEROUS WELFARE ATTRACT 
IMMIGRANTS? TOWARDS EVIDENCE-
BASED POLICY-MAKING 
CORRADO GIULIETTI 
AND MARTIN KAHANEC* 
1. Introduction 
In the past 20 years, both immigration and spending have substantially 
increased in the European Union.  The European discourse about migration 
policy heated up with the eastern expansion of the Union in 2004 and 2007. 
Given the significant income differentials and other dissimilarities between 
incumbent EU member states (EU15) and the new entrants (EU8+2 and 
EU2),1 fears of negative effects on the labour market and welfare systems 
have been voiced in the receiving countries.2 A specific concern put 
forward was the notion that migrants are especially attracted to countries 
that provide more generous welfare provisions, the so-called ‘welfare-
magnet hypothesis’. 
In spite of the recent attenuating effect of the Great Recession on 
migration to the European Union and of the generally low interstate 
mobility rates within the Union,3 many EU member states host significant 
                                                   
* The authors would like to thank Victoria Finn for helpful assistance. 
1 EU15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. EU8 includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; EU8+2 adds Cyprus and Malta, and EU2 is comprised 
of Bulgaria and Romania. 
2 H.-W. Sinn and W. Ochel (2003), “Social Union, Convergence and Migration”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, No. 5, pp. 869–896. 
3 I.S. Gill and M. Raiser (2012), Golden Growth: Restoring the Luster of the European 
Economic Model, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
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immigrant populations.4 These populations are on average well skilled and 
mobile, but often suffer from segmentation and exclusion from labour 
markets and other spheres of life.5 As these welfare magnet concerns have 
begun to affect policy-making, it is necessary to confirm their validity with 
hard empirical evidence.6 In fact, misinformed policies could be the reason 
behind some difficulties which migrant populations face.  
In this chapter, we review recent studies on whether generous public 
spending attracts immigrants to the EU. We focus on the EU15, since about 
94% of immigrants to the EU27 reside there.7 We first look at the general 
development of welfare spending and migration, identifying some trends 
and stylised facts. We then critically evaluate the European evidence and 
confront it with studies possessing similar contexts. The technical aspects 
of the statistical evaluation of the studied relationship are discussed next. 
We conclude that current empirical evidence suggests weak or no 
magnet effects. This has important implications for the policy debate, 
which appears to be rather misinformed regarding this topic. In the final 
section, we discuss methodological implications as well as challenges for 
evidence-based policy.  
2. Is immigration related to welfare spending?  
Welfare spending has traditionally been high in the EU15, but over the past 
20 years it has reached particularly high levels (Figure 1). In 2011, EU15 
member states on average devoted nearly one-quarter of GDP to welfare 
                                                   
4 M. Kahanec (2013), “Skilled Labor Flows: Lessons from the European Union”, 
Social Protection and Labor Discussion Paper No. SP 1301, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 
5 See A.F. Constant, M. Kahanec and K.F. Zimmermann (2009), “Attitudes Towards 
Immigrants, Other Integration Barriers, and their Veracity”, International Journal of 
Manpower, Vol. 30, No. 1-2, pp. 5-14; and M. Kahanec, K.F. Zimmermann, L. 
Kurekova and C. Biavaschi (forthcoming), “Labour Migration from EaP Countries 
to the EU - Assessment of Costs and Benefits and Proposals for Better Labour 
Market Matching” (www.iza.org/files/ENPImatching.pdf). 
6 For an account of the recent debate in the UK, see www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
22712569 and www.economist.com/news/britain/21573144-government-wants-
curb-benefits-eu-migrants-can-it-once-more-unto-breach.  
7 This figure is based on our own calculations using Eurostat data 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Migration_and
_migrant_population_statistics).  
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spending. Yet spending varies substantially across countries, both in terms 
of level and composition (Figure 2). Pension spending is the highest 
component of expenditure in most countries, but is nearly three times 
higher in Italy than in Ireland. Expenditure on health is more homogenous 
across countries (between 6% and 8%). Spending on unemployment 
benefits is highest in Belgium and Spain and lowest in the UK. 
In parallel, over the past 20 years immigration to the EU15 has 
increased substantially. In 2011, one in eight residents was born in another 
country.8 This high stock of immigrants has been reached principally due 
to rising immigration flows over the past 30 years (Figure 1).   
Figure 1. Attitudes towards migrants – immigrants’ tax contribution 
 
Source: Own elaborations from OECD International Migration Database and 
from OECD SOCX database, 1985-2011.  
 
 
 
                                                   
8 Ibid.  
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Figure 2. Breakdown of social expenditure by major components 
 
Source: Own elaboration from OECD SOCX database, 2009. For detailed 
definitions of expenditure components, see W. Adema, P. Fron and M. 
Ladaique (2011), “Is the European welfare state really more expensive? 
Indicators on social spending, 1980-2012; and a Manual to the OECD Social 
Expenditure Database (SOCX)”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration 
Working Paper No. 124, OECD, Paris.   
The public debate about the consequences of immigration to the EU has 
perhaps increased at a greater speed than immigration itself and has 
climaxed in recent years. In many countries, there are public worries that 
immigrants “take jobs” from natives, or that they constitute a fiscal burden 
to the extent that they contribute to the public system less than they receive 
in social benefits. 
Data on attitudes towards migrants show that across the EU15, there 
is a rather high share of individuals who are sceptical about migrants 
contributing enough to the social system.9 Such opinions can be driven by 
individuals’ perceptions and feelings, but are often instilled by the media 
or originate from the political arena. The rise of anti-immigration sentiment 
                                                   
9 European Commission (2010), Eurobarometer 71: Future of Europe: 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb713_future_europe.pd
f). 
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and of political parties strongly opposed to immigration is a clear indicator 
on how the immigration debate has become a key issue for Europe.  
Figure 3. Attitudes towards migrants 
 
Source: Own elaboration from Eurobarometer data, 2009. DE includes the 
samples of East and West Germany; UK includes the samples of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. Figures refer to simple averages for each sample (data 
accessed at www.gesis.org/en/eurobarometer/data-access/). 
 
Whether such worries are warranted in any way (i.e. whether immigration 
benefits or hinders the host country) is very much an empirical question, 
which economists have explored for the past 20 years or so. The picture 
that emerges is that immigration does not substantially impact the wages 
or employment in the host region; this appears to hold across countries, 
including EU member states.10  
                                                   
10 Contributions to the analysis of the economic effects of immigration include: G.J. 
Borjas (1994), “The Economics of Immigration”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
32, No. 4, pp. 1667-1717; G.J. Borjas (2003), “The Labor Demand Curve is 
Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor 
Market”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 4, pp. 1335-1374; D. Card 
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This chapter reviews the literature and major economic studies 
discussing whether or not welfare acts as a magnet for immigrants in the 
EU15. Before doing so, we first describe the EU15’s current patterns of 
welfare and migration using data gathered for this chapter. The scope is to 
introduce the reader to the complexities behind obtaining empirical 
evidence on this issue and to familiarise her with the topics discussed in 
the review.   
First, it is certainly possible that there is a ‘raw positive association’ 
between immigration flows and welfare spending in host countries.  Both 
spending and immigration flows as a whole increased in the EU15 at a 
similar rate (see Figure 1). The raw correlation between the two aggregate 
series is a staggering 0.82.   
However, such positive association per se is often misleading and 
stems from a spurious correlation operating through other variables – such 
as macroeconomic fundamentals  – which share the same positive trend as 
immigration and public spending. The effect of such confounding factors 
could be isolated by the means of regression analysis. Using this statistical 
tool for the pool of 15 member states over the period 1985−2011 produces a 
positive, but rather mild, association, even when narrowing the attention to 
inflows from developing countries (see column 1 in Table 1). A correlation 
of 0.011 for the case of developing countries implies that if public spending 
increases by 1%, flows would increase – in relative terms – by about 1.5%.  
A spurious correlation between migration and welfare spending may 
arise when putting in relation these variables with contextual ones with 
which they share similar trends. In a regression framework, one way to 
directly control for such co-movements is to add indicators for each year 
                                                                                                                                 
(1990), “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market”, Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 245-257; D. Card (2001), “Immigrant 
Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher 
Immigration”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 19, No. 11, pp. 22-64; D. Card (2005), 
“Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 115, No. 507, 
pp. 300-323; for the US, K. Butcher and D. Card (1991), “Immigration and Wages: 
Evidence from the 1980s”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 292-
296; for the UK, C. Dustmann, F. Fabbri and I. Preston (2005), “The Impact of 
Immigration on the British Labour Market”, Economic Journal, Vol. 115, No. 507, pp. 
324-341; for Germany, F. D’Amuri, G. Ottaviano and G. Peri (2010), “The Labor 
Market Impact of Immigration in Western Germany in the 1990s”, European 
Economic Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 550-570. 
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(see column 2 in Table 1). Another – or additional – strategy is to control 
for destination-specific, time-varying factors, such as the unemployment 
rate (see column 3 in Table 1). After implementing year fixed effects and 
controlling for the unemployment rate, the positive raw correlation 
between migration and welfare generosity becomes essentially zero, or 
even negative in some cases.  
Table 1. Regression of immigration inflows on social expenditure 
 
Source: Own computations from OECD international migration database and from 
OECD SOCX database, 1985-2009. Unemployment rate is obtained by Eurostat 
Labour Force Survey Statistics 1985-2009. Observations are weighted by the 
population size of each country.  
Social expenditure as % of GDP 0.0010    -0.0041    -0.0050 *  -0.0012       -0.0007
            (0.0026)    (0.0030)    (0.0029)    (0.0045)       (0.0049)
Unempl expenditure as % of GDP 0.0320
(0.0220)
Soc. Exp X Year>=2008                                                                  -0.0070
                                                                             (0.0038)
R2 0.001    0.094    0.121    0.341    0.413    0.360
Social expenditure as % of GDP 0.0019    0.0010    0.0000    -0.0019       -0.0019
            (0.0013)    (0.0016)    (0.0015)    (0.0022)       (0.0022)
Unempl expenditure as % of GDP 0.0047
(0.0156)
Soc. Exp X Year>=2008                                                        -0.0004
                                                                   (0.0008)
R2 0.024    0.113    0.298    0.374    0.370    0.374
Social expenditure as % of GDP 0.0031    -0.0049    -0.0054 *  0.0008       0.0018
            (0.0026)    (0.0029)    (0.0031)    (0.0040)       (0.0038)
Unempl expenditure as % of GDP 0.0261
(0.0153)
Soc. Exp X Year>=2008                                                        -0.0125
                                                                   (0.0074)
R2 0.022    0.367    0.385    0.650    0.612    0.705
Social expenditure as % of GDP 0.0106 *  -0.0085    -0.0075    0.0120       0.0131
            (0.0059)    (0.0065)    (0.0063)    (0.0094)       (0.0106)
Unempl expenditure as % of GDP 0.0321
(0.0312)
Soc. Exp X Year>=2008                                                                  -0.0140
                                                                             (0.0101)
R2 0.048    0.436    0.446    0.690    0.665    0.701
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Unemployment rate N N Y Y Y Y
N           104    104    104    104    78    104
OLS Panel data
Immigrants - inflows from EU15
Immigrants - inflows from other OECD
Immigrants - inflows from A10
Immigrants - inflows from developing countries
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More sophisticated methods to control for confounding factors come 
from the use of panel data methods. These allow for control of unobserved 
heterogeneity of each country, namely time-variant specific factors which 
are usually not observed by the analyst. Fixed effects panel data methods 
applied to our data corroborate that there is no statistical evidence of a 
magnet effect (see column 4 in Table 1). The same overall conclusion is 
reached if we focus on a particular component of expenditure, 
unemployment benefits spending. In all samples, the estimated correlation 
is statistically insignificant, with very small magnitudes (an estimate of 0.03 
for developing countries would imply that a 1% increase in unemployment 
benefit spending would increase migration by 0.3%).  
While panel data methods are useful to address problems of 
identification, there are additional challenges when trying to identify the 
welfare magnet hypothesis. Some of these are related to immigration and 
welfare measurement, others pertain to the possibility that the two 
variables are endogenous. The size and direction of the bias derived from 
these issues are a priori unknown. In the following section, we explore how 
recent studies have coped with such challenges.  
3. Recent evidence from the European Union 
A few studies have attempted to assess whether immigrants are attracted 
by welfare.  Here we review three recent studies that have explored this 
question within the European Union.11 
Pedersen et al. analyse the determinants of immigration flows into 22 
OECD countries (including the whole EU15 except Ireland) over the period 
1990-2000.12 Their comprehensive origin-destination database allows 
accounting for the bilateral ‘distance’ between countries in income per 
capita and unemployment rates – two of the most important factors 
                                                   
11 For comprehensive reviews on this topic, see P. Nannestad (2007), “Immigration 
and Welfare States: A Survey of 15 Years of Research”, European Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 512–532; and C. Giulietti and J. Wahba (2013), “Welfare 
Migration”, in K.F. Zimmermann and A.F. Constant (eds.), International Handbook 
on the Economics of Migration, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 489-504 
(pre-publication version available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp6450.pdf).     
12 P.J. Pedersen, M. Pytlikova and N. Smith (2008), “Selection and Network Effects: 
Migration Flows into OECD Countries 1990-2000”, European Economic Review, Vol. 
52, No. 7, pp. 1160–1186.   
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determining immigration. The study finds that besides such 
macroeconomic factors, social networks are an important determinant for 
immigrants. On the other hand, social expenditure as a per cent of GDP – 
the authors’ measure of welfare – only weakly influences immigration.   
De Giorgi and Pellizzari analyse whether more welfare-generous 
countries attract immigrants in the EU15 by combining micro-level data 
from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) with information 
from the OECD Database on Unemployment Benefit Entitlements and 
Replacement Rates.13 They measure welfare generosity using the net 
replacement rate (NRR), which corresponds to the ratio between out-of-
work income (e.g. unemployment benefits) and the average wage. They 
estimate the correlation between the location choice of immigrants from 
outside the EU15 and the NRR using various specifications. Their 
conclusion is that there is a statistically significant but small effect in the 
sense that immigrants tend to locate in more generous welfare countries. In 
terms of size, the effect of welfare is smaller in magnitude than the magnet 
effect of other incentives, such as wages or lower unemployment. Yet, 
according to the simulations carried out by the authors, the effect is 
deemed large enough for welfare to be non-trivially affecting labour 
mobility within the European Union.  
There are several reasons why results from De Giorgi and Pellizzari 
differ from Pedersen et al. Besides differences in the data sources, the paper 
by De Giorgi and Pellizzari uses a sample of immigrants observed at a 
certain point in a country and correlates it with the level of benefits at the 
time of arrival. The paper by Pedersen and co-authors uses origin-
destination migration flows – a more ‘macro’ approach. Both papers only 
partially address the problem of causality. De Giorgi and Pellizzari assess 
that the correlation between observables – namely, the welfare measure 
and other covariates such as unemployment rate and wages – is low and 
hence deduce that the role of unobservable confounding factors is limited. 
Pedersen et al. reduce the potential bias by using panel methodology and 
by exploiting the availability of origin-destination flows, which allow for 
better control of unobserved heterogeneity.  
In a more recent paper, Giulietti et al. directly tackle the issue of 
endogeneity by using an instrumental variable (IV) approach within a 
                                                   
13 G. De Giorgi and M. Pellizzari (2009), “Welfare Migration in Europe”, Labour 
Economics, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 353–363.   
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panel setting.14 The authors analyse immigration flows into 19 European 
countries over the period 1993-2008. The measure of welfare generosity is 
represented by unemployment benefit spending as a percentage of GDP. 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates on panel data show that the 
unemployment benefit positively correlates with immigration inflows from 
non-EU countries; the association is not large, yet it is statistically 
significant. On the other hand, inflows from EU origins are essentially 
uncorrelated with unemployment benefit spending, and the same 
conclusion is reached when only cross-country variation is explored. The 
positive association between immigration and welfare could be driven, the 
authors argue, by the endogeneity between the two variables. In order to 
cope with this issue, the authors adopt the number of parties in the 
government coalition as an instrumental variable that predicts immigration 
only through its effect on unemployment benefit spending. The rationale is 
that public spending tends to be larger when ruling coalitions are 
composed of a large number of political parties, each of which has its own 
incentives to spend, and coordination becomes more difficult. At the same 
time, this variable is believed to not directly influence immigration. This 
procedure allows mitigating the role of potential reverse causality or other 
sources of endogeneity bias, such as omitted variable factors. The IV 
specifications yield estimates of the coefficient of interest that are 
essentially zero for both inflows from EU and non-EU origins. The same 
results are obtained when generalised methods of moments techniques are 
applied.   
The authors discuss the potential channels of endogeneity behind the 
discrepancy between IV and OLS. First, immigration could influence 
unemployment benefit spending as a percentage of GDP, for example 
through welfare programme participation, as well as through tax 
contributions and consumption. Second, welfare policy could react to 
immigration, such that policy-makers could encourage or discourage 
immigrant welfare participation by modifying eligibility criteria or welfare 
duration. The authors provide some evidence that both channels of 
endogeneity could be at work and need to be accounted for in the analysis. 
More research is therefore desirable in order to better understand the 
                                                   
14 C. Giulietti, M. Guzi, M. Kahanec and K.F. Zimmermann (2013), 
“Unemployment Benefits and Immigration: Evidence from the EU”, International 
Journal of Manpower, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 24–38.   
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various causality channels active within the immigration-welfare 
relationship.  
4. Related evidence  
4.1 Welfare use 
An often-investigated parallel question is whether immigrants ‘abuse’ the 
welfare system. While this is a rather challenging question to test, the 
typical approach is to compare welfare use between immigrants and 
natives and assess whether the former exhibit ‘residual’ welfare 
dependence, i.e. excess use not explainable by observable characteristics.  
Barrett and Maître analysed a sample of 19 EU member states plus 
Norway from the 2007 European Union Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) and found that after immigrant characteristics are 
taken into account, there is evidence of residual welfare dependency only 
in Sweden, Denmark and, marginally, Finland and Germany.15 Higher 
relative welfare use by migrants is found when looking at unemployment 
support in eight countries; however, once immigrants’ higher probability 
of being unemployed is accounted for, the large gap with natives 
disappears or even becomes negative in some countries. This indicates a 
residual disadvantage of migrants in accessing unemployment benefits. 
Similar results are found when considering other welfare programmes. 
One striking result in Barrett and Maître is that, against weak evidence of 
welfare dependency, in nearly all countries immigrants face a substantially 
higher risk of poverty than natives.  
Welfare use by immigrants in the European Union is also 
investigated in the country studies collected in Zimmermann et al.16 The 
analysis reveals the presence of welfare dependency in a few countries. 
However, the picture that often emerges yet again is one of insufficient 
welfare coverage by migrants in many countries, documented by the 
absence of assistance programmes or the presence of obstacles to welfare 
access due to institutional constraints or discrimination. Severe barriers to 
                                                   
15 A. Barrett and B. Maître (2013), “Immigrant Welfare Receipt across Europe”, 
International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 8–23.     
16 K.F. Zimmermann, M. Kahanec, A. Barrett, C. Giulietti, B. Maître and M. Guzi 
(2012), “Study on Active Inclusion of Immigrants”, IZA Research Report No. 43, 
Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn.    
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migrant inclusion are corroborated by the results from a stakeholder 
survey reported by Constant et al. and Kahanec et al.17 
4.2 Welfare magnets in the United States 
While the United States has different migration and public spending 
patterns, it is interesting to compare the statistical evidence for this country 
and the European Union. One of the main substantial differences between 
the European Union and the United States is that, in the latter, migration is 
unrestricted across state borders. On the other hand, within the European 
Union, free movement of labour is virtually free only for EU citizens. As 
documented by Razin and Wahba, the migration regime can affect the 
magnitude of the welfare magnet effect.18     
Most of the US evidence on the welfare magnet hypothesis is focused 
on welfare programmes that provide cash benefits, such as the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). In this case, studies are 
interested in investigating whether cross-state differences in the provision 
of welfare affect the location choices of welfare recipients, such as women 
who receive AFDC. The evidence in this case is mixed, with some studies 
finding some ‘magnet effect’,19 and some finding a small or inexistent 
effect.20  
                                                   
17 A.F. Constant, M. Kahanec and K.F. Zimmermann (2009), op. cit.; Kahanec, M., 
A.M.-H. Kim and K.F. Zimmermann (2013), “Pitfalls of Immigrant Inclusion into 
the European Welfare State”, International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 34, No. 1/2, 
pp. 39-55. 
18 A. Razin and J. Wahba (2011), “Free vs. Controlled Migration: Bilateral Country 
Study”, NBER Working Paper No. 17515, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA. 
19 L. Southwick (1981), “Public Welfare Programs and Recipient Migration”, 
Growth and Change, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 22–32; E.M. Gramlich and D.S. Laren (1984), 
“Migration and Income Redistribution Responsibilities”, Journal of Human 
Resources, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 489–511; R. Blank (1988), “The Effect of Welfare and 
Wage Levels on the Location Decisions of Female Households”, Journal of Urban 
Economics, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 186–211; M.E. Enchautegui (1997), “Welfare 
Payments and other Economic Determinants of Female Migration”, Journal of Labor 
Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 529–554.   
20 P.B. Levine and D.J. Zimmerman (1999), “An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare 
Magnet Debate Using the NLSY”, Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 
391–409; B. Meyer (2000), “Do the Poor Move to Receive Higher Welfare 
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In the context of international migration to the United States, Borjas 
compares the location choices of natives and immigrants who receive 
AFDC, Supplemental Security Income and general assistance using data 
from the 1980 and 1990 Census Public Use Microdata Samples.21 He finds 
statistically weak but sizeable evidence that immigrants who receive 
benefits are geographically clustered in a few welfare-generous states, such 
as California. Most of this clustering, however, is explained by low-skilled 
immigrants self-selecting into California. Kaushal exploited an exogenous 
nationwide policy change in welfare provision during the mid-1990s, 
which excluded access to means-tested benefits for five years to 
immigrants who arrived after August 1996.22 After the enactment of the 
reform, several states decided to institute state-level welfare programmes. 
The comparison between states which restored means-tested benefits and 
those which did not allows assessing whether newly arrived immigrants 
are more likely to locate in the former rather than the latter states. The 
results show that the location choices of low-skilled single immigrant 
women – a welfare-prone group – are only marginally affected by the new 
state-level programmes.    
4.3 Sustainability of welfare systems 
Concerns about welfare migration are also related to whether welfare 
systems are sustainable. Excessive welfare use by immigrants could 
ultimately generate a fiscal burden for the host society. Yet, typically 
migrants are on average younger than natives and hence more likely to 
contribute to taxes, which could generate fiscal gains. Some simulations for 
the United States show that admitting a large flow of high- and medium-
skilled immigrants would be a sustainable policy.23 Such intervention 
would exclude low-skilled immigrants, since they do not contribute 
enough in terms of taxes. When simulations take the demographic 
                                                                                                                                 
Benefits?”, Joint Center for Poverty Research Working Paper No. 58, Northwestern 
University, Evanston, IL. 
21 G.J. Borjas (1999), “Immigration and Welfare Magnets”, Journal of Labor 
Economics, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 607–637. 
22 N. Kaushal (2005), “New Immigrants’ Location Choices: Magnets Without 
Welfare”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 59–80.   
23 See K. Storesletten (2000), “Sustaining Fiscal Policy Through Immigration”, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 208, No. 2, pp. 300–323.    
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evolution of the population into account, higher immigration would 
provide fiscal benefits irrespective of skill composition.24 In the EU context, 
Dustmann et al. assess the consequences of the 2004 EU enlargement for 
immigrants from eight accession countries.25 The analysis reveals that 
immigrants are highly educated, are young and go to the UK mainly for 
work reasons. These factors make them net contributors to the tax system 
in the various scenarios considered by the authors.  
4.4 The effect of the crisis 
Evidence on whether the financial crisis has affected the relationship 
between welfare spending and migration is still sparse. OECD data show 
that welfare spending did not change dramatically in the past few years 
and neither did immigration flows (Figure 2). In parallel, the 
unemployment rate for immigrants increased by five percentage points 
during the period 2009-12 (vis-à-vis 3% for natives), and particularly 
affected young and unskilled immigrants.26 This suggests that the number 
of immigrants in need of welfare might have increased. It is unlikely that a 
stronger positive relationship between welfare spending and migration is 
found during the crisis. In fact, estimates from our data suggest that the 
relationship could even be negative (see column 6 in Table 1).  Although 
not statistically significant, we found a negative correlation between 
immigration and the interaction term between social expenditure and an 
indicator for the period after 2007 (the beginning of the crisis).  However, 
more empirical evidence is needed to test the welfare magnet hypothesis 
during the crisis. 
5. A critical assessment of the literature  
The studies covered in this chapter provide comprehensive and exhaustive 
evidence that there is either weak or no support for the hypothesis that 
welfare acts as a magnet for immigration. The study comparison offers the 
                                                   
24 See R. Lee and T. Miller (2000), “Immigration, Social Security, and Broader Fiscal 
Impacts”, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 350–
354.   
25 C. Dustmann, T. Frattini and C. Halls (2010), “Assessing the Fiscal Costs and 
Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK”, Fiscal Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 1–41.   
26 See OECD (2013), International Migration Outlook 2013 (online at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2013-en). 
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opportunity to highlight not only what we have learned about identifying 
such effects, and on which type of data to rely, but also the potential 
limitations and future steps that research could take to provide sound 
empirical evidence on this topic.   
First, we address how to measure migration and welfare, and which 
data are most suitable for analysis. Most of the US studies use microdata to 
investigate migrant location choices, and combine them with aggregate 
measures of welfare provision. A similar approach is adopted in De Giorgi 
and Pellizzari,27 who combine ECHP microdata with country-specific levels 
of NRR for EU member states. The remaining two studies for the European 
Union, Pedersen et al. and Giulietti et al., use data aggregated at the state 
level.28 Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. Microdata are 
desirable since they allow modelling individual migration status as a 
function of actual or potential welfare participation. On the other hand, 
they might present particular challenges in terms of the sample size 
necessary for identification (e.g. individuals living at the border of two 
states) or self-selection (e.g. only individuals who did not return to the 
place of origin are eventually observed in the data). Aggregated data are 
ideal for cross-country comparisons of the migration and welfare measures, 
but have the disadvantage of being prone to measurement error and to 
allowing for a relatively small set of covariates to be controlled for in the 
regressions. Also, a behavioural interpretation of the results based on 
macro-level data is not straightforward.  
The second main challenge relates to the appropriate methodology to 
identify the causal relationship of interest. In other words, the issue is 
whether the estimated correlation captures a causal effect or is rather the 
artefact of self-selection or endogeneity. Irrespective of whether micro or 
macro data are used, the use of longitudinal data to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity (at the individual or aggregate level) is desirable. In addition, 
the use of control variables which are deemed to affect both welfare 
spending and immigration (such as macroeconomic controls) are effective 
in reducing omitted variable bias. IV strategies are perhaps a sound 
method, but their use is often hindered by the need to find a convincing 
                                                   
27 De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009), op. cit.   
28 Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2008), op. cit.; Giulietti, Guzi, Kahanec and 
Zimmermann (2013), op. cit.  
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valid instrument (Giulietti et al. offer one29). To our knowledge, there is 
scarce evidence on the use of quasi-experimental methodologies to test the 
welfare magnet hypothesis (an exception is Kaushal for the United 
States30). However, this is a promising avenue allowing for a neater 
identification of a causal effect.  
An aspect that could not be directly tested in the three studies 
covered in this review is the interactive role between welfare and other 
policies. The effects of welfare interventions could well be interrelated with 
those of other instruments that affect mobility, namely immigration 
policies (point-based systems, skill transferability, etc.). The joint modelling 
of the political processes and of immigration is rather unexplored and is a 
promising avenue for research on this topic.  
6. Conclusion and policy perspectives 
Statistical analysis does not support the hypothesis that welfare is a strong 
magnet for immigrants; even when such an effect is found, it is relatively 
weak compared to other immigration determinants.  
Even though findings indicate that welfare migration is not 
substantial and does not constitute a fiscal burden, such myths derail 
European policy discourse. Welfare ‘abuse’ by migrants remains a 
predominant prior in this discourse, yet the hard evidence reviewed in this 
chapter makes a rather strong case for a paradigm shift accounting for the 
existence of barriers to migrants’ inclusion in receiving labour markets and 
welfare systems.31   
The role for integration policy intervention remains crucial. One 
promising path – followed only by a few countries so far – is to design 
programmes that improve immigrants’ socioeconomic situation upon 
arrival by integrating them into the host labour market and fostering 
assimilation. Interventions in this direction include language training, 
active labour market policies and anti-discrimination interventions.32 By 
                                                   
29  Giulietti, Guzi, Kahanec and Zimmermann (2013), op. cit. 
30 Kaushal (2005), op. cit.  
31 See Zimmermann, Kahanec, Barrett, Giulietti, Maître and Guzi (2012), op. cit.    
32 For a review, see U. Rinne (2013), “The Evaluation of Immigration Policies”, in 
K.F. Zimmermann and A.F. Constant (eds.), International Handbook on the Economics 
of Migration, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 530-551, forthcoming (pre-
publication version available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp6369.pdf).   
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effectively improving immigrants’ labour market attachment, such 
interventions could ultimately lead to a reduction of immigrants’ welfare 
claims. Empirical studies are still scarce, yet there is evidence of such an 
effect. For example, in Denmark – a country where immigrants’ welfare 
take-up is rather high – participation in active labour market policies, such 
as subsidised employment programmes, is found to hasten immigrants’ 
assimilation out of social assistance (Heinesen et al., 2013).33   
As much of the observed gaps between immigrants and natives are 
due to distributional characteristics of some immigrant populations, 
migration policy lays the foundation for future prospects of immigrants in 
host labour markets. For example, migration policy could provide for a 
positive selection of migrants, possibly by means of point-based systems. 
In fact, a battery of complementary policies is desirable. This could include 
integration policies, but also complementary interventions ensuring 
transferability of rights upon immigrants’ arrival and departure, reducing 
informational asymmetries, enabling migrants to reconcile their migration 
project with family life and childcare in particular, or ensuring access to 
education, housing and financial services. Negative perceptions and beliefs 
lead to inadequate policy approaches, resulting in adverse integration 
outcomes, which in turn feed back into negative attitudes. Only a thorough 
and concerted effort could break this vicious circle and achieve more 
positive migrant labour market outcomes, and lessen the gap between 
immigrants and natives.  
                                                   
33 H. Heinesen, L. Husted and M. Rosholm (2013), “The Effects of Active Labour 
Market Policies for Immigrants Receiving Social Assistance in Denmark”, IZA 
Journal of Migration, Vol. 2, No. 15.  
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AND KATHARINA EISELE 
his book has critically examined some of the main controversies 
surrounding the intersection between social benefits and migration 
in the European Union, and the usages and misuses of data and 
knowledge in these debates and policy making processes. The various 
chapters have studied these contested issues from the perspective of five 
general categories of ‘non-citizens’ who are captured by EU law and policy 
for the purposes of social benefits: first, EU citizens living in a member state 
other than that of their nationality; second, third-country nationals lawfully 
resident in the European Union; third, Turkish nationals; fourth, third-
country nationals covered under the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements; and fifth, asylum seekers and refugees. 
The analysis has revealed three cross-cutting findings delineating the 
relationship between migration and social benefits in the European Union: 
first, member states attempting to limit or ‘re-nationalise’ free movement 
(social benefits) rights and freedoms of mobile EU citizens (Section 1, 
below); second, a rather confusing setting and framing of the policy issues, 
priorities and challenges, particularly concerning the scope of the actual 
phenomenon at stake (is it ‘migration’ or is it ‘mobility’?) and the 
group/category of people who are covered (are they ‘migrants’ or ‘EU 
citizens’?) (Section 2); and third, the need for more social sciences 
knowledge and higher quality statistics on the costs of social benefits in the 
migration-related fields, which are currently incomplete or largely lacking, 
to gain a better understanding of the actual reach (and relevance) of this 
phenomenon (Section 3) and to support a more optimal a more optimal 
policy-shaping and policy-making process in these domains at the EU level 
(Section 4). 
T
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1. Member states’ challenges to free movement 
A first controversy relates to widespread political discourses and policy 
agendas/strategies from a growing number of national governments and 
authorities of member states on the ‘costs’ and ‘financial burdens’ of 
migration and ‘social welfare tourism.’ The various chapters have signalled a 
trend in a number of EU member states for ‘migration’ to be perceived as 
creating a disproportionate burden on their labour market and social 
welfare systems. Some of the contributions have illustrated past and 
ongoing national government reactions and attacks on ‘free’ mobility of EU 
citizens exercising intra-EU movement to a second member state. They are 
calling for the restriction of pre-established EU freedoms and rights 
currently envisaged by EU free movement, social security coordination, 
asylum and migration laws.  
As referred to by Jean Lambert, MEP in her Foreword, a prime 
example of the highly protectionist attitude some member states have 
adopted is reflected in the joint letter that the ministers for the interior of 
Germany and Austria, the UK home secretary and the Dutch immigration 
minister sent to the Irish Presidency in May 2013.1 In this letter, the 
ministries of interior requested the amendment of Directive 2004/38/EC 
(on citizens of the European Union) because of the use of national social 
welfare schemes by “certain immigrants from other member states.” The 
concerns expressed related to the additional costs such member states 
would have to bear because of a “fraudulent use of the right of free 
movement of EU citizens”, which, in their view, would require more 
effective sanctions, such as expulsion, re-entry bans, and “practical 
measures to address the pressures” according to these member states.2  
In their response of 24 May 2013, Commissioners Reding (DG Justice, 
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship), Andor (DG Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion), and Malmström (DG Home Affairs) took a clear 
position stating that EU law already provided explicitly and sufficiently for 
the prevention of abuse or fraud, and criticised the member states for 
alleging welfare tourism without backing the allegation up with any 
                                                   
1 Letter to Mr. Alan Shatter, Minister for Justice and Equality (Republic of Ireland), 
President of the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs, May 2013. 
2 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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statistical evidence and data.3 The Commission stressed that in such cases, 
certain guarantees must be safeguarded; hence general prevention 
measures cannot be taken by the member states. The response further 
underscored the importance of the freedom of movement of EU citizens 
while also highlighting the economic and demographic need for and the 
positive effects of increased intra-EU mobility.  
After a discussion at the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting 
on 6-7 June 2013 in Luxembourg, Commissioner Malmström gave a “blunt 
refusal” to the request of the four member states, reiterating that the 
Commission did not intend to amend the fundamental right of free 
movement.4 The Commissioner further stressed that there was an 
agreement to clarify the application of the existing EU rules. The Irish 
Minister warned that this debate could fuel xenophobic reflexes.5 The 
Council invited the Commission to look at the implementation of the free 
movement rules, including guidance on fighting the ‘abuse’ of these rules, 
and to present an interim report to the Justice and Home Affairs Council by 
October 2013 and a final report by December 2013.6 Importantly, it must be 
borne in mind that there is no abuse where EU citizens and their family 
members obtain a right of residence under EU law (as specified in the EU 
Treaties, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU secondary 
legislation) in a member state other than that of the EU citizen’s nationality, 
as they are benefiting from an advantage inherent in the exercise of the 
right of free movement protected by the Treaty. This was stressed and 
clarified by the above-mentioned response from the Commission.7 
                                                   
3 Letter from the Commissioners Reding, Andor and Malmström to Mr. Alan 
Shatter, President of the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs, 24 May 
2013, Ref. Ares (2013) 997663. 
4 “JHA: Commission and Dublin do not want to revise free movement rules”, 
Agence Europe, 7 June 2013.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Council of the European Union, “3244th Justice and Home Affairs Council 
Meeting”, 6-7 June 2013, Luxembourg, document number: 10461/13, p. 22. 
7 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on guidance for better transposition and 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member 
states, COM(2009) 313, 2.7.2009, p. 15, referring to Cases C-212/97 Centros [1999] 
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The non-evidence-based fears expressed by certain EU member states 
have been addressed by a majority of the chapters in this volume. Jean 
Lambert, MEP highlights the work carried out by the European Parliament 
in tracking down the basis upon which claims concerning ‘abuse’ of and 
‘pressure’ from migration on social benefits are made. The Parliament’s 
work indicates that, in fact, it is very difficult to substantiate the claims 
with objective evidence and concrete examples, and that these discourses 
“are rarely backed with figures and data.” Fears of ‘welfare tourism’ have 
consistently preceded every single enlargement process in the EU. Paul 
Minderhoud’s analysis in Chapter 3 explains the revitalisation of a nation-
state approach in a phase of European integration where EU legislation and 
rules are increasingly interfering with national discretion and member 
states’ policies related to social security systems. Anja Wiesbrock 
emphasises in Chapter 4 that “interior ministers are inherently eager to 
defend national sovereignty and are concerned about ‘losing control’ over 
who is admitted and who is beneficiary of social benefits.” The UK 
constitutes a case in point in this respect. Rob Cornelissen clarifies in 
Chapter 6 that the concept of residence in the scope of Council Regulation 
1408/71 was never dependent upon the legality of that residence. 
Cornelissen concludes that the UK’s right-to-reside test is incompatible 
with the Regulation and that “it constitutes indirect discrimination based 
on nationality […] this additional requirement is intrinsically liable to affect 
nationals of other member states to a greater extent than nationals of the 
host state.”8 
This has been also signalled in Chapter 5 by Madeline Garlick, who 
has pointed out how the issue of perceived financial burdens and high 
costs of asylum on the social welfare systems of EU member states was 
very controversial during the negotiations of the recast proposals 
composing the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), with 
comparatively weaker leadership on solidarity and an humanitarian 
approach. Her contribution underlines how the concerns of member states 
to limit costs and of the possibility of ‘abuse’ of reception entitlements were 
                                                                                                                                 
ECR I-01459, para. 27 and C-147/03 Commission vs. Austria [2005] ECR I-05969, 
paras. 67-68. 
8 On the “right-to-reside-test”, see also P. Minderhoud (2009), “Free Movement, 
Directive 2004/38 and Access to Social Benefits”, in P. Minderhoud and N. 
Trimikliniotis (eds), Rethinking the free movement of workers: the European challenges 
ahead, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, pp. 69-85. 
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raised during the negotiations of the recast proposals, in contrast with the 
efforts by the European Commission, the European Parliament, UNHCR 
and civil society actors.  
Garlick’s analysis also shows, however, that ‘economic imperatives’ 
have not always been central when determining member state 
governments’ positions during the negotiations of the recast proposals. She 
gives examples of where national governments could have agreed on 
provisions that would have reduced the economic dependency of asylum-
seekers, but have not done so. For instance, when negotiating the recast of 
the Reception Conditions Directive, the member states did not accept early 
access by asylum-seekers to the labour market; this proved to be amongst 
the most critical issues at stake. The potential contributions of asylum-
seekers to state revenues through taxation and economic activity were 
overridden by “member states’ sensitivities about rising unemployment, 
with evident fears that the public would see more extensive work rights for 
asylum seekers as depriving them of jobs.” This takes us to the point 
emphasised by Kees Groenendijk in Chapters 1 and 2 about the decisive 
role played by state control. 
2. The material and personal scope: What and who?  
The second controversy relates to the following question: ‘What’ and ‘who’ 
are we talking about in the migration-welfare debates? As this collection of 
contributions illustrates, the legal categories or statuses of people at play 
are of particular relevance when looking at the set of rights and freedoms 
(in terms of access to social benefits) granted to each individual having 
exercised mobility to a member state of the European Union, as well as the 
set of derogations and exceptions which national authorities are entitled to 
apply to their enjoyment. 
There is currently a highly fragmented legal framework for access to 
social benefits depending on the relevant legal category into which the 
person on the move falls (see Section 2.1 below on the personal scope). The 
chapters have pointed out the complexities and high technicalities inherent 
to the EU legal frameworks in this policy area, which are by and large 
confusing and leave considerable room for discretion for member states, 
yet also set common standards and principles with which national 
governments need to comply. The resulting picture is one which too often 
leads to legal uncertainty. It also makes it challenging to inform non-
citizens about, and therefore enable them to effectively claim and have 
access to, the rights and benefits to which they are entitled under EU law. 
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This is a point of concern underlined in Anja Wiesbrock’s chapter, in which 
she points out that “[…] migrant workers are often insufficiently informed 
about their social security rights in EU law. It is individuals who keep those 
rights visible, by exercising them and invoking them before courts and 
other national authorities.”  
This is also an area of EU law and policy where concepts and notions 
matter a great deal and where the boundaries between them often remain 
contested territory, ending too often before European tribunals. That has 
been particularly visible when member states have tried to limit the 
allocation and granting of rights and freedoms to non-citizens. Concerning 
the definitions of “abuse and fraud” as used in the Free Movement 
Directive, the Commission referred to its 2009 guidelines for ensuring the 
correct transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC that were issued in the 
context of a previous, similar attempt to modify the Free Movement 
Directive in 2008 by the member states.9 However, the Council’s attempt 
turned out to be rather unsuccessful.  
There has also been some disagreement as regards the difference 
between the concepts of social security and social assistance, and the legal 
boundaries differentiating one from another. Anja Wiesbrock’s contribution 
emphasises how “special non-contributory benefits” have tended to fall 
into the grey area between the two concepts. Similar debates have taken 
place regarding the various substantive connotations inherent to the 
concept of “residence”, as benefits have often been granted on the basis of 
residence or on contributions made (Chapter 4). Madeline Garlick’s chapter 
highlights how the concept of “necessary social assistance” has been 
diverged in different member states in relation to refugees and subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries, or the definition of “core benefits” (Chapter 5). 
Similar contested concepts have been, as Rob Cornelissen’s highlights, 
those related to “special non-contributory benefits” as well as a number of 
non-contributory benefits considered “borderline benefits.”  
2.1 ‘Who’ are we talking about?  
The knowledge emanating from the various chapters illustrate the blurring 
of the target groups subject to these discourses and policies. Are they 
                                                   
9 Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions on abuses and misuses of 
the right to free movement of Persons”, document number: 16483/08, 28 
November 2008.  
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migrants, or are they citizens? Are we talking about EU citizens or third-
country nationals? The policy controversies and debates across a majority 
of member states in Europe, and particularly those more openly concerned 
with ‘migration’ such as the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, mainly 
focus on EU citizens moving (exercising their free movement rights and 
freedoms) and amongst those, the non-economically active (the ‘poor’) 
exercising their freedom to move. Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, and 
especially those of Roma origin, appear to be a group raising major 
concerns.10 The ‘young migrants’ seeking jobs in the European Union also 
seem to be at the centre of political attention and are often artificially 
constructed as a ‘threat’ to the national welfare systems, labour markets 
and economies of the receiving member states.11 An immediate issue of 
concern arising from these framings is that they challenge the equal 
treatment and non-discrimination principles laying at the basis of 
citizenship of the European Union. 
Jean Lambert’s Foreword has underlined the ways in which the 
actual barriers and practical hurdles which are still experienced by many 
EU citizens and non-citizens entitled to social benefits under EU law have 
not been a priority in EU-level political debates and on member states’ 
agendas. Her contribution resituates the concerns not so much on ‘misuses’ 
and ‘abuses’ but rather on ensuring that “the system works better for 
people”. An illustrative example is access to health care, which remains a 
highly contested right on the ground. In Lambert’s own words, the priority 
should be for the system to not work against people, including those 
having moved from one member state to another (cross-border cases). Kees 
Groenendijk’s analysis demonstrates that the main focus of recent debates 
on immigration and social benefits has surprisingly not concerned third-
country nationals, but rather EU nationals from other member states 
exercising their freedom to move, i.e. EU citizens. The status and institution 
of citizenship of the Union comes into sharp relief here and is subject to 
reframing strategies by some member state governments. This has 
                                                   
10 On the specific case of the evictions of Roma, see S. Carrera (2013), “Shifting 
Responsibilities for EU Roma Citizens – The 2010 French Affair on Roma Evictions 
and Expulsions Continued”, CEPS Working Paper No. 55, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels.  
11 R. Minder (2013) “Europe’s Reservation on Immigration Growth”, The New York 
Times, 28 May; P. Pinzler (2013), “Arme, junge, kluge Einwanderer”, Die Zeit, 4 
May.  
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particularly been the case concerning the rights of jobseekers and 
unemployed persons from other member states, and those related to the 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria. In his contribution, Groenendijk also 
illuminates that – under Directive 2004/38/EC – the principle of equal 
treatment was extended to social assistance (except for the first three 
months of residence in the host member state) and the possibilities to 
remove EU nationals for being in need of social assistance were limited. 
The scope ratione materiae of the Citizens Directive 2004/38/EC regarding 
social benefits and its relationship with Regulation 883/2004 have been the 
subject of various controversies too, in particular with regard to special 
non-contributory benefits for economically non-active persons, as 
examined by Rob Cornelissen. 
For third-country nationals, the coordination of social security today 
is highly dispersed and characterised by a patchwork of legal regimes. The 
internal dimension of this coordination is determined by Regulation 
1231/2010 that only applies to third-country nationals legally residing in a 
member state and who are in an EU ‘cross-border’ situation.12 The external 
dimension of social security coordination is even more fragmented, as EU 
law provides for different rules for certain third-country nationals (such as 
Turkish nationals and nationals from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, as 
examined by Minderhoud and Wiesbrock in their respective contributions). 
In addition, some member states have also bilaterally concluded 
conventions on social security matters with selected countries of origin 
leading to inconsistent social security coordination, and thus adding to the 
patchwork external approach.13 The Commission, being aware of the need 
to address this fragmentation, issued in 2012 a Communication calling for 
                                                   
12 Regulation (EU) No 1231/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 extending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) 
No 987/2009 to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by these 
Regulations solely on the ground of their nationality. 
13 H. Verschueren (2009), “Social Security Co-ordination in the Agreements 
between the EU and Mediterranean Countries, in particular Turkey and the 
Maghreb Countries”, in D. Pieters and P. Schoukens (eds), The Social Security Co-
Ordination Between the EU and Non-EU Countries, Antwerp: Intersentia, pp. 19-55; 
Prof. Hervig Verschueren highlighted the fragmented legal framework and the 
difficulties it entails at the Seminar on “Labour Migration and Mobility in the 
European Union – Assessing Attractiveness and Labour Market Needs” that was 
jointly organised by CEPS and the EESC on 7 May 2013 at the EESC.  
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better cooperation among the member states and a common EU approach 
to social security coordination with third countries.14 
2.2 The scope of non-citizens’ EU freedoms and rights  
Another point of controversy has been the actual reach of non-citizens’ (all 
five categories of people listed above) freedoms and rights conferred by EU 
law and the lawfulness of member states’ attempts to limit and/or derogate 
those freedoms in their national arenas, in particular in the light of the 2013 
European Year of Citizens.  
The role played by CJEU has been particularly active and substantive 
in interpreting and reviewing such freedoms and rights for EU citizens and 
third-country nationals.15 Anja Wiesbrock’s chapter covers the ways in 
which the main controversies reaching the CJEU have concerned the scope 
of the right to equal treatment or non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality with regards the right to social security benefits in the 
framework of the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
(EMAAs) concluded with inter alia Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. She 
demonstrates the ways in which certain member states, such as Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands, have attempted several times to limit the 
impact and practical application of such Agreements on their domestic 
social security systems.  
The CJEU has played a significant role in these controversies and has 
been a key driver for resolving disputes in this area. Anja Wiesbrock’s 
contribution also demonstrates how the Court’s interventions have been 
                                                   
14 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on the External Dimension of EU Social Security 
Coordination, COM(2012) 153, 30.3.2012; a relevant issue that falls outside the 
scope of this book relates to access to social security for third-country migrant 
workers who find themselves in an irregular situation in the EU. More research is 
needed on this particularly vulnerable group, see K. Kapuy (2009), “European and 
International Law in relation to the Social Security of Irregular Migrant Workers”, 
in D. Pieters and P. Schoukens (eds), The Social Security Co-Ordination Between the 
EU and Non-EU Countries, Antwerp: Intersentia, pp. 115-153. 
15 See for instance Case C-443/11 Jeltes and Others [2013], judgement of 13 April 
2013, not yet reported, in which the CJEU ruled that a wholly unemployed EU 
frontier worker can obtain unemployment benefit only in his member state of 
residence.  
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overall positive when protecting the EU rights of migrant workers. The 
Luxembourg Court has applied what it refers to as “a maximalist 
approach” to enforcement, presenting significant similarities to the 
jurisdictional approach taken in the scope of EU internal market law, such 
as an inclusive notion of ‘worker’. It has equally limited the margin for 
manoeuvre of EU member states to control and limit the access of third-
country nationals to social security systems and to apply additional criteria. 
The extent to which the EMAAs have direct effect has been particularly 
contested here. The role of the CJEU has been also underlined by Rob 
Cornelissen. He states that, for instance, “it was clear from the abundant 
case law of the Court [of Justice], that the question how a benefit was 
classified under national legislation was not decisive”, which in practice 
meant that benefits not falling within the national definition of social 
assistance were still interpreted as falling within the scope of Regulation 
1408/71. 
3. Data and statistics: Evidence-based policy-making? 
One could be inclined to think that data and statistics would be a central 
component in current EU debates on social benefits and migration in the 
Union. That notwithstanding, it is striking to see that quantitative and 
qualitative knowledge on costs of social benefits in the migration fields are 
not available or lacking, and have been largely missing in current debates. 
There is, in fact, very little data and statistics as regards the actual reliance 
on social benefits in the receiving member states by non-citizens and the 
extent to which these people use social benefits in the receiving state. 
Surprisingly, therefore, the widening of alarming discourses on ‘social 
welfare tourism’ has not been accompanied by objective evidence and solid 
statistical data backing up these claims. 
One would assume that the existence of ‘evidence’ would be central 
at the EU level for member states to have well-justified, necessary and 
proportionate restrictions or exceptions to EU-level rights and freedoms. As 
the European Commission Guidelines on the transposition of Directive 
2004/38/EC have clearly outlined, member states’ derogations to EU-
recognised rights and freedoms cannot take place on a purely 
precautionary or preventive basis, or on the basis of “fears” of national 
governments and administrations. Such derogations need to comply with a 
number of specific conditions and criteria.  
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More generally, the following findings emerge from the examination 
conducted in the various chapters as regards the challenges inherent to the 
provision of data and statistics in these discussions. 
First, all the contributions have highlighted that data and national 
statistics on the uses of social assistance are scarce, limited, lacking and not 
easily accessible and comparable in a cross-member state fashion. This 
favours an increasing focus on subjective, non-rational and politicised 
discourses and policy initiatives, particularly by some national 
governments of the EU member states. Perceptions and fears appear to be 
the main framing factors in presenting access to social benefits and social 
welfare tourism as a major policy problem. These fears, however, are not 
corroborated by objective, comparative and high-standard data and 
statistical evidence. This has been confirmed by Corrado Giulietti and 
Martin Kahanec’s chapter, which concludes that “statistical analysis does 
not support the hypothesis that welfare is a strong magnet for immigrants; 
even when such an effect is found, it is relatively weak compared to other 
immigration determinants”. Their analysis concludes that an examination 
of the existing research on the relation between welfare and immigration 
demonstrates that the actual challenge is one of insufficient welfare 
coverage by immigrants and barriers to their inclusion in many EU 
member states. The lack of knowledge therefore leads to irrational debates 
about the linkages between non-citizens and social benefits in the European 
Union. More analysis and data showing the negative repercussions of 
national restrictions and barriers for non-citizens to access the labour 
market of the receiving state should be also conducted. As Rob Cornelissen 
has pointed out, “until now we lack convincing facts and figures showing 
that the current system leads to imposing an unreasonable burden on the 
public finances of Member States with the most generous subsistence 
benefits.”  
Second, there is a largely diversified and heterogeneous picture as 
regards the publicly available data across the different EU member states. 
For example, in the UK data broken down by nationality of people having 
access to social assistance simply do not exist. Each member state presents 
their own methodologies in the gathering, collection and 
interpretation/calculation of the data. This is often linked to their distinct 
national traditions and systems of social security and assistance. The 
examination of existing statistical knowledge included in some of the 
chapters of this book reveals, however, the mismatch between policy 
discourses and actual realities. Kees Groenendijk’s chapter provides some 
detailed statistical figures which demonstrate that “long-term residents 
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having more than five to ten years’ residence in the member states or are 65 
years or older” are those receiving more social assistance in the 
Netherlands and Germany. Madeline Garlick demonstrates that “social 
support for asylum-seekers is extremely low in the EU.”  
Third, the shaping of politics and the production of statistics are too 
often intertwined. Statistics are highly vulnerable to, and sometimes 
dependent on, political interests and weak (and normatively driven) 
methodologies. This is pointed out by Kees Groenendijk, who highlights 
that “the decision not to register the nationality of persons claiming social 
benefits not only has administrative but clearly also political dimensions.” 
Other reasons may well relate to the political choice to ignore the actual 
facts and figures because they could be politically unwelcomed, or could 
perhaps provide additional ammunition to anti-immigration discourses. 
Similarly, Madeline Garlick’s examination underlines that “the 
administrative burden associated with compiling disaggregated data for 
recipients of social benefits and public support [...] may mean that states 
are unable or unprepared to compile disaggregated data on support for 
refugees and holders of subsidiary protection, as distinct from other 
categories of welfare benefits.” The absence of data makes it difficult to 
verify the legitimacy of claims and statements such as those recently 
expressed by the above-mentioned letter by the four ministries of interior 
of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.16 
4. Policy Recommendations 
On the basis of the research findings provided in this book, the following 
policy recommendations are advanced: 
 There is an urgent need for more research and 
quantitative/qualitative knowledge and statistics as regards the 
relationship between migration and social benefits in the European 
Union and the actual financial demands by non-citizens on public 
funds and welfare (reliance on social benefits), as well as their 
contributions to the receiving state. The focus of the research should 
be balanced so that not only the right of non-citizens to have access to 
social benefits is well documented but, more generally, their 
                                                   
16 See letter from the Commissioners Reding, Andor, and Malmström to Mr. Alan 
Shatter, President of the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs, 24 May 
2013. 
140  ELSPETH GUILD, SERGIO CARRERA AND KATHARINA EISELE 
contributions to the receiving societies and economies are equally 
factored in and form part of any comprehensive analysis.  
 The member states’ governments and administrations should 
ensure the production of better statistics, quality of administration 
and better guidance to local and regional authorities at the national 
level. The EU could play a key role in preventing a mismatch 
between the policy discourse and realities by ensuring (and even 
coordinating) a high standard of methodology, the comparability of 
data, and the collection, evaluation and dissemination of the relevant 
information and data. At the same time, is it vital to bear in mind that 
statistics have to be interpreted and put into context with care, as they 
can easily be misused for certain nationalistic political agendas. 
 A more rational and evidence-based debate on human mobility is 
needed, as demonstrated by the current politicised discussions on 
the trends of alleged welfare tourism in the EU. Such a debate 
should be framed on the basis of the applicable terminology that EU 
free movement law foresees, taking into account that the use of 
language may convey strong, subtle messages, especially to a non-
informed audience. The letter on an alleged social welfare tourism 
drafted by Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and the UK constitutes 
a shining example of how terms and fears can be misused for political 
purposes. 
 It is crucial to raise the question of who is responsible for shaping 
the recent debates on ‘social welfare tourism’ in the EU. Why did 
ministers in charge of home affairs, as well as one minister 
responsible for immigration matters, send the letter requesting an 
amendment to EU free movement law, and not the ministers for 
employment-related issues? This proves that the dividing line 
between the free movement regime for EU citizens and immigration 
matters concerning third-country nationals has been blurred and the 
two different legal regimes have wrongfully been intertwined. It also 
demonstrates that an approach and understanding of human 
mobility driven by a ministry of interior tends too often to artificially 
link it with insecurity and illegality, which stands in direct conflict 
with the equality of treatment and non-discrimination embodying the 
status that all nationals of EU member states behold as EU citizens. 
 There is no abuse or illegalities when EU citizens and their family 
members exercise a right to move and to residence under EU law in 
a member state other than that of the EU citizen’s nationality, as 
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they are benefiting from an advantage inherent in the exercise of the 
right of free movement protected by the Treaty and enshrined in the 
status of citizenship of the European Union. This should be stated in 
unequivocal terms and be communicated as a key message to EU 
citizens. Priority should be given, for instance, to ensuring the 
protection of particularly vulnerable human beings (independently of 
their migratory status) and effectively improving immigrants’ labour 
market attachment and inclusion. 
 The current EU rights and freedoms as envisaged in the Citizens’ 
Directive 2004/38/EC should not be restricted and the amendments 
to existing EU legislation should not be proposed if not proven to 
be necessary and proportionate to achieve a public goal backed up 
with objective, accurate and scientifically based data and figures. In 
case of an abuse of rights, Directive 2004/38/EC sets forth sufficient 
legal safeguards as pointed out by the Commission.17 In this 
connection, it is to be welcomed that the Commission has regularly 
emphasised its readiness to enforce EU free movement law in the 
member states, pointing to its “Report under Article 25 TFEU – On 
progress towards effective EU Citizenship 2011-2013.”18  
 A common EU approach on social security coordination for third-
country nationals is highly desirable. Such an approach should be 
primarily focused on remedying the current fragmented legal and 
policy frameworks at the EU and national levels, and thereby 
contribute to strengthening legal certainty. A more coherent 
regulation concerning the access to social benefits is also needed 
under the six EU migration Directives that the EU has adopted since 
2003. The member states should make a stronger commitment to 
social security benefits for third-country nationals in line with the EU 
Charter, including reinforcing the right to equal treatment.19 To 
                                                   
17 See letter from the Commissioners Reding, Andor, and Malmström to Mr. Alan 
Shatter, President of the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs, 24 May 
2013, Ref. Ares(2013) 997663, Annex, p. 4 on the prevention of abuse. 
18 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions under Article 25 TFEU – On progress towards effective 
EU Citizenship 2011-2013, COM(2013) 270, 8.5.2013. 
19 For a detailed analysis on the prohibition of nationality discrimination in social 
security matters in light of the EU’s accession to the ECHR, see F. Pennings (2013), 
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ensure greater reliance on the rights envisaged in EU legal 
frameworks, information and knowledge on social security rights 
should be accessible, transparent and clear, so that such rights can be 
increasingly and effectively invoked before national and European 
courts. 
                                                                                                                                 
“Non-Discrimination on the Ground of Nationality in Social Security: What are the 
Consequences of the Accession of the EU to the ECHR?”, Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 
9, No. 1, pp. 118-134.  
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F ollowing the fi nancial crisis that commenced in 2008, the relationship between migration and social benefi ts has become increasingly contested 
in a number of large EU member states. The Eastern expansion of the EU in 2004 
and 2007 has added a new dimension to the relationship. Concerns have spread 
across a number of member states about the 'costs' and 'fi nancial burdens' 
of migration and intra-EU mobility and there have been calls for restrictions 
of existing EU rights and freedoms in the areas of EU free movement, social 
security coordination, asylum and migration laws.
The collection of essays contained in this book examines the main policy 
controversies that have emerged in the EU regarding linkages between welfare 
and migration. Does migration constitute a disproportionate burden to member 
states’ domestic labour markets and welfare systems ? Should non-citizens 
be entitled to social benefi ts in the state where they live ? Is there objective 
evidence and statistical data indicating abuse of social benefi ts and increasing 
fi nancial burdens by non-citizens, 'social welfare tourism' or the so-called 
'welfare magnet’ hypothesis, whereby migrants are attracted to countries that 
provide more generous welfare?
The book analyses these controversies as they affect different categories of 
non-citizens in the framework of EU law and policy. This is coupled with an 
examination of the uses or misuses of data, information and social science 
knowledge in the debates on the reliance by non-citizens on social benefi ts. 
The book concludes with a set of recommendations addressed to EU policy-
makers.
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